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Abstract 
Since 2015, the management of refugee and migration movements has been 
high on the agenda of the European Union (EU) and its member states. Great 
hopes are being pinned on development policy interventions that offer the 
people who are willing to migrate prospects in their home countries. This 
policy is accompanied by a strong focus on migration statistics. At the same 
time, the local contexts and regional dynamics of partner countries tend to 
be neglected. This is where this study comes in: What social, political, and 
economic processes do the EU’s external migration policies encounter in 
African states? Which possibilities for cooperation are realistic? 
This study focusses on several countries that are governed in an authori-
tarian manner, albeit with strong variance in the degrees of authoritarian-
ism: Egypt; the Maghreb states Algeria and Morocco; the Sahel state of Niger; 
as well as Sudan and Eritrea, which are linked together in a “migration com-
plex” at the Horn of Africa. The study analyses migration cooperation in 
countries with different degrees of proximity and interaction with Europe 
and examines whether – and to what extent – authoritarian rulers, in 
particular, benefit from this cooperation. 
The analysis shows that the impact of external EU migration policies 
varies according to the political, economic, and social contexts in partner 
countries. The respective degree of centralisation, assertiveness, creative 
drive, and regional ambitions of the regimes are decisive in determining 
whether European offers are perceived as a welcome influx of project funds 
or as an opportunity to pursue overarching political goals – or neither of 
the two. The interests in maintaining power and the legitimacy strategies 
of the elites play decisive roles in responding to offers of cooperation in all 
countries examined. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Profiteers of Migration? 
Authoritarian States in Africa and 
European Migration Management 
Since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, the handling 
of refugee and migration movements has been high on 
the agenda of the EU and its member states. Urgently 
needed reforms of the Common European Asylum 
System and European migration policies are proving 
difficult because many EU member states rely exclu-
sively on restrictions for domestic reasons. The exter-
nal dimensions of EU migration policies are becoming 
increasingly important in light of the difficulties of 
achieving internal change. Alongside the strengthen-
ing of the EU’s external borders, this is the lowest 
common denominator among the member states: 
Under the banner of “combating the root causes of 
migration”, cooperation with countries of origin and 
transit countries is being promoted in order to stop 
migration movements, even before the EU’s external 
borders. Great hopes are being pinned on develop-
ment policy interventions that offer the people will-
ing to migrate prospects in their home countries, 
and thus discourage them from leaving or continuing 
their journeys. The consequences are a steadily 
growing number of cooperation formats and project 
funds related to migration as well as an increased 
focus by the EU on the African continent. 
A reduction in irregular entries into the EU is the 
declared aim of this policy, which is accompanied 
by a focus on migration statistics. However, the local 
contexts and regional dynamics of the partner coun-
tries are being neglected. This is where this study 
comes in: What social, political, and economic pro-
cesses do the EU’s external migration policies en-
counter in African countries, and which possibilities 
for cooperation are realistic? After an initial contribu-
tion, which provides an overview of the EU’s coopera-
tion instruments on migration policies, it is a ques-
tion of analysing the “cornucopia” of corresponding 
European projects pouring across African states. 
Which dynamics are triggered, reinforced, or changed 
in partner countries? The analysis focusses on a 
number of countries that belong to the spectrum of 
authoritarian regimes: Egypt; the Maghreb states 
Algeria and Morocco; the Sahel state of Niger; as well 
as Sudan and Eritrea, which are linked together in a 
Issues and Recommendations 
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“migration complex” in the Horn of Africa. The focus 
on the realities of migration movements and the as-
sociated interests and strategies of important partner 
countries enables a change of perspective in the cur-
rent debate. It allows a nuanced presentation of the 
resonating effects generated by migration policy 
cooperation in countries with close ties to Europe. It 
clarifies existing patterns of cooperation and enables 
a discussion of whether – and to what extent – 
authoritarian rulers benefit from this cooperation. 
As the country case studies show, intentions and 
outcomes often diverge. Although the impacts of 
external EU migration policies on concrete migration 
dynamics are difficult to measure, a look at the Afri-
can partner countries shows that the elites there often 
know how to use European offers to their own ad-
vantage. But can they be described as “migration 
profiteers”? A closer look shows that differentiation 
is necessary: Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, 
is using the high priority that the EU attaches to 
migration policy cooperation with third countries to 
consolidate his power. The Sudanese regime, on the 
other hand, faces a multitude of cooperation options, 
whose importance and priorities have not been 
clearly identified by the EU and, moreover, do not 
meet Khartoum’s expectations. The government of 
Niger hopes that cooperation will improve relations 
with the EU and individual member states. However, 
at the same time, Niger must deal with problematic 
consequences in its own country if, for example, the 
transport of irregular migrants as a source of income 
is halted and local conflicts become a threat. The 
Moroccan government has its own design ambitions 
on migration policy and is acting strategically. It is 
therefore placing the EU’s migration policy offers at 
the service of its own modernisation agenda. The 
neighbouring country of Algeria, on the other hand, 
has so far largely avoided cooperation, so there are 
no potential “migration profits”. However, there are 
signs of a cautious opening towards more coopera-
tion. The Eritrean regime, on the other hand, remains 
categorically opposed to partnership-based coopera-
tion. 
This brief overview shows that the impacts of the 
EU’s external migration policies vary according to 
the internal conditions of the partner countries. The 
degrees of centralisation as well as the assertiveness 
and willingness to shape the regional ambitions of 
the regimes are decisive factors in determining 
whether European proposals are perceived primarily 
as a welcome influx of project funds or as an oppor-
tunity to pursue overarching political goals. Countries 
such as Morocco and Egypt, which have many years 
of experience with EU cooperation, know how to 
make much better use of their negotiating powers 
and act more strategically vis-à-vis the EU than “co-
operation newcomers” such as Niger. Notably how-
ever, the degrees of authoritarianism and its mani-
festation, which varying across the states analysed, 
do not correlate significantly with the respective wil-
lingness to cooperate with the EU. 
However, interests in the preservation of power 
and legitimation strategies play a formative role in 
the responses to offers of European cooperation in 
all countries examined in this study. A precise under-
standing of the specific interests that are linked to 
migration and flight in the individual states is re-
quired by German and European decision-makers in 
order to avoid contradictions between the migration 
policy agendas and longer-term development policy 
objectives, thereby avoiding any potential for domes-
tic political conflicts in partner countries (“do no 
harm” principle). A deeper understanding of local 
contexts also reveals that the willingness to cooperate 
is not necessarily tied to a desire for more financial 
support but linked to strategic interests, such as the 
lifting of sanctions or the normalisation of relations 
and international recognition. 
Equally central to successful “migration manage-
ment” is knowledge of the respective migration move-
ments in transnational migration complexes, whether 
circular, regional, or to Europe. European approaches 
should build on these growing regional dynamics. 
After all, regional freedom of movement, in particu-
lar, has promoted the economic development of Afri-
can states. It is therefore counterproductive to jeop-
ardise progress in this area by focussing on restrictive 
border management. Rather, it is necessary to work 
out how intra-African circular migration can be pre-
served despite intensified border management. 
In addition to the local economies that are devel-
oping in connection with migration, the remittances 
of migrants are of great importance. For the families 
who remain in their home countries, this money 
often represents important social security. The vol-
ume of these financial flows has an impact on the 
scope for negotiations in migration policy coopera-
tion. For example, states for which remittances from 
Europe are an important economic factor have a 
greater interest in enhancing the possibilities of legal 
migration than states whose citizens primarily send 
money home from the Gulf States. 
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Financial means or surveillance technologies, 
which are actually intended to build border manage-
ment and other migration-regulating capacities, can 
be misused for repressive purposes by partner coun-
tries. This circumstance must also be taken into 
account – and avoided. Special attention is required 
here because the authoritarian elites examined in this 
study have long understood that the willingness to 
cooperate on migration policy alleviates the pressure 
exerted by the EU on issues concerning political trans-
formation. Therefore, it makes sense to replace the 
ambitious – but de facto ineffective – transforma-
tion agenda with clear red lines in the area of human 
rights, and to adhere to these consistently. This means 
that European actors must set clear priorities, avoid 
misunderstandings about their priorities (develop-
ment, security, or both?), and generate realistic time-
lines. To avoid raising false expectations – particularly 
in view of the EU-Turkey agreement, which has also 
generated commotion in several of the countries 
examined in this study – Europe must in each case 
communicate more clearly than it has to date about 
which forms of cooperation on migration policy are 
possible, and which are not. 
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The external migration policy of the European Union 
(EU) has become more complex since the early 2000s: 
There are now a large number of different instru-
ments and agreements, and the areas of responsibility 
and competences of foreign, security, development, 
and economic policy actors are sometimes hard to dis-
entangle. The policy area is therefore very complex. 
It is the stated goal of the European Commission to 
implement a comprehensive approach – particularly 
with regards to cooperation with relevant African 
partner countries. However, this attempt has in the 
past been characterised by diverging priorities and 
interests within the EU. 
In the course of the long-standing, but profoundly 
increased, irregular migration of migrants and refu-
gees via the Mediterranean in 2015, the issue of 
migration management has moved to the top of the 
European agenda. This has intensified the pre-existing 
tendency towards the externalisation of migration 
control and restriction.1 On the other hand, three fur-
ther trends can be identified since 2015: (1) a regional 
shift in migration cooperation from the direct Euro-
pean Neighbourhood area to more distant countries 
of origin and transit, with a focus on the countries 
neighbouring Syria and the African continent in 
particular; (2) an increasing instrumentalisation of 
EU development aid for migration policy purposes; 
 
1 Luiza Bialasiewicz, “Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the 
Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border Work in the Medi-
terranean”, Geopolitics 17, no. 4 (2012): 843–66; Rens van 
Munster and Steven Sterkx, “Governing Mobility: The Ex-
ternalization of European Migration Policy and the Bounda-
ries of the European Union”, in European Research Reloaded: 
Cooperation and Integration among Europeanized States, ed. Ron-
ald Holzhacker and Markus Haverland (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2006), 229–50. 
(3) a gradual re-nationalisation of European devel-
opment policy, for example through new migration 
funding instruments that have been established 
outside the Community method. The result is that 
funds are allocated more often to the member states’ 
national implementing organisations. 
The EU’s migration cooperation 
instruments2 
For a long time, EU member states’ cooperation on 
migration policies with third countries was predomi-
nantly bilateral. Since 2005, the EU has gradually 
developed a policy framework to serve as a basis for 
balanced and partnership-orientated external asylum 
and migration policies. This Global Approach to 
Migration (GAM) was revised in 2012 under the name 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). 
The latter is made up of four officially equivalent 
objectives: (1) better organising of legal migration and 
fostering well-managed mobility; (2) preventing and 
combating irregular migration and eradicating traf-
ficking in human beings; (3) maximising the develop-
ment impacts of migration and mobility; and (4) pro-
moting international protection. In response to the 
increasing number of deaths due to migrants and 
refugees attempting to reach Europe via the Mediter-
ranean, the European Commission published the 
European Agenda on Migration in May 2015. This 
was before mixed migration movements to Europe 
increased sharply in the following months.3 Even 
 
2 See the overview on p. 11. 
3 On the phenomenon of mixed migration, see Steffen 
Angenendt, David Kipp, and Amrei Meier, Mixed Migration. 
David Kipp and Anne Koch 
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though the long-term objectives of GAMM are adopted 
on paper, the primary focus is de facto on the short-
term reduction of irregular migration. This reflects 
an understanding of migration as being primarily a 
problem, not an opportunity. Thus, the goal of im-
proved border and migration management in impor-
tant countries of transit and origin is becoming just 
as important as the protection of the EU’s external 
borders. This is demonstrated by the efforts to inten-
sify regional dialogues on migration management 
as well as the expansion of the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). 
Political and legal partnership 
agreements 
The decision of the European Agenda on Migration 
was swiftly followed by the creation of a new instru-
ment, the so-called Migration Partnership Framework. 
In June 2016, five major African countries of origin 
and transit – Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Sene-
gal – signed documents to this effect. It is striking 
that the list of objectives (to save lives in the Mediter-
ranean sea and break the business model of smug-
glers; to increase the rate of returns to countries of 
origin and transit; and to stem irregular flows)4 only 
vaguely refers to the need to offer legal migration 
channels. Instead of proposing more concrete steps, 
the European Commission just mentions the need for 
increased resettlement efforts and possibly piloting 
legal migration. 
Partner countries are motivated to 
cooperate through financial 
incentives, as there are no prospects 
for legal migration routes. 
This marks a change of direction. GAMM stresses 
the idea of legal migration opportunities as an incen-
tive for cooperating with third countries. Offers in the 
 
Challenges and Options for the Ongoing Project of German and Euro-
pean Asylum and Migration Policy (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stif-
tung, 2017). 
4 European Commission, Establishing a New Partnership 
Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on 
Migration, COM (2016) 385, 7 June 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/ 
european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160607/communication_external_aspects_ 
eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf (accessed 
10 October 2017). 
area of legal migration were intended to motivate 
the partner countries to restrict irregular emigration 
from their own territories and to take back irregular 
migrants through Mobility Partnerships, if these were 
countries in the European Neighbourhood, or Com-
mon Agendas on Migration and Mobility (CAMMs) in 
the case of more distant countries. Mobility Partner-
ships and CAMMs contain mutual objectives as well 
as offers for support from the EU for the cooperating 
countries. Mobility Partnerships have legally binding 
elements, since they foresee negotiations on visa lib-
eralisation and readmission agreements. Nine Mobility 
Partnerships have been established so far, three of 
them with African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Cape Verde). However, Cape Verde is the only African 
country that concluded a visa liberalisation and re-
admission agreement. CAMMs have even shown 
fewer results and so far only been agreed with India, 
Ethiopia, and Nigeria. 
The limited success can be explained by the fact 
that the European Commission does not have the 
competency to effectively promote legal migration. 
Visa liberalisation merely amounts to a simplification 
of procedures; for the partner countries, this is not a 
sufficient incentive to commit to readmission agree-
ments, which are often highly controversial in do-
mestic policy terms (see the contribution on Morocco 
and Algeria, p. 22ff.). More substantial incentives, 
for example additional legal migration routes, would 
require the initiative and willingness of individual 
EU member states – and that is what is lacking. 
Even though the European Commission has fol-
lowed up on the idea to establish pilot projects for 
migrants seeking work from partner countries,5 it is 
increasingly offering partner countries other incen-
tives for cooperation on migration policies. The new 
Migration Partnership Framework, introduced in 
2016, is seeking to combine different policy elements 
within EU competence areas (Neighbourhood Policy, 
development aid, trade, mobility, energy, security, 
digital policy). The main financial assistance for this 
instrument has come from the EU Emergency Trust 
Fund (EUTF) for Africa, which was set up in November 
2015 and now amounts to a budget of €3.4 billion. In 
 
5 European Commission, Communication on the Delivery of the 
European Agenda on Migration, COM (2017) 558, 27 September 
2017, 22, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/ 
files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170 
927_communication_on_the_delivery_of_the_eam_en.pdf 
(accessed 26 October 2017). 
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addition, the European Commission plans to use 
funds from the European External Investment Plan, 
newly established in 2017, for this purpose.1 With a 
contribution of €4.1 billion from the European Com-
mission, the External Investment Plan is expected 
to leverage more than €44 billion in investments by 
2020. The dimensions of the planned – but not yet 
secured – financial support for the partner countries 
confirm that the European Commission is increasing-
ly replacing the previously promised, but unfulfilled, 
prospects of legal migration routes with financial 
incentives in its external migration policy. 
Regional dialogues 
In addition to agreements with individual partner 
countries, the EU also participated in regional dia-
logues for discussions on – and harmonisation of – 
migration policy approaches. The oldest dialogue is 
the Budapest Process, which was initiated in 1993 as 
part of the Eastern enlargement of the EU and has 
developed into a European-Asian forum with 52 
member states. Building on this experience, further 
regional dialogues followed within the framework 
of GAMM. Although there are attempts to have dia-
logues with all regions relevant to migration policy,2 
a focus on the African continent can now be observed. 
The Rabat Process was established in 2006 and brings 
together 57 countries along the West and Central 
African migration routes.3 For the Horn of Africa, the 
Khartoum Process was launched in 2014 to intensify 
cooperation on migration management and to com-
bat human trafficking.4 
 
1 European Commission, EU External Investment Plan. Fact 
Sheet, 7 December 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/ 
devco/files/factsheet-eip-20171120_en.pdf (accessed 31 Janu-
ary 2018). 
2 European Commission, Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility, last update 20 March 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-
approach-to-migration_en (accessed 20 March 2018). 
3 International Organization for Migration (IOM), Euro-
African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process), 
https://www.iom.int/euro-african-dialogue-migration-and-
development-rabat-process (accessed 10 October 2017). 
4 Abdirahman Olow, Readmission, Global Compact Thematic 
Paper (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 
o.D.), https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/ 
GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Readmission.pdf (accessed 9 May 
2017); IOM, EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khar-
Both regional dialogues bring together a number 
of countries along important migration routes to 
Europe. However, there are different regional con-
ditions for cooperation. In the Rabat Process, the EU 
cooperates with the Economic Community of West 
African States, whose citizens enjoy free movement 
between member states. Even though the dialogue 
has been ongoing for more than a decade, it has hardly 
achieved any concrete results. The more recently 
established Khartoum Process is driven mainly by a 
security approach to the challenges of migration.5 
This can partly also be observed in the EUTF-funded 
projects in the Horn of Africa. The Better Migration 
Management programme, implemented by the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammen-
arbeit (GIZ), is intended to strengthen the rights of 
refugees and migrants and protect them from vio-
lence, exploitation, and ill-treatment. At least in-
directly, however, the measures also aim at reducing 
irregular migration by building more capacity in 
the security sector (see the contribution on Sudan, 
p. 44ff.). This notion is even more obvious in the 
planned Regional Operational Centre in Support of 
the Khartoum Process and AU-Horn of Africa Initia-
tive, which is promoting the exchange of information 
between security institutions. 
Developments in EU border protection 
Although a policy area in its own right, the protection 
of the EU’s external borders is closely linked to the 
EU’s external migration policy. It is obvious that effec-
tive border protection is a requisite for controlling 
migration. Although there is little consensus between 
the EU member states on how to deal with migration, 
particularly in a crisis situation like the one in 2015, 
investments in border protection are often the lowest 
common denominator that everyone can agree on. 
 
toum Process), https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-
route-initiative-khartoum-process (accessed 10 October 2017). 
5 Even before the founding of the Khartoum Process in 
2014, the “Horn of Africa” initiative of the African Union 
(AU) had a regional dialogue on migration issues. Its primary 
rights-based orientation is now overshadowed by the more 
security-oriented perspective of the Khartoum Process. See 
Tuesday Reitano, The Khartoum Process. A Sustainable Response 
to Human Smuggling and Trafficking?, ISS Policy Brief, no. 93 
(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies [ISS], November 2016), 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief 
93.pdf (accessed 10 October 2017). 
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Frontex, founded in 2004, supports the member 
states in the operational control of the EU’s external 
borders and in the repatriation of irregular migrants 
and rejected asylum seekers. Marine operations in the 
Mediterranean, whose focus has shifted over the years 
from the western to the eastern and central Mediter-
ranean, are some of the most well-known operations 
in this regard. In response to the European “refugee 
crisis” of 2015, Frontex was reformed in October 2016 
and equipped with additional competences and re-
sources, but its operational work continues to depend 
on cooperation from the EU member states. Frontex 
activities also go beyond the EU, since Frontex liaison 
officers are deployed to third countries or – vice 
versa – border officers of third countries participate 
in Frontex operations.6 
The barriers for the EU to cooperate 
with authoritarian and fragile states 
on migration have lowered. 
In addition, the EU established operational activi-
ties to improve its external border management and 
security cooperation with transit countries, for ex-
ample within the framework of the EU-Turkey agree-
ment and through support for the G5 Sahel Joint 
Force for cross-border, anti-terrorist operations in the 
Sahel zone. The European Union Naval Force Mediter-
ranean operation, also known as Operation Sophia, 
which has been active since spring 2015, is mainly 
intended to combat smuggling routes on the central 
Mediterranean route and, since September 2016, to 
train the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy. These security 
policy operations show that the barriers for the EU 
and its member states to cooperate with authoritarian 
and fragile states in the course of migration control 
have lowered in recent years. 
In 2015, the European Agenda on Migration suc-
cessively replaced GAMM and made – with the sup-
port of member states – the restriction of migration 
the main priority. As a consequence, a multitude of 
 
6 With the countries examined in this publication, the 
following cooperations are ongoing or planned: From 2014 
to 2016, Frontex has been piloting the concept of integrated 
border management in Morocco. The agency is also in nego-
tiations with Niger, Morocco, and Egypt on formalised 
“working arrangements”. In the context of the Africa-Frontex 
Intelligence Community, Frontex works together with all six 
countries surveyed here. See http://www.statewatch.org/ 
news/2017/jul/eu-com-frontex-coop-third-states-letter-28-11-
16.pdf (accessed 15 December 2017). 
instruments and cooperation possibilities have 
emerged, but their respective status is often not 
clearly communicated to partner countries, which 
makes cooperation difficult and hinders a com-
prehensive approach. 
Central actors and their interests 
The EU’s engagement in external migration policy has 
steadily developed over the past decade. This has been 
characterised by complex relationships between EU 
institutions, member states, international organisa-
tions, and implementing organisations, which often 
pursue contradictory objectives. The EU institutions 
try to exert influence by establishing the political 
framework and different funding instruments. The 
actual dialogue with third countries is often charac-
terised by an informal division of labour: EU member 
states that have historical ties with certain partner 
countries will become particularly active there. Mem-
ber states also try to influence the implementation 
of the new instruments by giving priority to national 
implementing organisations instead of international 
organisations, which were traditionally commissioned 
to implement migration-related projects in third 
countries. 
EU institutions: Struggle for coherence 
Legally and politically, the European Commission 
has instruments with limited reach at its disposal. 
It therefore seeks to assert its role through various 
financing instruments.7 From 2015 to 2017 alone, the 
funds available under the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund as well as the fund going to relevant 
EU agencies increased by 75 per cent.8 In addition to 
this, new financial instruments such as the EUTF for 
Africa have been developed for the external dimen-
sion. These instruments are a departure from the pre-
 
7 Leonhard den Hertog, Money Talks. Mapping the Funding 
for EU External Migration Policy, (Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies [CEPS], 15 November 2016), https://www.ceps. 
eu/publications/money-talks-mapping-funding-eu-external-
migration-policy (accessed 19 March 2018). 
8 European Commission, Communication on the Delivery of the 
European Agenda on Migration, Brussels, 27 September 2017, 
COM(2017) 558 final, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/ 
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20170927_communication_on_the_delivery_of_ 
the_eam_en.pdf (accessed 5 February 2018). 
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viously prominent transformation agenda and its 
focus on democracy and the rule of law, particularly 
with regard to the North African states. A prime 
example is the (migration) cooperation with Egypt 
(see the contribution on Egypt, p. 56ff.). 
Within the European Commission, the Directorate-
Generals for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), 
Neighbourhood and Enlargement (DG NEAR), and 
International Cooperation and Development (DG 
DEVCO) are central to the development of Commu-
nity migration policy. DG HOME has succeeded in 
gradually appropriating the external dimension of 
migration policy beyond its actual field of internal 
affairs and – with the help of the migration policy 
frameworks GAMM and the European Agenda on 
Migration – in shaping the strategic orientation of 
the cooperation with third countries.9 However, DG 
HOME had only limited financial resources available 
for a long time. Only under the current multiannual 
EU financial framework (2014–2020) was DG HOME 
– for the first time – not able to both finance migra-
tion policy projects inside and outside the EU.10 The 
majority of the funds for migration policy coopera-
tion with third countries, however, continue to come 
from DG NEAR and DG DEVCO, which have thus been 
able to design and implement the policy frameworks 
according to their own priorities – but at the price of 
incoherent objectives and the resulting low levels 
of effectiveness.11 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) has 
also gained importance in external migration policy. 
Its task is to coordinate the dialogues with third coun-
tries, for example in the case of the Migration Part-
nership Framework, and to act as a link to the initia-
tives of the member states. By sending migration 
attachés to the EU delegations, the EEAS will monitor 
the implementation of the respective partnerships 
more closely in the future. At the same time, the EEAS 
is responsible for security aspects of the external 
 
9 Sergio Carrera, Raluca Radescu and Natasja Reslow, 
EU External Migration Policies. A Preliminary Mapping of the Instru-
ments, the Actors and Their Priorities. Report prepared for the 
FP7 project “Transnational Migration in Transition: Trans-
formative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People” 
(EURA-NET), deliverable 3.1, o. D. [2015], 46. 
10 Den Hertog, Money Talks (see note 7), 15f. 
11 Europäischer Rechnungshof, EU-Ausgaben im Bereich 
externe Migration in Ländern des südlichen Mittelmeerraums und der 
östlichen Nachbarschaft bis 2014 (Luxembourg, 2016), http:// 
www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_09/SR_ 
MIGRATION_DE.pdf (accessed 19 March 2018). 
migration agenda within the framework of the Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy. This concerns, for 
example, the EU missions to build capacity for the 
fight against smuggling organisations in Niger (see 
the contribution on Niger, p. 34ff.) and Operation 
Sophia. 
The EUTF for Africa gives the EU more 
flexibility to respond to dynamic 
developments on migration routes. 
In the context of the “refugee crisis”, the EU felt 
pressured to strike new agreements with important 
countries of origin and transit to reduce irregular 
migration. The European Commission reacted with 
new financing instruments that made funding more 
flexible. The EUTF for Africa gives the EU institutions 
more means to respond to dynamic developments on 
migration routes; 63 per cent of EUTF funds go to de-
velopment projects, 22 per cent to projects focussing 
on migration management, and 14 per cent to secu-
rity and peace-building measures.12 Since the fund is 
an emergency mechanism outside the regular EU 
budget, it also undermines the strict EU procurement 
procedures. 
The European Commission was able to give €3 bil-
lion to the EUTF by March 2018, which corresponds to 
a financing share of 88 per cent. This money has been 
taken from different funds: €2.3 billion comes from 
the European Development Fund, which is managed 
by DG DEVCO and is not part of the regular budget.13 
All other funds are taken from the regular budget: 
€313 million from the Development Cooperation 
Instrument, also managed by DEVCO; €226 million 
 
12 Elise Kervyn and Raphael Shilhav, An Emergency for 
Whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – Migratory Routes 
and Development Aid in Africa, Oxfam Briefing Note (Oxford: 
Oxfam, November 2017), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www. 
oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp-emergency-for-whom-eutf-africa-
migration-151117-en.pdf (accessed 16 November 2017). 
13 The European Development Fund (EDF), the financial 
instrument of the Cotonou Agreement, supports activities in 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Adopted 
intergovernmentally so far, the fund is largely managed by 
the Commission. The integration of the EDF into the regular 
budget has already been discussed several times in the past. 
How the EDF will be established after 2020 will depend on 
the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 
and on Brexit. In addition, the Cotonou Agreement expires 
in 2020 and will be renegotiated between the EU and ACP 
countries from September 2018. 
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from DG NEAR; €77 million from DG HOME; and €50 
million from the Directorate-General for Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO).14 
Bringing together the various EU financial instru-
ments has the advantage that the coherence of EU 
policy as a whole can be strengthened. The European 
Parliament, however, criticises that the new external 
migration policy instruments and agreements are 
largely beyond its control and too strongly dominated 
by the self-interests of the member states.15 
EU member states focus on self-interest 
Since 2015, external EU migration policy has increas-
ingly been lifted to the top of the political agenda. 
It has been shaped by the four largest16 EU member 
states (following “Brexit”): Germany, France, Italy, 
and Spain. These four states have special historical 
relations with various partner countries, which are 
relevant as countries of origin and transit. The 
Spanish-Moroccan cooperation is regarded by many as 
an important model (see the contribution on Morocco 
and Algeria, p. 22ff.).17 France and Italy are mainly 
active in those countries that emerged from their 
former colonial territories. Since 2015, Germany has 
also been increasingly involved bilaterally, for exam-
ple in Niger, Sudan, Eritrea, and Egypt (see the con-
tributions on Niger (p. 34ff.), Sudan and Eritrea 
(p. 44ff.), and Egypt (p. 56ff.). Other member states 
confine themselves to supporting measures strength-
ening the EU’s external borders. This applies, for 
example, to Eastern European countries. 
 
14 EU Contributions Pledged, ed. European Commission 
(March 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/ 
euetfa/files/eu_contributions_pledged_1.pdf (accessed 
19 March 2018). 
15 See European Parlament, Bewältigung von Flüchtlings- und 
Migrantenströmen: Die Rolle des auswärtigen Handelns der EU, 
Entschließung vom 5 April 2017, Punkt 70, http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+ 
REPORT+A8-2017-0045+0+DOC+XML+V0//DE (accessed 
10 October 2017). 
16 Measured by population size and gross domestic 
product in 2016. 
17 Sergio Carrera, Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Nora El Qadim, 
Mehdi Lahlou, and Leonhard den Hertog, EU-Morocco Coopera-
tion on Readmission, Borders and Protection. A Model to Follow?, 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, 87 (Brussels: 
CEPS, January 2016), https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU-
Morocco%20Cooperation%20Liberty%20and%20Security% 
20in%20Europe.pdf (accessed 19 March 2018). 
While member states are steering 42 per cent of 
EUTF for Africa towards projects implemented by 
national implementing organisations,18 they show 
less willingness to support the EUTF with additional 
funds: According to the European Commission, they 
only finance 12 per cent of EUTF funds.19 Critics see 
this as part of a trend – that EU development policy 
is becoming re-nationalised.20 Member states, on the 
contrary, are wary of the expansion of the European 
Commission’s competences through the EUTF, be-
cause it undermines their rights under the committee 
procedure.21 
The informal division of labour 
between the European Commission 
and member states contributes to the 
dynamics of external migration policy. 
The dynamic development of external migration 
policy is nevertheless also the result of individual 
initiatives by the member states. In addition to Ger-
many’s important role in the conclusion of the EU-
Turkey agreement,22 this is illustrated by the agree-
ments reached by Italy with the Libyan Government 
of National Accord. The Memorandum of Understand-
ing of February 2017 explicitly refers to Italy’s pre-
vious agreement with the Gaddafi regime of 2008 and 
is thus an example of the informal division of labour 
between EU member states and the European Com-
mission, as the EU supports the bilateral initiative 
 
18 2017 Annual Report. EU Trust Fund for Africa, ed. European 
Commission (March 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund 
forafrica/sites/euetfa/files/2017_tffa_en_web_lowres_final 
05.pdf (accessed 20 March 2018). 
19 The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: EU MS and Other 
Donors Contributions (Pledges and Received Contributions), ed. Euro-
pean Commission (19 March 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/donor_2.pdf (accessed 
19 March 2018). 
20 Den Hertog, Money Talks (see note 7). 
21 The comitology procedure foresees a right for member 
states to control the adoption of implementing acts by the 
European Commission in accordance with Article 291 TFEU. 
EUR-Lex, Komitologie (Ausschusswesen), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
summary/glossary/comitology.html?locale=de (accessed 
1 February 2018). 
22 Robin Alexander, Manuel Bewarder, Christoph Schlitz 
et al., “Flüchtlingskrise: Wie Merkel und Erdogan die EU 
überrumpelten”, Die Welt (online), 13 March 2016, https:// 
www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article153234567/Wie-
Merkel-und-Erdogan-den-Tuerkei-Deal-einfaedelten.html 
(accessed 13 November 2017). 
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with accompanying measures.23 The migration sum-
mit in Paris in August 2017 – at which the heads of 
state and government of Germany, France, Italy, and 
Spain met with representatives from Libya, Chad, 
and Niger – suggests that the four largest EU mem-
ber states will step up their coordination efforts to in-
crease the number of migration partnership agree-
ments with important countries of origin and transit. 
Competition between national 
implementing organisations and 
international organisations 
International organisations also play a role in the 
EU’s external migration policies. When it comes to 
the humanitarian care and registration of refugees, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
is the most important partner. The International 
Organization for Migration offers a wide range of 
services: information campaigns, programmes to sup-
port returnees, and advice to partner countries on the 
drafting of migration-related legislation. It also acts 
as a secretariat for many regional dialogue processes 
in which the EU participates. The lesser-known Inter-
national Centre for Migration Policy Development, 
which has played a decisive role in the Europeanisa-
tion of the policy field of migration since the 1990s,24 
fulfils some similar functions; it currently manages 
the funds for DG HOME to enable partner countries 
to implement Mobility Partnerships and CAMMs 
(Mobility Partnership Facility).25 Under the EUTF for 
Africa, however, national implementing organisa-
tions are given preference, and international orga-
nisations are only commissioned with about 30 per 
cent of projects. Instead of using formal procurement 
procedures, member states can have their project 
proposals drawn up directly by their implementation 
organisations in consultation with the European 
Commission. However, international organisations 
still have the advantage that they can become active 
more quickly and more easily in countries that are 
 
23 Daniel Howden, The Central Mediterranean: European 
Priorities, Libyan Realities (October 2017), http://issues. news-
deeply.com/central-mediterranean-european-priorities-
libyan-realities?utm_source=rd-banner (accessed 5 October 
2017). 
24 Sabine Hess, “‘We Are Facilitating States!’ An Ethno-
graphic Analysis of the ICMPD”, in The Politics of International 
Migration Management, ed. Martin Geiger (Basingstoke et al.: 
Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2010), 96–118. 
25 Den Hertog, Money Talks (see note 7), 17. 
considered politically sensitive due to violent conflicts 
or human rights violations. This results in regional 
differences in the allocation of funds: For example, 
the EU makes much more use of the expertise of UN 
organisations in the North Africa and Horn of Africa 
regional windows than in the Sahel regional window. 
The relevance of civil society organisations for the 
implementation of the EU’s external migration policy 
is also decreasing under the new instruments – only 
22 per cent of the EUTF funds allocated so far have 
gone to NGOs. This development supports the thesis 
concerning the re-nationalisation of this policy area. 
Most EUTF funding goes to national implementing 
organisations in France, Germany, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. Three French implementing organi-
sations are mainly active in the Sahel region and to-
gether receive 13 per cent of the EUTF funds disbursed 
to date; the GIZ is increasingly involved in the Horn 
of Africa and North Africa and receives about 10 per 
cent (see the contribution on Sudan and Eritrea, 
p. 44ff.). 
Strategies of external EU migration policy 
The fragmented nature of the EU’s external migration 
policy is, as has been shown, the product of complex 
negotiation processes between a large number of 
actors. Is it at all possible for the EU to take strategic 
action in this policy area? If so, to what extent? Three 
strategic elements can be identified: (1) Shifting the 
focus towards activities on the African continent is 
linked to the narrative of “reducing the root causes of 
forced displacement”; (2) subordinating development 
cooperation to migration policy; (3) further informal-
ising external EU migration policy by developing 
migration policy instruments outside the Community 
method. 
Root cause narrative 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, external EU migra-
tion policy focussed on the Eastern European Neigh-
bourhood. European interests in the area of migra-
tion policy were often discussed in the context of 
ongoing or planned EU accession negotiations. This 
arrangement strengthened the EU position and en-
abled the conclusion of legally binding readmission 
agreements with many Eastern European countries. 
In the course of the growing mixed migration move-
ments via the Mediterranean and the associated 
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deaths, the tenor changed: Since the Valletta Summit 
of European and African heads of government in 
autumn 2015, the aim of “reducing the causes of 
forced displacement” became the new narrative. The 
EUTF for Africa brings together many different proj-
ects under this umbrella term, which also has an 
important discursive effect: It suggests that the “evil” 
of unregulated cross-border migration movements 
can be tackled at its roots. In practice, however, there 
is often a lack of distinction between structural and 
acute causes of forced displacement; voluntary and 
involuntary migration; and primary and secondary 
migration movements.26 
Together with the European governments’ focus on 
reducing the number of migrants coming to the EU, 
this conceptual uncertainty is leading to an increas-
ing (mis-)use of funds from development cooperation. 
This is dangerous: The opportunities for development 
cooperation to reduce migration movements are bur-
dened with huge expectations; longer-term structural 
measures are replaced with short-term measures to 
prevent migration. The principles of both humani-
tarian aid and development cooperation are watered 
down. The barriers to cooperating with authoritarian 
regimes have noticeably lowered. Taken together, all 
these factors are giving rise to the fear that the meas-
ures initiated under the umbrella term of reducing 
the “root causes” are just about combating the symp-
toms – the irregular migration to Europe. 
Migration as a new conditionality of the 
EU’s development cooperation 
The subordination of development policy objectives 
to the maxim of reducing “root causes” is accompa-
nied by a conditionalisation of migration-related 
development cooperation. The key issues here are 
new readmission agreements and improved migration 
and border management. On the one hand, there is 
direct conditionalisation. The “more for more” prin-
ciple was already pursued with the EU Mobility Part-
nerships: The cooperative behaviour of partner coun-
tries concerning the readmission of rejected asylum 
seekers or irregular migrants was supposed to be re-
warded with visa liberalisation and the opening of 
 
26 Steffen Angenendt and Anne Koch, “Fluchtursachen-
bekämpfung: Ein entwicklungspolitisches Mantra ohne 
Inhalt?”, in Ausblick 2016: Begriffe und Realitäten internationaler 
Politik, ed. Volker Perthes (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, January 2016), 41–44. 
routes for legal migration. However, this idea suf-
fered from the fact that the EU has very limited com-
petences in the area of legal migration. This weakens 
the EU’s negotiating position as long as there is a lack 
of willingness by member states to fill the idea of 
“more for more“ with substance. 
European efforts to make policies dealing with 
returns more effective have intensified in recent 
years. However, such negotiations are lengthy and 
often fail because of the different domestic policy 
interests of African partner countries.27 A central 
point of contention is the demand of Europeans that 
partner countries should also take back third-country 
nationals who have travelled through their territory 
to the EU. This is a request that is highly problematic, 
especially for important transit states such as Morocco, 
and therefore not expedient from a strategic perspec-
tive (see the contribution on Morocco and Algeria, 
p. 22ff.). The idea of using development policy as 
a sanction for a lack of cooperation in the area of re-
admission (“less for less”) is repeatedly raised in both 
national and European contexts, but has so far not 
been able to gain ground. According to studies, the 
EU has so far not strategically applied its trade-policy 
power to achieve migration policy concessions in the 
partner countries.28 
On the other hand, financial incentives play an 
increasing role in cooperation on migration. A large 
number of individual projects add up to considerable 
funding amounts, from which state and other actors 
in authoritarian partner countries are increasingly 
benefiting. Funding is made available for projects 
motivated by development policy that aim to improve 
the rights and prospects of migrants and refugees 
in the country, as well as for projects with a security 
 
27 See, among others, Natasja Reslow, “EU ‘Mobility’ Part-
nerships: An Initial Assessment of Implementation Dynam-
ics”, Politics and Governance 3, no. 2 (2015): 117–28 (125); 
Sadio Soukouna, L’Échec d’une coopération franco malienne sur 
les migrations: Les logiques du refus malien de signer, Mémoire 
de Master 2 Science Politique, Mention Relations Inter-
nationales, April 2011, http://www.reseau-terra.eu/IMG/pdf/ 
SOUKOUNA_Sadio.pdf (accessed 5 March 2018); Stephan 
Dünnwald, “Remote Control? Europäisches Migrations-
management in Mauretanien und Mali”, movements. Journal 
für kritische Migrations-und Grenzregimeforschung 1, no. 1 (2015): 
21–23. 
28 Flavia Jurje and Sandra Lavenex, “Trade Agreements as 
Venues for ‘Market Power Europe’? The Case of Immigration 
Policy”, in Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 2 (2014): 
320–36. 
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policy orientation that are of particular interest 
to European home ministries. The entirety of all 
individual projects serves as a “door opener” for 
further cooperation on migration policy with 
strategically important countries. 
Informalisation of external EU 
migration policy 
Developing relationships is indeed an important 
aspect of external EU migration policy. Since bilateral 
channels of dialogue are indispensable for function-
ing cooperation with partner countries, European 
governments also see the agreement of migration 
partnerships and dialogue forums as confidence-
building measures for establishing or consolidating 
high-level working contacts. Despite the attempt to 
formulate comprehensive frameworks for migration 
cooperation, mostly restrictive approaches dominate 
the operational agenda. This can be explained on the 
one hand by the domestic political preferences of 
the European governments. On the other hand, such 
measures are often easier to implement than initia-
tives aimed at greater mobility, as targets and co-
operation partners are easier to define.29 
Informal channels for dialogue are 
crucial for external migration policy, 
but they make democratic control 
more difficult. 
The implementation of restrictive measures in 
partner countries goes hand in hand with a prefer-
ence for legally non-binding political agreements. By 
bypassing the comitology procedure new forms of 
cooperation can be established. This however goes at 
the expense of transparency and democratic control 
through the European Parliament. Although the 
Treaty of Lisbon gave the EU institutions more powers 
in the policy area of asylum and migration, it is ulti-
mately the member states that continue to set the 
tone and help to implement their own migration 
policy interests within the flexible framework that 
the European Commission offers them. The informal 
division of labour among the relevant actors, which 
gives particular weight to the four largest member 
 
29 Daniel Wunderlich, “Implementing EU External Migra-
tion Policy: Security-driven by Default?”, Comparative Euro-
pean Politics 11, no. 4 (2013): 406–27. 
states and their networks, is driving this development 
forward. 
Conclusion 
External EU migration policy is caught between 
internal and external policy interests and contains 
elements motivated by both security and develop-
ment policy. However, it is dominated by the short-
term interest in curbing irregular migration to 
Europe, whereby the facilitation of legal migration 
from and within the African continent serves as an 
incentive for partner countries that has yet to be 
fulfilled. 
Looking at the migration policy instruments that 
have been developed since the “EU refugee crisis” of 
2015, the following strategic elements can be identi-
fied: at the discursive level, the narrative of combat-
ing the “root causes”, the conditionalisation of devel-
opment cooperation, the circumvention of the Com-
munity method by creating new instruments and the 
focus on intergovernmental negotiations. However, 
this does not yet result in a comprehensive strategy. 
Instead, the multitude of migration policy instru-
ments and partnership formats, as well as the often 
inadequate communication with partner countries, 
make counterproductive results more likely. The risk 
increases to the extent that other policy areas are 
placed at the service of migration policy interests 
and alternative logics of action are neglected: If, for 
example, development policy no longer primarily 
aims at combating poverty and promoting the rule 
of law, there is a risk of cuts in longer-term structural 
measures in favour of short-term interventions in 
the area of border management. If this change hurts 
cross-border trade or if existing distribution conflicts 
are fuelled, this can lead to more rather than less 
involuntary migration movements in the medium 
term. Furthermore, by prioritising the reduction 
irregular migration, EU member states accept that 
their negotiating power vis-à-vis third countries is 
shifting: From the perspective of key countries rele-
vant to migration policy, especially those bordering 
the southern Mediterranean, the EU-Turkey agree-
ment not only shows examples of how irregular 
crossings can be managed, but also how one’s own 
political negotiation power can be upgraded vis-à-vis 
the EU. 
External EU migration policy is currently a labora-
tory for new approaches and instruments – often 
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primarily motivated by domestic policy and designed 
to send out a signal to the European public. In the 
view of the European Commission, these measures 
have helped to substantially decrease the number of 
irregular entries into the European Union in 2017 
compared with the previous year.30 However, the 
political and social realities in partner countries are 
out of sight. A comprehensive understanding of the 
consequences and effects therefore requires a change 
of perspective: a look at migration-related dynamics, 
interests and policies in authoritarian African third 
countries. 
 
30 European Commission, “Zukunftsfähige Migrations-
steuerung: Europäische Kommission legt Fahrplan vor”, 
Press Release, 7 December 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-5132_de.htm (accessed 12 February 2018). 
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Country Population 
Total population … in  … in  
 Germany Europe 
Remittances to… 
(in $ mil.)  
Migrant population 
Total Countries of origin  
 in Africa  
Registered refugees 
… total … from 
 Syria 
Egypt  93,778,172 (2015) 
 97,553,151 (2017*) 
 102,941,484 (2020*) 
 26,915  282,923 (2015) 
 267,470 (2010) 
 16,590 (2016) 
 14,324 (2011) 
 491,643 (2015) 
 295,714 (2010) 
Sudan 
Somalia 
Libya 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia  
31,589 
22,709 
5,591 
2,368 
1,457 
 213,530  116,013 
Algeria  39,872,000 (2015) 
 41,318,142 (2017*) 
 43,333,255 (2020*) 
 21,320  1,597,319 (2015) 
 1,484,565 (2010) 
 2,000 (2016) 
 1,942 (2011) 
 242,391 (2015) 
 244,964 (2010) 
Western Sahara 
Somalia 
Libya 
Sudan 
90,939 
20,810 
4,182 
2,873 
 94,232  0 
Eritrea  4,846,976 (2015) 
 5,068,831 (2017*) 
 5,432,216 (2020*) 
 59,800  98,175 (2015) 
 70,546 (2010) 
 318 (2012*) 
 599 (2008*) 
 15,941 (2015) 
 15,676 (2010) 
Somalia  
DR Congo 
Uganda  
South Sudan 
Mozambique 
2,457 
1,688 
1,524 
1,490 
1,107 
 2,342 No data  
Morocco  34,803,000 (2015) 
 35,740,000 (2017*) 
 37,070,718 (2020*) 
 75,855  2,507,560 (2015) 
 2,472,372 (2010) 
 7,088 (2016) 
 7,256 (2011) 
 88,511 (2015) 
 70,909 (2010) 
Algeria  
Tunisia 
Congo  
Egypt 
Senegal 
13,664 
2,622 
1,913 
1,890 
1,837 
 4,771  3,242 
Niger  19,896,965 (2015) 
 21,477,348 (2017*) 
 24,074,693 (2020*) 
 1,220  10,499 (2015) 
 9,376 (2010) 
 182 (2016) 
 134 (2011) 
 189,255 (2015) 
 126,464 (2010) 
Mali 
Nigeria 
Burkina Faso 
Benin 
Togo  
84,640 
19,436 
19,323 
17,908 
9,702 
 166,093  7 
Sudan  38,647,803 (2015) 
 40,533,000 (2017*) 
 43,541,203 (2020*) 
 6,225  44,900 (2015) 
 37,137 (2010) 
 153 (2016) 
 442 (2011) 
 503,477 (2015) 
 578,363 (2010) 
Eritrea 
South Sudan 
Chad 
Ethiopia 
Nigeria 
159,748 
135,558 
74,514 
60,734 
14,828 
 421,466  6,997 
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Country Population 
Total population … in  … in  
 Germany Europe 
Remittances to … 
(in $ mil.)  
Migrant population 
Total Countries of origin  
 in Africa  
Registered refugees 
… total … from 
 Syria 
Sources UN DESA 2017 
*mean estimate 
Destatis  
2016  
UN DESA  
2015 
World Bank 2017 
*African 
Development 
Bank 2016 
UN DESA  
2015 
UN DESA 
2015 
UNHCR 
2016 
UNHCR 
2016 
   
African Development Bank 2016 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/sites/default/files/content-pdf/AEO2009_EN.pdf 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEO_2016_Report_Full_English.pdf 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Eritrea___Interim_ 
Country_Strategy_Paper__I-CSP__2014-2016_-_11_2014.pdf 
Destatis 
German Federal Statistical Office 
2016 https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/data; jsessionid=171FDCBF1B26ADEF27C4B6F90FE7F204. 
tomcat_GO_1_3?operation=abruftabelleBearbeiten&levelindex=1&levelid=1513177720188&auswahl 
operation=abruftabelleAuspraegungAuswaehlen&auswahlverzeichnis=ordnungsstruktur&auswahlziel= 
werteabruf&selectionname=12521-0002&auswahltext=&nummer=6&variable=2&name=GES&nummer= 
5&variable=3&name=STAAG6&werteabruf=Werteabruf 
UN DESA Population Division 2015 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/data/ 
UN_MigrantStockByOriginAndDestination_2015.xlsx 
UN DESA Population Division 2017 https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/ 
WPP2017_POP_F01_1_TOTAL_POPULATION_BOTH_SEXES.xlsx 
UNHCR 2016 http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern 
World Bank 2017 http://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/bilateralremittancematrix2016_Nov2017.xlsx 
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Morocco and Algeria have been referred to pointedly 
as European Borderlands1 for some years now: This is 
where the European Union (EU) is trying to succes-
sively outsource border tasks and functions. In doing 
so, European political actors tend to lump the Magh-
reb states together. The German initiative to declare 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as safe countries of 
origin is an example of this. 
Indeed, the two authoritarian states Algeria and 
Morocco,2 which are examined in more detail in this 
article, show structural parallels in the area of migra-
tion: For many decades, both countries have been 
emigration countries and, since the 2000s, increasingly 
transit countries for mixed migration movements 
from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. Over the past 
decade, both countries have also become countries 
of immigration. Rabat and Algiers are thus facing 
similar political and social challenges as their Euro-
pean neighbours. Similarities between Morocco and 
Algeria can also be found in reactions to migration-
 
∗ The author thanks Athmane Bessalem and Salma 
al-Sayed for their assistance in doing research for this article. 
1 About this concept, see Raffaella Del Sarto, “Borderlands: 
The Middle East and North Africa as the EU’s Southern Buffer 
Zone”, in Mediterranean Frontiers: Borders, Conflicts and Memory 
in a Transnational World, ed. Dimitar Bechev and Kalypso 
Nicolaidis (London/New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 150–56. 
2 While Algeria is classified as “authoritarian” or “not 
free” in international comparative rankings of democracy 
and political freedoms, Morocco is considered “partly free” 
or falls into the category “hybrid”. See Freedom House, 
“Freedom in the World 2018”, https://freedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018; The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2017, https://www.eiu.com/ 
topic/democracy-index. In qualitative studies, on the other 
hand, Morocco is generally regarded as authoritarian, see 
Francesco Cavatorta, “Morocco: The Promise of Democracy 
and the Reality of Authoritarianism”, in The International 
Spectator 51, no. 1 (2016): 86–98, http://www.tandfonline. 
com/doi/full/10.1080/03932729.2016.1126155?src=recsys 
(all accessed 19 February 2018). 
related phenomena: concerning the relevance of 
security issues, social prejudices against “black 
Africans”, and Rabat and Algiers’ attempts to in-
strumentalise migration movements in order to 
disavow each other (internationally). The political 
elites in both states also know how to use their 
central geopolitical situation for Europe’s migration 
management and the fight against terrorism to 
increase their own negotiating power, expand bi-
lateral cooperation with individual EU states, and 
alleviate external transformation pressures. 
The migration policies are partly in 
the European interest – but they 
are not the result of European 
shaping power. 
Yet, Algerian and Moroccan migration policies 
differ fundamentally. Whereas Morocco belongs to 
the African avant-garde, Algeria has so far pursued 
isolationist policies. Morocco was the first North 
African country to take concrete steps towards an 
immigration and asylum policy. In doing so, King 
Mohammed VI has cleverly used the topic of migra-
tion to pursue a broad spectrum of interests. These 
range from capacity-building in the security appa-
ratus and in local administrations to establishing 
Morocco as a progressive multilateral player, expand-
ing its “soft power” in sub-Saharan Africa, and last 
but not least, attaining international recognition of 
Western Sahara as Moroccan territory. Ultimately, 
four factors are decisive for this proactive migration 
policy: the country’s exposed geographical location; 
regional lines of conflict, including that of the non-
resolved Western Sahara; a growing African reference 
in Moroccan foreign policy; and a highly assertive 
power centre in Rabat with a long-term vision. At 
least in part, the concrete political measures – even 
if they have little to do with Europe’s original inten-
tions – are in the European interest, but they are 
Isabelle Werenfels 
Migration Strategist Morocco – 
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more coincidental side effects than the result of Euro-
pean shaping power. 
In Algeria, which, unlike Morocco, has neither 
entered into a so-called Privileged Partnership with 
the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy 
nor a Mobility Partnership, the policy approach to 
mixed migration is both less nuanced and less in-
fluenced by external actors. Here, a focus on security 
dominates. The government’s primary aim is to seal 
off growing refugee and migration movements from 
sub-Saharan Africa – even if this runs counter to its 
own rhetoric of solidarity with Africa as well as to 
calls for an asylum law from Algerian civil society 
and individual political actors. A sophisticated migra-
tion strategy, as pursued by Morocco, is not to be 
expected in the short term. A worsening economic 
crisis caused by low oil prices in the past years has 
promoted populist positions; power struggles and 
manoeuvring over the succession of the president, 
who is suffering from health problems, are prevent-
ing bold new policies. Last but not least, Algeria’s 
particularly strong claim to sovereignty, stemming 
from its colonial history, sets narrow limits to in-
creased cooperation with Europe in the area of 
migration – beyond the readmission of its own 
citizens and selective security cooperation. 
Actors, interests, and social dynamics 
In Morocco and Algeria, mixed migratory flows can 
be divided into three categories: (1) emigration of 
their own citizens, (2) transit migration to Europe, 
and (3) immigration of migrant workers and refugees 
who settle permanently in the Maghreb. Each of these 
groups is associated with different political and social 
dynamics and interests. 
Welcomed emigration 
From the perspective of Moroccan and Algerian poli-
tics and society, by far the most important group of 
migrants is that of their own citizens who emigrate 
to Europe and North America.3 With 1.6 million 
Algerians and just under 2.5 million Moroccans, this 
represents just under 4 and a good 7 per cent, respec-
tively, of the total population (see Table 1, p. 20). 
 
3 Mohamed Berriane, Hein de Haas, and Katharina Natter, 
“Introduction: Revisiting Moroccan Migrations”, The Journal 
of North African Studies 20, no. 4 (2015): 503–21 (503). 
Since the 1990s, Morocco has been the EU’s largest 
source of immigrants, ahead of Turkey. In the course 
of 2017, irregular migration to Europe increased 
sharply. Moroccan and even more Algerian official 
bodies and (social) media reported an increase in 
intercepted boats whose passengers were locals.4 
According to the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (Frontex), almost 40 per cent of the people 
who came via the Western Mediterranean route in 
2017 came from the two Maghreb countries.5 Socio-
economic factors play a role in both countries, albeit 
not the only one. In Morocco, the repression of pro-
tests in the Rif region in the north of the country pro-
moted emigration in 2017; in Algeria, generalised 
political and economic disillusionment is also driving 
persons integrated in the labour market and even po-
liticians on an irregular path to Europe.6 
However, only some of these people use the Medi-
terranean route – informed circles point out that a 
considerable number of visas are issued on the basis 
of forged documents, particularly in Algeria.7 The 
extent to which socio-economic factors are respon-
sible for emigration could become apparent in Moroc-
co in the foreseeable future when the country reaches 
the threshold of socio-economic development, at which 
point emigration generally decreases again, according 
to migration research.8 
 
4 See the website of the Algerian Ministry of Defence, 
which registers all intercepted boats, http://www.mdn.dz/ 
site_principal/index.php?L=fr#Lutte181120172 (accessed 
29 January 2018). 
5 See Frontex, “Migratory Flows in 2017 – Pressure Eased 
on Italy and Greece, Spain Saw Record Numbers”, 5 January 
2018, http://frontex.europa.eu/news/migratory-flows-in-2017-
pressure-eased-on-italy-and-greece-spain-saw-record-
numbers-8FC2d4 (accessed 31 January 2018). 
6 A candidate in the local elections in Algeria in November 
2017 who fled to Spain with his campaign money across the 
Mediterranean made headlines. See “Mutarashah yafurr bi-
‘shakarat’ al-hamla al-intikhabiya wa-‘yuharrig’ ila isbaniya” 
[A candidate takes the money for the election campaign and 
flees across the Mediterranean to Spain], Ennahar Online, 21 
November 2017, https://www.ennaharonline.com/-ﺮﻔﯾ-ﺢﺷﺮﺘﻣ
ﺔﯿﺑﺎﺨﺘﻧﻻا-ﺔﻠﻤﺤﻟا-ةرﺎﻜﺸـﺑ/ (accessed 26 March 2018). 
7 Interviews with representatives of European countries 
and international organisations, Algier, November 2017. 
8 On the discussion about the so-called “migration hump”, 
see Berriane, de Haas and Natter, “Introduction: Revisiting 
Moroccan Migrations” (see note 3), 519; Steffen Angenendt, 
Charles Martin-Shields, and Benjamin Schraven, More Develop-
ment – More Migration? The “Migration Hump” and Its Significance 
for Development Policy Co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa, SWP 
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Political and social interest in 
voluntary returnees is very limited. 
The emigrants relieve the labour market and sup-
port the economies in their country of origin. Remit-
tances of around $7 billion (2016, see Table 1, p. 20) 
accounted for almost 7 per cent of Morocco’s gross 
domestic product and a multiple of total development 
aid.9 In Algeria, remittances are more modest at $2 
billion in 2016, but are also the main source of in-
come for many families and can reduce poverty 
in entire regions.10 Direct investments by wealthy 
emigrants living abroad or by voluntary returnees 
are also a welcome effect of migration. Especially in 
Algeria, which has no international tourism of note, 
les émigrés are an important pillar of the tourism 
sector. The generally high reputation of emigrants 
is therefore strongly based on their real or perceived 
economic success. From the point of view of the 
societies of origin, the question of whether emigra-
tion originally was regular or irregular plays no deci-
sive role. 
Conversely, this means that the political and social 
interest in returnees is low or is limited to people 
who have come into (relative) wealth abroad. On the 
other hand, those who are deported from Europe are 
primarily regarded in their country of origin as an 
economic burden and, in the case of criminal or radi-
calised returnees, also as social liabilities. This may 
be one reason why official cooperation regarding 
deportations from Germany proved difficult for years 
before a change occurred in 2017.11 However, the fact 
that Rabat and Algiers allow deportations by boat, for 
example from Spain, which are little noticed by the 
public, but do not permit returns from Germany and 
other European states with specially chartered air-
craft, shows how socially charged governments con-
sider this issue. At the same time, both countries have 
laws that not only punish smuggling and irregular 
 
Comment 40/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
October 2017), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/ 
more-development-more-migration/ (accessed 20 March 2018). 
9 About the Moroccan GDP, see The World Bank Data: Mo-
rocco, https://data.worldbank.org/country/morocco (accessed 
10 January 2018). 
10 See, e.g., David N. Margolis et al., “‘To Have and Have 
Not’: International Migration, Poverty, and Inequality in 
Algeria”, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 117, no. 2 
(2015): 650–85 (665ff.). 
11 Discussions with official bodies involved in the repatria-
tion process, Berlin, August/September 2017. 
residency in the country, but also the irregular depar-
ture of their own citizens. In practice, however, the 
latter is handled rather flexibly.12 
Unwelcomed transit passengers to Europe 
Migration and flight from sub-Saharan Africa are not 
a new phenomenon for Algeria and Morocco. Every 
major conflict in the Sahel states has been accompa-
nied by waves of migration and refugees towards the 
Maghreb states, mostly with Europe as their desti-
nation. Some of these passers-by spend weeks and 
months in the Maghreb under precarious circum-
stances in order to earn money to continue their jour-
neys, for example in the construction industry. The 
number of people using Algeria or Morocco as a tran-
sit country has fluctuated greatly over the years. As a 
result of increased European border protection meas-
ures and security cooperation with (North) African 
states, the main flight and migration routes towards 
Europe have repeatedly shifted. Intensive bilateral 
security cooperation between Spain and Morocco has 
reduced Morocco’s importance as a transit country 
since 2006.13 The fact that a turnaround towards 
greater use of the western Mediterranean route be-
came apparent in 2015 can be explained, on the one 
hand, by the increasing emigration from the Maghreb 
itself14 and, on the other, by the fact that the attrac-
tiveness of the Libyan route has diminished. Migrat-
ing people have experienced massive levels of vio-
 
12 Interviews with Moroccan and Algerian journalists and 
migration experts, Rabat, March 2017, Berlin, July 2017, and 
Algiers, November 2017. See law 02-03 of 20 November 2003 
on the legal framework in Morocco, Titre II, Art. 50, in Bul-
letin Officiel http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ed5c.html; 
on Algeria see Art. 175, law 09-01 of 25 February 2009, in 
Journal Officiel, https://www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/2009/ 
F2009015.pdf (all accessed 29 January 2018). 
13 However, human rights organisations argue that this 
cooperation breaks EU law through blanket expulsions, 
including of asylum seekers, and encourages Morocco to 
commit human rights violations. See Judith Sunderland, 
“Outsourcing Border Control to Morocco a Recipe for Abuse”, 
Human Rights Watch, 28 August 2017, https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2017/08/28/outsourcing-border-control-morocco-recipe-
abuse (accessed 11 January 2018). 
14 So far, fewer central routes have been used, such as 
from Annaba in Algeria to Sicily. See Naima Benouaret, 
“Lorsque le mal-vivre se dévoile au monde”, El Watan, 
19 October 2017, http://www.elwatan.com/hebdo/magazine/ 
lorsque-le-mal-vivre-se-devoile-au-monde-19-10-2017-
354992_265.php (accessed 11 January 2018). 
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lence there, and Italy’s intensified security coopera-
tion with Libyan actors as well as European border 
protection activities in Niger have also had an impact. 
How many people were irregularly in Morocco and 
Algeria in autumn 2017 is unclear. In Morocco this 
group was estimated at 40,000 people by officials and 
at 80,000 by NGOs. In Algeria, official sources in 2017 
spoke of 25,000 people, mainly from sub-Saharan 
Africa, living illegally in the country; human rights 
activists of more than 100,000; and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) of 50,000 to 75,000 
people.15 In both states, the majority of migration 
from sub-Saharan Africa is mixed migration. These 
figures do not include refugees registered by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in-
cluding more than 90,000 Sahraouis (indigenous 
people of Western Sahara, see Table 1, p. 20) who 
have been living in refugee camps in south-western 
Algeria for decades, as well as more than 40,000 
Syrian refugees who, according to the Algerian gov-
ernment, are in the country.16 Moreover, because 
some African and Asian countries do not require 
visas, some migrants on their way to Europe in Mo-
rocco and Algeria have legal status.17 Last but not 
least, the figures mentioned on irregular migration 
do not indicate whether a person is actually passing 
 
15 See Mixed Migration Hub, Trend Bulletin, August 2017, 
http://www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/02/MHub-Trend-Bulletin-AUGUST-2017-v.3.pdf; 
“En Algérie, Amnesty dénonce des expulsions massives 
et ‘illégales’ de Subsahariens”, Le Monde, 24 October 2017, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/24/en-algerie-
amnesty-denonce-des-expulsions-massives-et-illegales-de-
subsahariens_5205271_3212.html (both accessed 11 January 
2018); conversations with representatives of the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), Algiers, November 2017. 
16 See Abdelkrim Zerzouri, “Syriens bloqués à la frontière 
marocaine: Le HCR pour libérer les ‘prisonniers du désert’?”, 
Le Quotidien d’Oran (Algeria-Watch), 15 June 2017, http:// 
www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/pol/migration/hcr_syriens_ 
bloques.htm (accessed 11 January 2018). 
17 In Morocco, citizens from Ivory Coast, the Republic of 
Congo, Mali, Niger, and Senegal, among others, can enter 
without a visa (see website of the Moroccan Foreign Ministry, 
http://www.consulat.ma/fr/prestation.cfm?gr_id=6&id=53) 
in Algeria from Mali, Mauritania, and the Democratic Arab 
Republic of Sahara (recognised by Algeria but not by Moroc-
co). See visa regulations of the Algerian Foreign Ministry, 
http://www.mae.gov.dz/images/sce/documents/visas.pdf (both 
accessed 23 March 2018). 
through or intends to settle permanently in one of 
the two countries.18 
Since the figures circulating in the public are so 
widely divergent, the various political actors can play 
the issue of flight and migration up or down, depend-
ing on their interests. Governments generally set the 
number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa low for 
internal political reasons, but tend to accentuate or 
exaggerate these figures selectively when it comes to 
highlighting the security risks of migration, pointing 
to successful repatriations (Algeria), or soliciting ex-
ternal funds for integration (Morocco).19 The number 
of Syrian refugees, on the other hand, is often em-
phasised by the authorities in Algeria in order to 
demonstrate Arab solidarity.20 Moreover, as Arabs, 
“Whites”, and Muslims, they enjoy a higher social 
acceptance than refugees from sub-Saharan Africa. In 
Morocco, and even more so in Algeria, the latter are 
increasingly exposed to physical assaults and pogrom-
like riots.21 
Whereas the Algerian government does little to 
counter these dynamics, the Moroccan monarchy is 
sending out very different signals. In Algeria in the 
summer of 2017, the prime minister and the foreign 
minister reproduced common prejudices against 
people from sub-Saharan Africa by publicly portray-
ing them as a security threat and blaming them for 
 
18 In a survey in Mali in autumn 2017, 28 per cent of 
people on migration routes to North Africa stated Algeria as 
their destination. See IOM, “Flow Monitoring Mali, 30 June 
2016 – 30 September 2017”, https://drive.google.com/file/d/ 
0B841q6qT8kS_WG5Jdjc3U1ZmQlE/view (accessed 11 Janu-
ary 2018). 
19 Interviews with representatives of the Moroccan Minis-
try of Migration (Ministère chargé des marocains résidant à 
l’étranger et des affaires de la migration) in Rabat, March 
2017, and with migration researchers in Berlin, July 2017. 
About high deportation figures, see also Rachid Ikhen, 
“Migrants – 120 milliards pour le rapatriement des Sub-
sahariens”, Algerie Focus, 30 July 2017, http://www.algerie-
focus.com/2017/07/migrants-120-milliards-rapatriement-
subsahariens/ (accessed 11 January 2018). 
20 See Zerzouri, “Syriens bloqués à la frontière marocaine” 
(see note 16). 
21 A corresponding xenophobic debate took place in 
the social media in 2017, on Twitter under the hashtag 
“#ﻻ_ﮫﻗرﺎﻓﻼﻟ_ﻲﻓ_"ﺮﯾاﺰﺠﻟا”(#No to Africans in Algeria). Syrine 
Attia, “Algérie: pourquoi la situation des migrants sub-
sahariens est-elle si problématique?”, Jeune Afrique, 21 July 
2017, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/459154/societe/situation-
migrants-subsahariens-algerie-problematique/ (accessed 21 
November 2017). 
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moral decline and spread of diseases.22 The Moroccan 
king, on the other hand, emphasises his African ori-
gin at every opportunity and stated at the EU-African 
Union (AU) summit in Abidjan in November 2017 
that the 21st century would become one of mixture 
(of peoples), and thus any change towards an ideo-
logical and xenophobic discourse on migration 
should be out of the question.23 At the AU summit in 
January 2018, Morocco presented the first corner-
stones of an “African Agenda for Migration”, which 
are to include national policies, sub-regional coordi-
nation, a continental vision, and international part-
nerships.24 The fact that this is not just about rhetoric 
is mirrored by the fundamentally new decisions that 
have been made in Moroccan migration policy since 
2013. 
Immigration and integration as a 
new challenge 
The Moroccan and Algerian treatment of the growing 
number of sub-Saharan Africans who either “got stuck” 
on their way to Europe or who arrived irregularly 
in Morocco or Algeria could not be more different. 
Morocco is the first – and so far the only – North 
African country to pursue a policy of legalising cer-
tain groups of people. Through a so-called wave of 
regularisation initiated by the king, 18,000 irregular 
immigrants were granted one-year and later multi-
year residence permits in 2014/2015, a right to school-
ing and health care, and access to the labour mar-
ket.25 In a second regularisation phase in 2017, 
25,600 applications were submitted. At the beginning 
 
22 See “Les propos ‘choquants et scandaleux’ de Ahmed 
Ouyahia sur les migrants subsahariens indignent les associa-
tions et la toile”, HuffPost Algeria, 9 July 2017, http://www. 
huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/07/09/ouyahia-migratns_n_ 
17445678.html (accessed 12 January 2018). 
23 About the speech, see “Le texte intégral du discours du 
roi au sommet UA-UE”, HuffPost Maroc, 29 November 2017, 
http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/11/29/le-texte-
integral-du-discours-du-roi-au-sommet-ua-ue_n_18681526. 
html (accessed 12 January 2018). 
24 See “King Mohammed VI Submits African Agenda 
on Migration to AU”, The North Africa Post, 29 January 2018, 
http://northafricapost.com/21977-king-mohammed-vi-
submits-african-agenda-migration-au.html (accessed 30 
January 2018). 
25 Information from the Moroccan Ministry of Migration. 
of 2018, however, no figures were available on how 
many of these were approved.26 
Behind this policy is a paradigm shift towards 
an immigration policy and an asylum system with 
corresponding structures and integration measures. 
Statements by Moroccan officials that one cannot “tell 
Europeans to treat our people well, and then treat our 
African neighbours badly”27 bear witness to a new 
awareness of one’s own responsibility. At the end of 
2017, the institutional structures required for the new 
policy were still under construction, and the legal 
framework had not yet been adopted.28 Nevertheless, 
the new legal status has significantly improved the 
living conditions of tens of thousands of people. This 
is also due to the fact that an increasing number of 
state-recognised organisations are committed to the 
humanitarian support and integration of migrants 
from sub-Saharan Africa; in 2017, a good 30 such 
NGOs were active, often run by refugees themselves. 
The State Human Rights Authority (CNDH) has also 
been central in implementing the new provisions. 
As in Europe, the vision of an 
immigration society arouses socio-
economic and identity-related fears. 
At the same time, the process of regularisation and 
integration reveals political, bureaucratic, and social 
resistance to this kind of opening up to sub-Saharan 
Africa. Civil society actors report on the arbitrary ap-
proach to regularisation at the local level,29 the unwill-
ingness of local state actors to inform migrants about 
existing options, as well as the selective and still bru-
tal handling of people from sub-Saharan Africa by the 
police. Furthermore, human rights groups complain 
 
26 Anaïs Lefébure, “Régularisation de migrants au Maroc: 
25.600 dossiers déposés en 2017”, Huffpost Maroc, 22 Novem-
ber 2017, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/11/22/ 
regularisationmgrants-maroc-25600-dossiers-deposes-en-
2017_n_18624394.html (accessed 19 February 2018). 
27 Interview with representatives of the Moroccan Ministry 
of Migration, Rabat, March 2017. 
28 Of the three laws announced on asylum, on immigra-
tion, and on integration, residence and illegal immigration 
and emigration, only the last was passed by the end of 2017 
(Law 02-03 as of 23 May 2016). 
29 Interview with Moroccan journalist and migration 
expert Hicham Arroud, representatives of the Association 
Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme (AMDH) and several NGOs 
founded by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, Ra-bat, March 
2017. 
 Migration Strategist Morocco – Fortress Algeria35F 
 SWP Berlin 
 Profiteers of Migration? 
 July 2018 
 27 
that, proportionally, significantly more people from 
Arab states than from sub-Saharan Africa have ben-
efited from legalisation.30 In addition, in the era of 
the new migration policy, the police regularly deport 
sub-Saharan Africans from the northern coastal 
region to the south of the country because the Mo-
roccan government wants to keep migrants away 
from the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla and pre-
vent them from crossing the Mediterranean.31 
The difficulties described can be partially ex-
plained by the fact that regularisation is above all the 
king’s hobbyhorse. The state apparatus and the larger 
parties are much more reserved towards the under-
taking, especially as the vision of an immigration 
society – as in Europe – arouses socio-economic or 
identity-related fears in parts of society: The lower 
classes of society are concerned about competition on 
the (informal) labour market from immigration, and 
the conservative social spectrum is concerned because 
many of the migrant workers and people seeking pro-
tection from sub-Saharan Africa are Christians, and 
there are fears that they have different moral con-
cepts.32 Because politics is propagated by the king, 
however, resistance is only quietly stirred up and is 
reflected more in individual assaults than in populist 
political movements. In any case, migration and im-
migration played virtually no role in the 2016 parlia-
mentary election campaign.33 
In neighbouring Algeria, migration policy is much 
more one-dimensional. The signs here have primarily 
been of sealing off borders and isolation. According 
to the IOM, in the course of 2017, the government de-
ported far more than 10,000 sub-Saharan Africans to 
Niger and Mali, half of whom were African third-
 
30 Syrians are the largest group among refugees, but 
not among irregular migrants. Nevertheless, they profited 
disproportionately from the first wave of regularization – 
they accounted for 23 per cent of the legalised. See Royaume 
du Maroc, Ministère Chargé des Marocains Résidant à l’Étran-
ger et des Affaires de Migration, Politique Nationale d’Immi-
gration et d’Asile 2013–2016 (Rabat, September 2016), 84. 
31 Interviews with representatives of NGOs working in the 
field of migration, Rabat, March 2017. 
32 Interviews in the Moroccan Ministry of Migration and 
with civil society actors, Rabat, Casablanca, and Marrakesh, 
March 2017. 
33 Interviews with parliamentarians of the PJD (Parti de la 
Justice et du Développement) and the FGD (Fédération de 
la gauche démocratique), Rabat, March 2017. 
country nationals.34 Although human rights activists 
and journalists vehemently criticise these actions, 
there have been no notable protests from the larger 
population. Similar to Morocco, concerns about com-
petition in the labour market and the rejection of 
other “customs” and lifestyles prevent widespread 
solidarity. Theoretically, people who are in Algeria 
irregularly have a right to basic medical care and 
schooling – in practice, this is usually not guaran-
teed. Humanitarian civil society initiatives, for 
example to accommodate homeless migrants or to 
educate children who have entered Algeria irregularly, 
receive no state support.35 Anyone who has entered 
the country irregularly has no chance of obtaining 
a legal residence permit, and thus no legal access 
to the labour market. Syrian refugees are a partial 
exception.36 
However, in 2017 there were indications that a 
more differentiated policy was being fought for 
behind the scenes. In the summer of 2017, the For-
eign Ministry announced that a draft law would soon 
enter parliament, and the then–prime minister 
promised a reform of the right of residency for irregu-
lar migrants.37 However, with the replacement of this 
prime minister a few weeks later, the more progres-
sive voices in this respect among the political elite 
have ceased to exist for the time being. Whether ob-
servers who are reminded of the situation in Morocco 
before 2013 – and therefore predict a paradigm shift 
for Algeria – are right remains to be seen. So far, the 
domestic political settings and the larger geopolitical 
interests have been too different for simple parallels 
to be drawn between the neighbouring countries. 
 
34 Algeria has concluded readmission agreements with 
these two neighbouring countries. 
35 Interview with Algerian civil society activists working 
in the field of migration, Berlin, October 2017. 
36 See République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, “Ressortissants syriens 
bloqués au Maroc: l’Algérie contrainte de lever provisoire-
ment le dispositif mis en place pour leur accueil et prise en 
charge”, 7 June 2017, 
http://www.mae.gov.dz/news_article/4870.aspx (accessed 
21 November 2017). Symptomatic of the attitude towards 
people from sub-Saharan Africa is that they are called “les 
Africains”, despite the fact that the Maghreb is also on the 
African continent. 
37 A Bureau algérien pour les réfugiés et apatrides (BAPRA) 
was created as early as 1963, but its work is not very trans-
parent. It also remains unclear what tasks it performs. 
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Migration strategies and policies in a 
broader (geo)political context 
Algerian and Moroccan approaches to mixed migra-
tion are based on fundamental differences in the 
political system, historical experiences, and the cul-
ture of external cooperation. 
Successful interweaving of domestic 
and foreign policy interests in Moroccan 
migration policy 
In Morocco, despite a constitutional amendment in 
2011 during the course of the so-called Arab Spring, 
decisions of strategic relevance are still in the de facto 
hands of the Royal Palace. Morocco not only has an 
assertive power centre with the king, but it is also 
pursuing a clear and ambitious strategy for modernis-
ing and developing the country, both internally and 
externally.38 An important driving force behind this 
strategy is the desire for an international recognition 
of Western Sahara as Moroccan territory. The migra-
tion policy that has been pursued since 2013 is cen-
tral to achieving these goals, as it affects Rabat’s poli-
cies regarding Africa, Europe, and the region, as well 
as its development, security, and economic interests. 
Firstly, the regularisation policy fulfils a security 
function. It allows for the better control of people on 
Moroccan territory, which is in Morocco’s own inter-
est with regards to jihadists – especially from Arab 
states – and organised crime, but the policy also ac-
commodates Europe. At the same time, closer security 
cooperation with selected partners, such as Spain, is 
taking place under the banner of migration policy; in 
addition, data and technological and military know-
how are being transferred as part of migration man-
agement.39 Moreover, in the fight against migration 
as well as terrorism, security and economic interests 
 
38 Isabelle Werenfels and Ilyas Saliba, No Rivals to the King. 
The Limits of Political Reform in Morocco’s “Enlightened Authoritar-
ianism”, SWP Comment 17/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, May 2017), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2017A25_wrf_saliba.pdf 
(accessed 21 November 2017). 
39 See Laura L. Caro, “España y Marruecos reunirán en 
mayo del año que viene al Comité Mixto migratorio”, ABC, 
8 December 2016, http://www.abc.es/espana/abci-espana-y-
marruecos-reuniran-mayo-viene-comite-mixto-migratorio-
201612080210_noticia.html (accessed 10 January 2018). 
At the beginning of 2018, possible cooperations were also 
discussed with Frontex. 
are combined – this applies to European arms 
exporters as well as to Moroccan economic actors.40 
An important driving force behind 
migration policy is the quest for 
international recognition of Western 
Sahara as Moroccan territory. 
Secondly, regularisation and planned immigration 
policies are important building blocks in Morocco’s 
eminently strategic soft power policy in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is not only due to the economic interests 
of Moroccan economic actors in expanding into Afri-
can growth markets. It is also about diplomatic efforts 
to persuade more and more African states to officially 
support the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara 
(contrary to international law). Against this back-
ground, the country has been investing heavily in 
Africa for more than a decade41 – promoting social 
and scientific exchanges as well as training imams in 
numerous African states – and it has expanded legal 
employment opportunities for sub-Saharan Africans. 
The fact that Morocco was integrated into the AU in 
January 2017 is largely due to this commitment. It 
should not be seen as a coincidence that the second 
wave of regulations was announced shortly before, in 
December 2016. Morocco’s 2017 application for mem-
bership in the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) is the logical continuation of its 
Africa policy. To what extent this accession would 
give citizens from ECOWAS countries a greater degree 
of freedom of movement is still open, but a migration 
policy primarily aimed at isolation would not be com-
patible with Morocco’s policy of openness towards 
sub-Saharan Africa. Not least for this reason: Morocco 
also firmly rejects European ideas to set up so-called 
reception camps on Moroccan soil for people from 
other African states. 
Thirdly, Morocco is skilfully using the issue of 
migration to gain support on the international stage, 
both for its domestic modernisation agenda and for 
the international recognition of Western Sahara as 
part of Morocco. In its cooperation with Germany and 
Spain, for example, Rabat uses the voluntary return 
 
40 It is not for nothing that security technology producers 
and consulting firms with Moroccan participation are pres-
ent at forums on security and migration in Morocco, such as 
the African Security Forum in Casablanca in October 2017. 
41 Especially in the telecommunications, insurance, finance, 
banking, and agricultural technology sectors. 
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of Moroccans propagated by European states, which 
has so far been extremely modest in terms of num-
bers, to set up programmes that are generously 
supported by external actors such as the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and 
ultimately serve the general capacity-building of local 
administrative structures in the course of decentrali-
sation.42 Significantly, until the end of 2017, Morocco 
only received money from the EU Emergency Trust 
Fund (EUTF) in the area of development, but not for 
migration management, etc.43 Morocco’s close secu-
rity cooperation with Spain in the Western Mediter-
ranean, the isolation of the enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla, and the rapid readmission of migrants is pay-
ing off for Rabat, in that it can count on Spanish visas 
for seasonal workers and avert Spanish pressure on 
the Western Sahara issue.44 
Morocco is demonstrating its own negotiating 
power to its European partners, at times quite bluntly. 
Observers, for example, interpret the successful 
storming of the border walls in Ceuta in February 
2017 as a signal from Morocco to Europe that co-
operation cannot be taken for granted.45 Only one 
month later, in March 2017, the Moroccan Agricul-
ture Minister announced that if the EU (following 
the confirmation of a first-instance ruling by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in December 2016) no 
longer allowed exports of agricultural products from 
the “Moroccan Sahara”, unemployment would rise 
in Morocco, and that Europe knew what this meant 
for migration.46 Morocco has thus shown that it is a 
 
42 Interviews in the Moroccan Ministry of Migration and 
with representatives of the GIZ, Rabat, March 2017. 
43 See Elise Kervyn and Raphael Shilhav, An Emergency for 
Whom?, Oxfam Briefing Note (November 2017), https://www. 
oxfam.org/en/research/emergency-whom-eu-emergency-trust-
fund-africa-migratory-routes-and-development-aid-africa 
(accessed 12 January 2018). 
44 “España no apoya a los saharauis porque teme perder 
el apoyo de Marruecos en migración y terrorismo”, Espacios 
Europeos, 28 September 2017, http://espacioseuropeos.com/ 
2017/09/espana-no-apoya-los-saharauis-teme-perder-apoyo-
marruecos-migracion-terrorismo/ (accessed 10 January 2018). 
45 Beat Stauffer, “Handelspolitik mit Migranten”, Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 20 February 2017, https://www.nzz.ch/ 
international/ansturm-in-ceuta-handelspolitik-mit-
migranten-ld.146723 (accessed 21 November 2017). 
46 Sam Edwards, “Are Morocco and EU Heading towards 
a Political Impasse?”, Al Jazeera (online), 13 March 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/morocco-
eu-heading-political-impasse-170301102342685.html (ac-
cessed 21 November 2017). 
master in “packaging”, in linking different concerns. 
Negotiations with the EU on a readmission agreement 
are stalled, not least because of the question of West-
ern Sahara. The spelling out of the mobility partner-
ship has so far failed, not least because of another 
Moroccan red line: the readmission of third-country 
nationals. Morocco does not want to be seen by its 
own people or African governments as a willing 
executor of European policy and does not understand 
that Europe “does not directly regulate the problem 
with third countries, as we do”.47 
Fourthly, Morocco’s regularisation policy and its 
active involvement in international migration forums 
and initiatives serve to consolidate the reputation 
of an open-minded country with a reform-oriented, 
multilateral, and humanitarian approach. In 2017/ 
2018, Morocco shares the chairmanship with Ger-
many of the Global Forum on Migration and Develop-
ment, which will hold its summit meeting in Morocco 
in 2018. As early as 2006, the country was the first 
host of the so-called Rabat Process, a Euro-African dia-
logue format designed to combat the causes of flight 
and irregular migration. From the perspective of ex-
ternal actors, Morocco’s migration policy approach 
fits in with its progressive commitment to global cli-
mate and energy goals. The fact that these publicity-
effective international successes are displacing less 
pleasing internal developments – stagnating political 
reforms, the restriction of political freedoms, and 
the continuing socio-economic hopelessness of lower 
social strata – from the global headlines is some-
thing that suits Rabat.48 
Fifthly, Rabat, like Algiers, is using the issue of 
migration to discredit its unloved neighbour inter-
nationally. The background is the permanent com-
petition between Morocco and Algeria for power and 
influence in the region and on the continent, espe-
cially as Algeria supports the Polisario independence 
movement in the Western Sahara conflict. For years, 
Rabat has accused Algiers of deliberately directing 
migratory flows to Morocco. Conversely, Algiers com-
plains that Morocco is deporting refugees and migrants 
across the border to Algeria. Examples of this are the 
 
47 Interview with an advisor to the king. When asked 
whether repatriations to African states would work, this 
advisor replied: “Of course, but à l’Africaine, that is infor-
mal. You Europeans always want everything formal.” 
48 European criticism of the suppression of the protests 
in the Moroccan Rif region since October 2016, for example, 
was limited. 
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several Syrian refugee families who were pushed 
back and forth for weeks in the Algerian-Moroccan 
no man’s land in spring 201749 – despite both states 
having raised border fences and ramparts to prevent 
(human) smuggling. The fact that propaganda wars 
are waged on the backs of migrants was also demon-
strated in the summer of 2016 by the Moroccan king’s 
demonstrative offer of aid to sub-Saharan Africans who 
had been deported from Algeria to Niger.50 At the 
same time, Morocco also continues to deport people 
to sub-Saharan Africa. Ultimately, however, Morocco 
has the greater leverage in these propaganda battles 
because, unlike Algeria, it can point to its own legali-
sation policy. 
Ad hoc policy in Algeria 
Algerian migration policy is not the result of a clear 
strategy, but an expression of the lowest common 
denominator: the primacy of internal security. The 
profound need for security shared by the government 
and the population can be traced back to the civil war 
of the 1990s, but this need is intensified by the decay 
of the neighbouring Libyan state and the associated 
fear of an intrusion of weapons and armed actors.51 
Nevertheless, according to a Gallup survey in 2017, 
Algerian citizens felt as safe as Swiss and Scandinavian 
citizens with regards to their immediate environment 
(neighbourhood and trust in the police).52 Maintain-
ing this high standard is therefore an important 
 
49 See République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, “L’Algérie dément avoir 
refoulé des ressortissants syriens qui se trouvent sur son 
territoire”, 23 January 2014, http://www.mae.gov.dz/news_ 
article/1874.aspx, or Kenza Filali, “En plein désert, des 
réfugiés syriens ballotés entre le Maroc et l’Algérie dans le 
dénuement le plus total”, Le Desk, 23 April 2017, https:// 
ledesk.ma/2017/04/23/en-plein-desert-des-refugies-syriens-
ballotes-entre-le-maroc-et-lalgerie-dans-le-denuement-le-plus-
total/ (alle accessed 12 January 2018). 
50 Nadia Lamlili, “Maroc: Mohammed VI envoie une aide 
d’urgence aux migrants subsahariens expulsés par l’Algérie 
vers le Niger”, Jeune Afrique, 15 December 2016, http://www. 
jeuneafrique.com/384288/politique/maroc-mohammed-vi-
envoie-aide-durgence-aux-migrants-subsahariens-expulses-
lalgerie/ (accessed 12 January 2108). 
51 An example of this is the terrorist attack on an Algerian 
gas production facility in January 2013, which claimed 
numerous victims. 
52 Gallup Global Law and Order 2015 Report (Gallup, 2015), 
http://news.gallup.com/reports/214607/gallup-global-law-
order-report-2017.aspx (accessed 30 January 2018). 
source of legitimacy for political decision-makers in 
Algiers. Against this background, it is not surprising 
that the government seeks to fend off outside influ-
ences and frames migrants primarily as a potential 
danger. This propaganda works,53 especially when 
the government activates the fear of the main étrangère 
(the hand of foreigners) – which is rooted in Alge-
ria’s colonial experiences, deeply entrenched in its 
collective memory, and widespread in society – and, 
for instance, accuses migrants of spying for Israel 
and trying to destabilise Algeria.54 
However, the policy of isolation also produces a 
number of tensions and dilemmas with regards to 
domestic and foreign policy interests and strategies. 
Firstly, the expulsion of refugees from sub-Saharan 
Africa undermines Algiers’ economic and diplomatic 
interests in sub-Saharan African states. It not only 
lessens Algeria’s chances to compete with Morocco for 
influence on the continent, but it also severely strains 
the historical connection and mutual solidarity with 
African freedom movements and the post-colonial 
states they built. Accusations made by African civil 
society activists about the brutal treatment of migrants 
put the Algerian government in an embarrassing 
situation.55 Moreover, decision-makers in Algiers will 
not fail to notice that Morocco is cooperating ever 
more closely with Algeria’s neighbour Niger (which 
is on Rabat’s side on the Western Sahara issue), while 
they are making headlines in Niger with deportations 
 
53 See “Messahel: ‘Les migrants clandestins constituent une 
menace pour la sécurité nationale’”, Le Matin d’Algérie, 10 
July 2017, http://www.lematindz.net/news/24866-abdelkader-
messahel-les-migrants-clandestins-constitent-une-menace-
pour-la-securite-nationale.html, and Hadjer Guenanfa, “Pro-
pos de Ouyahia sur les migrants africains: le RND confirme”, 
TSA, 9 July 2017, https://www.tsa-algerie.com/propos-de-
ouyahia-sur-les-migrants-africains-le-rnd-confirme/ (all ac-
cessed 12 January 2018). 
54 See Fatiha Mez, “Un officier algérien révèle: le flux de 
migrants planifié par un sioniste”, Algeriepatriotique, 25 July 
2017, https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2017/07/25/ 
complot-franco-sioniste-inonder-lalgerie-6-millions-de-
migrants-africains/ (accessed 12 January 2018). One of the 
theories about external manipulation spread among the 
Algerian population is that the French intervention in Mali 
is an attempt to destabilise Algeria qua refugee flows. Inter-
views, Algiers, November 2017. 
55 As happened in an open letter from African trade union-
ists to the Algerian president, see https://www.ituc-africa.org/ 
MIGRATION-Open-letter-to-His-Excellency-the-President-of-
the-Republic-of.html?lang=en (accessed 12 January 2018). 
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(see the contribution on Niger, p. 34ff.).56 Algerian 
officials are trying to counteract negative perceptions 
in sub-Saharan Africa, for example by justifying 
deportations also with “the security of migrants” in 
light of anti-migrant protests in the Algerian popu-
lation.57 Or they emphasise the need to reconcile the 
protection of one’s own borders with the duty of soli-
darity towards African brothers and to work inter-
nationally for a global fight against the causes of 
mixed migrations. This is how the Minister of Justice 
argued in Kigali in October 2017.58 
Secondly, if the policy of isolation is rigorously 
enforced, there is a risk of social tension. Even if 
Algeria’s immensely long borders could actually be 
closed, as the rhetoric of isolation pretends, such an 
undertaking would run counter to social reality. In 
the south of the country, a considerable proportion 
of the population traditionally lives from cross-border 
activities; the Tuareg, in particular, are also anchored 
in Libya, Mali, and Niger (see the contribution to Niger, 
p. 34ff.). The fact that the border trade has been fac-
ing ever higher hurdles for several years is regarded 
as one reason for the growing social protests in 
southern Algeria.59 In the north, on the other hand, 
security actors are trying to prevent not only sub-
Saharan Africans but also Algerians from crossing the 
Mediterranean. The action against the harraga (“who 
burn their papers”) is not unproblematic, as they have 
the status of tragic heroes, especially among younger 
generations.60 If the trend towards emigration to 
 
56 “Rabat & Niamey Building a Model Strategic Partnership 
in Africa”, The North Africa Post, 26 December 2017, http:// 
northafricapost.com/21465-rabat-niamey-building-model-
strategic-partnership-africa.html (accessed 12 January 2018). 
57 See, e.g., Djamila Ould Khettab, “Algérie: les opérations 
d’expulsion de migrants subsahariens depuis le camp de 
Tamanrasset sont en cours”, Jeune Afrique, 8 December 2016, 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/382003/politique/algerie-
operations-dexpulsion-de-migrants-subsahariens-camp-de-
tamanrasset-cours/ (accessed 12 January 2018). 
58 “‘L’Algérie n’a pas fermé ses portes’ devant les migrants, 
selon Tayeb Louh”, HuffPost Algeria, 12 October 2017, http:// 
www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/10/21/tayeb-louh-algerie__ 
18343878.html (accessed 12 January 2018). 
59 International Crisis Group (ICG), Islamism, Violence and 
Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page, ICG Middle East Report 
no. 29 (Cairo and Brussels, 30 July 2004), https://www. 
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/ 
islamism-violence-and-reform-algeria-turning-page (accessed 
10 January 2018). 
60 Rani Zaafan’s YouTube video about the hopelessness 
within Algeria and the tragedy of the Harraga was clicked 
Europe continues, the government is likely to face 
a dilemma: It wants to demonstrate to the outside 
world and the domestic audience that it has its bor-
ders under control, but in doing so it risks provoking 
domestic ire, as the repression of people who want to 
leave the country is likely to produce solidarity with 
the harraga among the population. 
Thirdly, Algeria’s and European states’ interests are 
converging on the issue of the externalisation of bor-
ders and on the policy of sealing them off. But it is not 
in Algiers’ interest that this be the perception either 
internally or externally. Algiers declared already years 
ago that it was not prepared to play the “gendarme of 
Europe”, and it has accused the EU of trying to get a 
clear conscience through financial transfers, the bulk 
of which flow to European experts anyway.61 Criti-
cisms by Algerian and international human rights 
activists of their own deportation practices are offi-
cially dismissed as attempts to taint Algeria’s image.62 
Moreover, Algiers points out that Europe has a similar 
approach.63 Cooperation and coordination with 
Europe on migration is also limited by Algeria’s very 
high sense of sovereignty and low threshold for what 
is perceived as foreign meddling in domestic affairs, 
which, among other things, can be explained with the 
traumatic colonial experience. Close cooperation with 
the EU, which would involve joint patrols between 
Morocco and Spain, for example, is hard to imagine. 
Cooperation with Frontex is not underway either, and 
the European idea of North African reception camps 
has even fewer prospects here than in Morocco. So 
far, Algeria has not even drawn any money from the 
EUTF.64 At the same time, Algeria is emphatically 
multilateral, at least on the rhetorical level: When it 
comes to migration issues, the government likes to 
 
on well over a million times within a few days: https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=UvE73kS7LG8 (accessed 12 January 
2018). 
61 See “Algeria Affirms Commitment to Migrants’ Wel-
fare”, BBC Monitoring Middle East, 15 December 2017. 
62 Adlène Meddi, “Algérie – Campagne anti-migrants: 
ce racisme qui ne dit pas son nom”, LePoint, 25 June 2017, 
http://afrique.lepoint.fr/actualites/algerie-campagne-anti-
migrants-ce-racisme-qui-ne-dit-pas-son-nom-25-06-2017-
2138142_2365.php (accessed 15 January 2018). 
63 “Messahel: ‘Les migrants clandestins’” (see note 53). 
64 See Yousef Salami, “Mécanism de lutte contre la migra-
tion clandestine: Bruxelles juge Alger peu coopérative”, 
Liberté, 3 December 2017, https://www.liberte-algerie. 
com/actualite/bruxelles-juge-alger-peu-cooperative-282393 
(accessed 17 January 2018). 
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point out to the EU that it is not Algiers, but rather 
the AU that is the right partner. Algeria was also the 
first North African country to join the IOM and took 
over its yearly presidency in 2009. Contrary to this, 
the multilateral organisation for migration could 
only start its work in the country itself in 2016, and 
its activities there until the end of 2017 have been 
limited to collecting data for statistics. 
These contradictions and areas of tension will 
hardly be resolved in the near future. In contrast to 
Morocco, the Algerian government currently does 
not have the capacity to be creative – not only with 
regards to designing a new migration policy. In 2018, 
just as in past years, the political elite is once again 
primarily engaged in power struggles and manoeu-
vring over the succession of the president, who is 
suffering from health problems, as well as disputes 
about the right way out of the economic crisis caused 
by low oil and gas prices. A nuanced migration policy 
beyond the lowest common denominator – internal 
security – is unlikely before the issue of succession 
is resolved and/or the 2019 presidential elections are 
over. Rather, it is to be expected that Algiers will con-
tinue to proceed in an ad hoc and reactive fashion 
rather than a strategic one with regards to migration 
issues. 
Scope for Europe 
With the issue of migration, Morocco and Algeria 
have gained in importance and negotiating power 
for Europe. Rabat, in particular, is using its political 
capital vis-à-vis Europe as strategically as Turkey has, 
albeit much more subtly. Ultimately, it is the Magh-
reb partner states that set the framework for coopera-
tion in the area of migration, and not the EU or its 
member states. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
respective handling of mixed migration flows is less a 
reaction to European incentives or pressure than an 
expression of central national interests. Where there 
is a convergence of interests with European actors 
and, as in the case of Morocco, decision-makers see 
a “win-win” situation, cooperation works well. This 
is particularly true at the bilateral level. Due to its 
strategic approach, Morocco, in particular, has very 
concrete ideas about what various European partners 
and the EU as a whole can offer Rabat under the 
broad umbrella of migration cooperation (see for the 
EU’s migration policy instruments the first contribu-
tion in this study, p. 9ff.). An example of this is the 
Moroccan-Spanish security cooperation in the area of 
migration. 
Agreements that are perceived as asymmetrical or 
that ignore the interests of the partner states – as is 
the case, for example, with the mobility partnership 
between the EU and Morocco – are difficult to imple-
ment. The blockades in the spelling out of this mobil-
ity partnership show that money cannot be used 
to buy the readmission of persons from third coun-
tries.65 In the context of the mobility partnership, 
Morocco would rather like to see concessions with 
regards to the free movement of persons than addi-
tional funds. Due to the high levels of pressure de-
scribed above on the Moroccan labour market and the 
great importance of remittances, it cannot be ruled 
out that generous quotas on work visas for Moroc-
cans, or even visa exemptions, could lead Rabat to 
accept persons from third countries who are rejected 
from Europe. 
Rabat, in particular, uses its 
negotiating power in a strategic 
manner similar to Turkey, 
albeit much more subtly. 
Algeria is pursuing a policy of isolation from 
sub-Saharan Africans, but the foreign policy costs 
in Africa are increasing. Moreover, as the economic 
crisis intensifies and Algerians are under pressure 
to emigrate, the number of Algerians who want to 
flee to Europe via the Mediterranean is growing. As 
remittances can protect family members left behind 
from poverty, support among the population for 
irregular Algerian migration is expected to increase. 
Here, too, European concessions on the free move-
ment of persons or the transfer of border protection 
equipment are likely to be needed to ensure that 
Algeria continues to be prepared to consistently hold 
back not only people from sub-Saharan Africa, but 
also its own citizens. 
Even if Europe has the short end of the stick, it 
can try to make better use of its leeway and offer both 
countries more attractive incentives for cooperation 
 
65 Sergio Carrera, Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Nora El Qadim, 
Mehdi Lahlou, and Leonhard den Hertog, EU-Morocco Co-
operation on Readmission, Borders and Protection. A Model to 
Follow?, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, 87 
(Brussels: CEPS, January 2016), 3–7, https://www.ceps.eu/ 
system/files/EU-Morocco%20Cooperation%20Liberty%20 
and%20Security%20in%20Europe.pdf (accessed 19 March 
2018). 
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– provided it understands the interests and sensi-
tivities of its respective counterparts. Measures to 
improve the investment climate or to create training 
and jobs already exist in cooperation with Europe – 
and Germany, in particular – and could be expanded. 
Moreover, Morocco is likely to react positively if its 
African Agenda for Migration, launched at the begin-
ning of 2018, is seen as a starting point for European-
African partnerships. 
However, some of the incentives and concessions 
most important for Morocco and Algeria – in the 
trade sector, where import regulations for (processed) 
agricultural products into the EU could be further 
relaxed, or higher European visa quotas and options 
for legal immigration – remain highly controversial 
within Europe. With regards to Morocco, trade issues, 
in particular, have considerable potential for conflict 
on account of the Western Sahara issue. For example, 
in February 2018, with a ruling on the validity of the 
fisheries agreement with Morocco, the ECJ once again 
confirmed that existing European agreements with 
Morocco do not extend to the territory or waters of 
Western Sahara. 
These restrictions at the EU level promote bilateral-
ism, particularly in the area of migration. European 
countries provide bilateral incentives for cooperation, 
especially in the security field. Border management 
and capacity-building in the security sector play in-
creasingly important roles in the cooperation with 
Maghreb states, whereas normative European agendas 
are receding into the background. This may lead to 
European governments, as well as the EU, being even 
more reluctant than before to criticise restrictions 
on political freedoms or the lack of political and eco-
nomic reforms. A de facto shift to the Moroccan line 
in the Western Sahara question is also conceivable. 
Such concessions could possibly lead to a “win-win” 
cooperation in the fight against irregular migration 
in the short term, but they do not eliminate the risk 
of a further increase in migratory pressures from the 
Maghreb, which is also a consequence of a lack of 
political and economic structural reforms. 
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Introduction 
Until 2015, Niger had little interest in regulating 
migration. The Nigerien government took correspond-
ing measures only in response to the EU’s proactive 
policies, although the government’s measures are not 
in the economic interest of the country: The North in 
particular – the region around Agadez – benefited 
from the economic effects of migration by providing 
transport and other services for migrants. A decline of 
this migration economy, which has been developing 
since 2011, is accompanied by losses that could lead 
to political destabilisation. But President Mahamadou 
Issoufou’s government hopes that cooperation with 
the European Union (EU) in the area of migration 
will help to avert threats from neighbouring coun-
tries, strengthen its own security sector, and intensify 
development cooperation. 
Niger is regarded by the EU as one of the most 
reliable allies in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of mi-
gration partnerships. Cooperation is close, and the 
Nigerien government has involved the EU to a large 
extent, both in the formulation of its migration policy 
and in its implementation. Through the EU Emergency 
Trust Fund (EUTF) and bilateral cooperation, the Com-
munity and its member states promote the compe-
tencies of the Nigerien administration in migration 
management and control and support the Nigerien 
security apparatus in order to increase the effective-
ness of controls. In addition, there are development 
projects and efforts to encourage West African 
migrants to return voluntarily. The focus of project 
implementation so far has been on repressive meas-
 
∗ The article is based on 35 qualitative interviews with 
political decision-makers, scientists, and staff of civil society 
and international organisations conducted in Niamey in 
June 2017 and in Berlin between May and December 2017. 
The interviews have been made anonymous for reasons of 
source protection. 
ures, which have led to a rapid decline in transit 
movements through the north of the country since 
2016. 
The IOM estimates that 70 per cent of 
West African migration flows take 
place within the ECOWAS region. 
Development projects aimed at creating new jobs, 
on the other hand, are only starting slowly. It cannot 
be predicted when – if at all – these projects will 
have the necessary effect to offer economic alterna-
tives to the migration economy in the long term. 
It is also not known to what extent the develop-
ment of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), which for years has successfully 
sought to integrate 15 West African states, will suffer 
under the new restrictions. 
The importance of migration for Niger 
Migratory movements are not a new phenomenon 
in Niger. For centuries, the Sahel region has been 
an important trading centre that lives from circular 
migration.1 This still applies today. Migration takes 
place primarily within the ECOWAS region. Never-
theless, the European interest in cooperation with 
countries of the region on migration policies has 
grown strongly since then. As a transit country, Niger 
moved into Europe’s focus in 2015 and has become 
one of its most important partners. 
Niger is considered a hybrid system with democratic 
and authoritarian tendencies. Elections have been 
held regularly since 1993, although they have been 
accompanied repeatedly by unrest and/or accusations 
 
1 Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara. Regional 
Connectivity in the Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
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of electoral fraud. The last military coup took place 
in 2010.2 A year later, President Issoufou was elected, 
who in turn withstood an alleged coup d’état in 2015. 
The background and causes of the coup were inten-
sively discussed in the country.3 The state monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force is weak outside the 
capital, Niamey, and especially in the north of the 
country and in the border region between Nigeria and 
Mali.4 Citizens’ rights are guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion but are often not respected in practice. Short-
comings exist, for example, with regard to freedom 
of opinion and freedom of the press, which has been 
repeatedly restricted in the past following criticisms 
of the government.5  
The country is the penultimate country in the 
Human Development Index6 and is highly dependent 
on international financial support. Niger has one of 
the highest birth rates in the world, with 7.3 children 
per woman.7 Bordering Mali, Algeria, Libya, Chad, 
Nigeria, Benin, and Burkina Faso, ECOWAS member 
Niger is both a recipient country for migrants and 
refugees and – to a lesser extent – a country of 
origin, but primarily a transit point. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 70 
per cent of West African migration flows take place 
within the ECOWAS region. Only 30 per cent of 
migrants leave the ECOWAS region to seek work 
either in North Africa or in Europe.8 Nigerien citizens 
mainly migrate to neighbouring countries such as 
Libya and Algeria or to other West African countries 
 
2 BTI 2016. Niger Country Report (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2016), 7, https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/ 
files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Niger.pdf 
(accessed 29 January 2018). 
3 Idayat Hassan, Situation Analysis Niger (Stockholm: Inter-
national Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
February 2016), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/ 
publications/situation-analysis-niger-EN.pdf (accessed 
30 January 2018). 
4 BTI 2016 (see note 2). 
5 Amnesty International, Niger 2017, 20 May 2017, https:// 
www.amnesty.de/jahresbericht/2017/niger (accessed 19 Janu-
ary 2018). 
6 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Niger 
(Stand 2015), Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp. 
org/en/countries/profiles/NER (accessed 19 January 2018). 
7 The World Bank, “Fertility Rates, Total (Birth per Women)” 
(Stand 2015), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN. 
TFRT.IN/ (accessed 26 January 2018). 
8 International Organization for Migration (IOM), West and 
Central Africa, 2017, https://www.iom.int/west-and-central-
africa (accessed 21 December 2017). 
looking for economic alternatives.9 Seasonal mobility 
also plays an important role to secure supply: Cattle 
herders and farmers move around within and outside 
national borders, depending on the wet and dry 
seasons.10  
Over the last 10 years, migration has slowly but 
steadily gained economic importance for northern 
Niger. Until 2007 tourism was an important eco-
nomic sector. The rebellion of the Tuareg faction MNJ 
(Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice) from 2007 
to 2009 put an end to this.11 Hostage-taking and 
attacks by jihadist networks such as AQIM (al-Qaida 
in the Maghreb) and MUJAO (Movement for Unity and 
Jihad in West Africa) ensured that the situation did 
not ease afterwards either – on the contrary.12 For 
the local population, which had previously worked 
in the tourism sector, the migration sector became an 
alternative, especially after political insecurity in the 
Sahel compelled more and more people to leave.13 
The state disintegration of Libya in 2011 led to a rapid 
increase in transit migration because people were no 
 
9 “Vom weißen Fleck zum Frontstaat”. Interview with 
Moussa Tchangari of the Nigerien human rights organisation 
Association Alternatives Espaces Citoyens, in Medico Inter-
national Rundschreiben, 4/17, 24–29, https://www.medico.de/ 
material/rundschreiben/2017/rettung-lauert-ueberall/ 
(accessed 18 January 2018). 
10 Mirjam de Brujin, “Mobility and Society in the Sahel: 
An Exploration of Mobile Margins and Global Governance”, 
in Cultures of Migration. African Perspectives, ed. Hans Peter 
Hahn and Georg Klute (Berlin: Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2007), 
109–28. 
11 Emmanuel Grégoire and Marko Scholze, “Identität, 
Imagination und Tourismus bei den Tuareg im Norden 
des Niger”, Via@ – internationale interdisziplinäre Tourismus-
zeitschrift, 2012/2, https://viatourismreview.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/06/Article10_DE.pdf (accessed 21 December 
2017). 
12 Wolfram Lacher and Guido Steinberg, “Transnationaler 
Jihadismus, lokal verwurzelt: AQIM und MUJAO in der 
Sahara”, in Jihadismus in Afrika. Lokale Ursachen, regionale Aus-
breitung, internationale Verbindungen, SWP-Studie 7/2015, ed. 
Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber (Berlin: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, March 2015), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2015_S07_ 
sbg_web.pdf (accessed 14 November 2017). 
13 Ines Kohl, “Flucht und Migration durch die Sahara: 
Tuareg, Akteure eines transnationalen Netzwerks”, in 
Schleppen, Schleusen, Helfen. Flucht zwischen Rettung und Aus-
beutung, ed. Gabriele Anderl and Simon Usaty (Vienna: 
Mandelbaum, 2015), 449–67 (451–53). 
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longer held back at the Libyan border.14 Since then, 
at the latest, the migration economy in the North has 
played a role that should not be underestimated, and 
various social actors have participated in it. 
Corruption is widespread in Niger. 
This also applies to migration. 
Well-developed networks, consisting primarily of 
the Tubu and Tuareg peoples, have taken over the 
transport of West African migrants along strategic 
junctions. The Tuareg networks were responsible for 
the route to Algeria, which runs via Arlit; they also 
controlled the route to the Tchinchad gold mines. The 
Tubu controlled the way to Libya via Dirkou and the 
route to the Djado gold mines under their control.15 
Labour migration from Niger and West Africa to these 
gold mines thus further intensified the migration 
dynamics.16  
Various sources suggest that the Nigerien security 
sector also benefited. Corruption is widespread in 
Niger.17 This also applies to the area of migration: 
Security forces raised a “Baksheesh” for the transit of 
migrants before they let buses pass.18 A study suggests 
that this illegal taxation was already included in the 
travel costs to ensure no delays at the crossings.19 It is 
 
14 Tahar Benattia and Marie-Cecile Darme, Mixed Migration 
Trends in Libya: Changing Dynamics and Protection Challenges 
(UNHCR, Impact, Altai Consulting, February 2017), http:// 
www.altaiconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Mixed-
Migration-Trends-in-Libya-Executive-Summary.pdf (accessed 
10 January 2018). 
15 Fransje Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand. Roadmap for 
Sustainable Migration Management in Agadez, CRU Report (The 
Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands Institute for International 
Relations, October 2017), 34, https://www.clingendael.org/ 
sites/default/files/2017-10/Roadmap_for_sustainable_ 
migration_management_Agadez.pdf (accessed 9 January 
2018). 
16 Interviews with scientists from the Nigerien Research 
Institute Laboratoire d’Études et de Recherches sur les Dyna-
miques Sociales et le Développement Local (LASDEL) and 
with a scientist from Niamey University, Niamey, June 2017. 
17 BTI 2016 (see note 2), 9; Marie Chêne, Niger: Overview 
of Corruption and Anti-corruption (Transparency International, 
23 January 2017), https://www.transparency.org/files/ 
content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Niger_2017.pdf 
(accessed 26 January 2018). 
18 Kohl, “Flucht und Migration” (see note 13), 454. 
19 Fransje Molenaar, Irregular Migration and Human Smug-
gling Networks in Niger (The Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands 
Institute for International Relations, February 2017), 15, 
striking that since 2011, Nigerien security officials 
have increasingly expressed the wish to be transferred 
to the North. Obviously, the officers expected addi-
tional income from such a step,20 which suggests a 
close cooperation between the transporters and the 
security apparatus. When the Nigerien government 
primarily addresses the profits in the migration 
economy, it primarily addresses those of the carriers. 
People in transit also have to stop somewhere and 
need accommodation, services, and goods. Staging 
destinations such as Agadez, Arlit, Dirkou, and 
Séguédine were prepared for this. Migrants spent 
weeks – or even months – preparing to continue 
their journeys.21 They were often accommodated in 
ghetto-like quarters; according to the European Bor-
der and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the Nigerien 
police reported 70 of these “ghettos” in 2015.22 The 
temporary stay of migrants23 developed into a com-
paratively lucrative business. In Dirkou alone, an 
estimated 60 per cent of 18- to 25-year-olds worked in 
the transport sector, and job seekers from other parts 
of the country also flocked to Agadez. This had an 
impact on population development: According to a 
study from the Clingendael Institute, the city’s popu-
lation would increase from 100,000 to 500,000 in just 
the four years between 2012 and 2016.24 
 
https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/irregular_ 
migration_and_human_smuggling_networks_in_niger_0.pdf 
(accessed 20 December 2017). 
20 Interview with Wolfram Lacher, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, January 2018. 
21 Interviews with scientists from the Nigerien research 
institute LASDEL and a scientist from Niamey University, 
Niamey, June 2017; see also: Molenaar, Irregular Migration 
(see note 19). 
22 Frontex, Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Front Report 
(2015), 26, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_ 
Analysis/AFIC/AFIC_report_2015.pdf (accessed 16 January 
2018). 
23 Alexandre Devillard et al., A Survey on Migration Policies in 
West Africa (Vienna: ICMPD/Dakar: IOM, March 2015), 240, 
http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/survey_west_ 
africa_en.pdf (accessed 9 January 2018). 
24 Molenaar, Irregular Migration (see note 19), 22. 
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EU initiatives are seen as an 
opportunity to raise one’s profile in 
foreign policy and to promote 
cooperation with Europe. 
Even if born out of necessity, the migration econ-
omy thus opened up the possibility of integrating 
dissatisfied groups economically and employing them, 
at least in a rudimentary way. The government 
abandoned this stabilising factor when it decided to 
regulate migration in 2015. The decisive factor for 
this was the changed interests of the EU. 
Whose migration agenda? 
Niger’s migration policy can be characterised as 
reactive in relation to European concerns: The regu-
lation of migration has only been taking place in 
Niger since the EU offered to cooperate in this area. 
The Nigerien government is prepared to do so, 
although the collapse of the described economy in 
the North could lead to political destabilisation. The 
EU initiatives are seen as an opportunity to sharpen 
Niger’s foreign policy profile and to promote both 
security and development cooperation with Europe. 
President Issoufou, who has been trying since the 
beginning of his electoral term to present himself 
to the EU as a reliable partner,25 has closely linked 
migration cooperation with his personal agenda and 
is resolutely pushing it forward; his most important 
supporter is Minister of the Interior Mohamed 
Bazoum. Meetings with European state and govern-
ment representatives have increased Issoufou’s 
prominence and popularity on an international level. 
In official statements, Nigerien government repre-
sentatives speak of the “converging interests” of the 
EU and Niger.26 This is reflected in the almost equal 
representation of the necessary coordination meet-
ings. The committee convened for this purpose 
(“cadre de concertation sur la migration”) is located at 
the Nigerien Ministry of the Interior. It has held three 
meetings so far.27 The meetings in October 2016 and 
 
25 Alex Thurston, “Issoufou Is Everything the West Wants 
in a Leader”, World Politics Review, 12 September 2017, https:// 
www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23116/niger-s-
issoufou-is-everything-the-west-wants-in-an-african-leader 
(accessed 19 December 2017). 
26 Interviews with representatives of Nigerien ministries, 
Niamey, June 2017. 
27 As of April 2018. 
June 2017 were attended not only by the EU delega-
tion but also by the ambassadors from Spain, Ger-
many, and France, and in June 2017 by the Italian 
ambassador.28 The meetings were coordinated jointly 
by the Nigerien Ministry of the Interior and the EU 
Representation in Niger.29 The composition of the 
staff in the meetings illustrates the Nigerien govern-
ment’s real political bartering: It implements the new 
migration policy in close consultation with the EU 
to receive political and economic support in return. 
However, critical observers fear that the Nigerien 
migration agenda is dominated by the EU.30 Since 
migration has hardly been regulated in Niger, the Ni-
gerien administration has few competencies in this 
area. The European partners offer support in this 
regard for the purpose of a “coherent migration 
policy”,31 but it is unclear to what extent the Nigerien 
government is at all capable of making decisions on 
regulatory matters. With regard to the objectives of 
migration policy, one can hardly recognise a differ-
ence between the rhetoric of the Nigerien and Euro-
pean partners. 
Domestically, this is not uncontroversial.32 Alt-
hough groups in Agadez reject the regulations that 
criminalise migration, civil society organisations 
and journalists complain that public criticism of the 
migration agenda has become more difficult. The gov-
ernment has reacted tensely to such reports, which 
 
28 See also pictures on the Facebook page of the EU dele-
gation in Niger, https://www.facebook.com/pg/UENiger/ 
photos/?tab=album&album_id=1730519080607143 (accessed 
1 December 2017). 
29 Le Sahel, “2ème réunion du cadre de concertation 
sur la migration: Passer en revue les nombreuses avancées 
dans la lutte contre le phénomène”, 2017, http://news. 
aniamey.com/h/80018.html (accessed 5 April 2018). 
30 Various interviews with civil society organisations and 
scientists at the University of Niamey and the research insti-
tute LASDEL, Niamey, June 2017). 
31 Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
“Niger. Migrationspolitische Beratung”, 2018, https://www. 
giz.de/de/weltweit/58037.html (accessed 29 January 2018). 
32 “Tcherno Boulama, periodista nigerino: ‘La frontera 
de la UE está en Agadez’”, interview in EFE, 11 July 2017, 
https://www.efe.com/efe/espana/entrevistas/tcherno-boulama-
periodista-nigerino-la-frontera-de-ue-esta-en-agadez/10012-
3322514; see also Medico International, “Wohin führt die 
aktuelle Flüchtlings- und Migrationspolitik?”, Podium dis-
cussion with, among others, Albert Chaibou and Ousmane 
Diarra, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJdL8BYBrSs 
(both accessed 29 January 2018). 
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therefore had to be formulated with caution.33 The 
restriction of civil society organisations in Niger is not 
on the same level as the massive levels of repression 
in Egypt or Sudan, for example (see the contributions 
on Egypt, p. 56ff., and Sudan, p. 44ff.). In recent years, 
however, people in Niger have been arrested, for 
example when cooperation between Niger and France 
in uranium mining and sales and in the security 
sector has been called into question.34 
Following the increasing levels of criticism in its 
own country, the Nigerien government has tried to 
explain more clearly why the regulation of migration 
is important and correct, despite economic losses. It 
focusses on humanitarian aspects: The new policy 
protects people from the dangerous crossing of the 
Sahara.35 In fact, robberies and mistreatment happen 
regularly on these routes, as various reports show.36 
Nevertheless, many migrants apparently renounce 
the “protection” that is offered and continue to take 
the journey, despite the risks.37 Officials counter the 
argument that the country is giving up an important 
economic sector with the argument that the country 
is also losing taxes because of illicit trade at the 
border.38  
The Nigerien government also stresses the secu-
rity dimension of the controls. Legal migration from 
ECOWAS countries would not be affected by this 
regulation; it is rather about “avoiding illegal onward 
 
33 Interviews with representatives of civil society organisa-
tions, Niamey, June 2017. 
34 Thibault Van Damme, Under the Shadow of Boko Haram: 
Niger on the Eve of Elections, CRU Commentary (The Hague: 
Clingendael, 2016), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/ 
files/pdfs/Under%20the%20shadow%20of%20Boko%20aram
%20Niger%20on%20the%20eve%20of%20elections.pdf 
(accessed 30 January 2018). 
35 Little is known to date about whether and how the slave 
trade from African countries to Libya, which caused great 
indignation on the part of the AU member states during the 
EU-Africa summit in November 2017, is linked to migration 
dynamics. 
36 Fabrizio Gatti, Bilal: Als Illegaler auf dem Weg nach Europa 
(Munich: Kunstmann, 2010); IOM, Migrant Profiling Report 
2016, https://gmdac.iom.int/sites/default/files/Web%20 
Version%20-%20IOM%20Niger%202016%20Profiling%20 
Report_EN.pdf (accessed 28 January 2018). 
37 Interviews with migrants from various West African 
countries in Niamey, June 2017. 
38 Interview with a representative of the Haute Autorité 
de la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP), Niamey, June 2017. 
travel to Algeria or Libya”.39 In addition, the same 
networks that transport people would also bring 
weapons and drugs to the country.40 So far, no sys-
tematic research exists that has proven this connec-
tion. Ethnological research with a focus on Tuareg 
groups even comes to a different conclusions: For 
these groups, which organise migrants’ journeys 
through the Sahel, there is the danger of encounter-
ing arms and drug traffickers.41 Civil society organi-
sations therefore complain that the government’s 
arguments put Nigerien transport networks in a bad 
light and exacerbate political and ethnic tensions.42 
Since cooperation with the EU is 
closely linked to the person of 
Issoufou, much is at stake for him. 
The nervous reaction of the Nigerien government 
shows how risky it is to cooperate with the EU. Those 
responsible are in a dilemma: Due to its financial 
dependence, Niger must meet the expectations of its 
European partners and, at the same time, further 
integrate divergent social groups in order to maintain 
political stability in the country. Since cooperation 
with the EU is closely linked to the person of Issou-
fou, much is at stake for him. Failure of cooperation 
would weaken him politically and jeopardise the 
implementation of development projects he is aiming 
for. At the same time, domestic dissatisfaction with 
the implementation of EU initiatives could provoke 
new coup attempts against the president. 
Priorities and effects of the 
new migration policy 
The migration policy, which Niger has been imple-
menting with European support since 2015, focusses 
on (1) repressive measures aiming at making migra-
tion more difficult; (2) various development coopera-
 
39 Interviews with staff from Nigerien ministries, Niamey, 
June 2017. See also Christian Putsch, “Glauben Sie mir, 
dieses Mal ist es uns ernst”. Interview with Mohamed 
Bazoum, Die Welt (online), 12 December 2016, https://www. 
welt.de/politik/ausland/article160094557/Glauben-Sie-mir-
diesmal-ist-es-uns-ernst.html (accessed 29 January 2018). 
40 Putsch, “Glauben Sie mir” (see note 39). 
41 Kohl, “Flucht und Migration” (see note 13), 460. 
42 Interviews with scientists from Niamey University and 
representatives of civil society organisations, Niamey, June 
2017. See also “Vom weißen Fleck zum Frontstaat” (see note 9). 
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tion instruments to create employment alternatives 
to the migration economy; (3) support for voluntary 
return to West Africa through cooperation with the 
IOM. So far, as the analysis shows, the main focus has 
been on reducing mixed migration. This has economic 
consequences that cannot yet be offset by develop-
ment cooperation measures. 
Restricting migration as a primary goal 
On 26 May 2015, the Nigerien government passed 
a law differentiating between “legal” and “illegal” 
migration. To date, citizens from ECOWAS countries 
have been able to stay in Niger without a valid pass-
port. Nor did the transporters have to fear any con-
sequences.43 Migrants without valid passports will 
still not be punished, but the drivers will be criminal-
ised. The government is focussing its attention on 
the region north of Agadez. If citizens from other 
ECOWAS countries are caught without valid passports 
while being driven in vehicles in this area, the drivers 
can be prosecuted as traffickers. The Nigerien govern-
ment assumes that the intention is then to cross the 
border, even if this border is 800 km further north.44 
This offence can be punished with imprisonment 
for up to 25 years.45 The reinforcement of Nigerien 
border controls – both on the border with West 
African countries and on the border with Libya and 
Algeria – was supported by the EU. About a quarter 
of the funds provided by the EUTF for Niger are spent 
on border control mechanisms.46 In addition, the fi-
nancing of numerous other initiatives shows a strong 
overlap between migration and security policies.47  
 
43 Kohl, “Flucht und Migration” (see note 13), 454. 
44 Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand (see note 15), 13. 
45 Republique du Niger, Loi No. 2015–36 du 26 mai 2015 
relative au trafic illicite de migrants, https://www.unodc.org/ 
res/cld/document/ner/2015/loi_relative_au_trafic_illicite_ 
de_migrants_html/Loi_N2015-36_relative_au_trafic_illicite_ 
de_migrants.pdf (accessed 9 January 2017). 
46 See overview of the European Commission, Fonds fidu-
ciaire pour l’Afrique. Actions au Niger, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/sites/devco/files/niger_vf.pdf (accessed 20 Decem-
ber 2017); see also Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand (see 
note 15), 16. 
47 These include the training missions of EUCAP (European 
Capacity Building Mission) Sahel, see https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
csdp-missions-operations/eucap-sahel-niger_en. The Federal 
Foreign Office is financing two projects to secure the coun-
try’s borders, https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/57301.html, and 
https://www.giz.de/de/weltweit/20718.html. In 2016 the Bun-
In autumn 2017, the Nigerien authorities took 
stock of the new law and its implementation: 282 
people who would have benefited from migration as 
drivers or operators of shelters have been arrested and 
169 cars confiscated by the Nigerien security forces 
since the law was passed.48 According to official IOM 
figures, migration via Agadez decreased by 75 per 
cent between the first half of 2016 and the same 
period in 2017.49 However, the IOM only monitors 
migration through Agadez. It is therefore possible 
that the drivers will now avoid these checkpoints. 
According to smugglers, it can be assumed that at 
least two new migration routes have been developed, 
writes the IOM: one on the border with Chad, another 
through Algeria.50 According to a report from the 
UN Security Council at the end of 2017, West African 
migrants are now increasingly reaching Libya via 
Chad and West and North Darfur.51 
Since transport has been criminalised, the travel 
costs for migrants have increased and the journey has 
become even more dangerous52: Between April and 
July 2017, the IOM reportedly rescued at least 600 
people who had been abandoned in the desert,53 pre-
 
deswehr included Niger for the first time in its upgrading 
initiative and paid for equipment for the Nigerien army, 
see https://www.bmvg.de/de/themen/dossiers/engagement- 
in-afrika/das-engagement/ertuechtigung-in-afrika/faq-
ertuechtigung (all accessed 27 March 2018). Since the mili-
tary and police take on border security tasks, security-sector 
support also influences – unspoken – the regulation of 
migration. 
48 Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand (see note 15), 8–9. 
49 Ibid., 9; see also IOM 2017, Point de suivi de flux de popu-
lation, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_hLuy9q1oXQai1FUn 
A1OTZGWlE/view (accessed 19 January 2018). 
50 IOM Niger Overview. Migrant Resource and Response Mecha-
nism (Niamey: IOM, June 2017), 2. 
51 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 28 December 
2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant 
to Resolution 1591 (2005) Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, S/2017/1125, 28 December 2017, http://www.un.org/ 
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/1125 (accessed 18 
January 2018). 
52 Alfred Hackensberger, “Wie riegelt man die Wüste ab?”, 
Die Welt, 20 December 2017, https://www.welt.de/print/die_ 
welt/politik/article171757194/Wie-riegelt-man-die-Wueste-
ab.html (accessed 21 December 2017). 
53 “52 Dead in Niger As UN Migration Agency Search and 
Rescue Operation Saves 600 Stranded Migrants in Sahara 
Desert” (IOM, 27 June 2017), https://www.iom.int/news/52-
dead-niger-un-migration-agency-search-and-rescue-operation-
saves-600-stranded-migrants (accessed 29 January 2018). 
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sumably for fear of arrest. Whether corruption con-
tinues to play a role in the security sector cannot be 
conclusively assessed from previous sources. Accord-
ing to an earlier study from February 2016, border 
officials are not willing to perform the prescribed 
controls – instead, they allow vehicles to pass 
through in exchange for bribes in order to improve 
their poor salaries.54 The Nigerien government stated 
in December 2016 that the security authorities con-
trolled the water points in the region and that the 
vehicles had little chance of crossing the Sahara.55 
However, it remains to be seen whether this will ac-
tually be done effectively. In any case, Issoufou trans-
ferred a new police chief to Agadez in mid-2017 who 
emphasises the faithful commitment of the police.56 
Slow economic compensation 
Agadez’s efforts to curb migration have affected the 
local economy, which had previously had to cope 
with the collapse of tourism. So far, there are few 
economic alternatives, especially since the Nigerien 
government closed gold mines of artisanal mining in 
2017 that operated without a licence.57 However, this 
had important – albeit indirect and informal – eco-
nomic implications for the region.58 High unemploy-
ment carries the risk of political destabilisation. It 
is therefore not surprising that the Nigerien govern-
ment has called for the expansion of development 
projects in Niger from the beginning of the coopera-
tion with the EU. 
 
54 Eric Komlavi Hahonou, Security in the Sahel – Corruption, 
Insecurity and Border Control in Niger, DDIS Policy Brief (Febru-
ary 2016), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ 
resources/PB_Sahel_WEB.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018). 
Note: The study does not explicitly refer to the new migra-
tion law, but to existing legislation on various forms of bor-
der activities (arms and drug smuggling, human trafficking, 
etc.). 
55 Putsch, “Glauben Sie mir” (see note 39). 
56 Hackensberger, “Wie riegelt man die Wüste ab?” 
(see note 52). 
57 Interview with Scientists of Niamey University, June 
2017. See also: “Niger: Artisanal Gold Panners Evicted from 
a Gold Site”, La Libre Afrique, 18 July 2017, https://afrique. 
lalibre.be/6176/niger-les-orpailleurs-artisanaux-evinces-dun-
site-aurifere/ (accessed 30 October 2018). 
58 Mathieu Pellerin, Beyond the “Wild West”. The Gold Rush in 
Northern Niger, SANA Briefing Paper (Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, June 2017), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ 
fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Niger-Gold.pdf 
(accessed 30 January 2018). 
At first it seemed to work out. Of the 139.9 million 
from the EUTF for Niger alone, 36.9 million will go 
to long-term development cooperation projects and 
8 million to create short-term employment opportuni-
ties, mainly in the Agadez and Diffa regions.59 At the 
end of 2017, the EU steered around €1 billion towards 
further development cooperation projects.60 A whole 
package of measures is therefore planned to boost the 
economy. But it will take time for these projects to 
take effect. 
Local actors in Agadez have been critical of the 
plans since their inception.61 Even if implementation 
were successful, the effects would be too small to 
compensate for the high losses incurred. There are 
different statements regarding the costs of a trip to 
Libya: The price range before the introduction of the 
law was €120 to €300.62 According to Nigerien stand-
ards, €120 would be a high profit, considering that a 
truck could accommodate between 15 and 30 people. 
A whole network of people involved in transport 
and logistics benefited from this income.63 Since the 
decline in migration, costs are said to have increased 
to at least €400. For trips in small groups, the average 
quoted price is €1,400.64 Here, however, the question 
 
59 Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand (see note 15), 16. See 
also: European Commission, Fonds fiduciaire pour l’Afrique 
(see note 46). 
60 “EU Will Support Niger with Assistance of €1 Billion 
by 2020”, European Commission Press Release (Brussels, 13 
December 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
5233_en.htm (accessed 19 January 2018). 
61 Laura Dean, “Migration after Rebellion”, International 
Reporting Project, 6 June 2017, https://internationalreporting 
project.org/stories/view/in-agadez; Ibrahim Manzo Diallo, 
“Niger-Agadez: Former Migration Operators Express Their 
Anger against the Authorities”, The Sahelien, 9 May 2017, 
http://sahelien.com/en/niger-agadez-former-migration-
operators-express-their-anger-against-the-authorities/ (both 
accessed 19 January 2018). 
62 Christian Jakob, “Endstation Agadez”, taz, 18 December 
2017, determined €120, http://taz.de/Wie-Niger-die-Flucht 
routen-dicht-macht/!5468121/ (accessed 10 January 2018). 
After citing “several sources”, Molenaar, Irregular Migration 
(see note 19), 21, calculated €230. Jérôme Tubiana, “Europe’s 
‘Migrant Hunters’” (in Foreign Affairs) states $250 (or €200), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/niger/2017-08-31/ 
europes-migrant-hunters (accessed 30 January 2018). 
Hackensberger, “Wie riegelt man die Wüste ab?” (see note 
52), cites a driver, who used to take $300. 
63 Molenaar, Irregular Migration (see note 19), 20–23. 
64 Tubiana, “Europe’s ‘Migrant Hunters’” (see note 62), 
speaks of at least $500 (i.e. €400), and $1,800 dollars (i.e. 
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arises as to which migrants can even afford to pay 
these prices. 
A survey of development projects in the region 
in autumn 2017 shows that the local population is 
not satisfied with the first phase of implementation. 
Around two-thirds of those surveyed stressed that 
they had benefited from the presence of migrants, but 
not from the development projects. This also applies 
to the municipality of Agadez as such.65 The projects 
mainly benefited (foreign) development organisations 
and some local political authorities. Some of these 
authorities would act more in the interests of the EU 
than of the local population. Traditional and religious 
authorities “such as community elders, imams, and 
the sultan” were not given a decent chance to have a 
say in the planning.66 Concrete proposals for projects 
in a reconversion plan for the Agadez region were 
also refused funding.67 This criticism is also being 
directed against the central government: President 
Issoufou has filled the governor’s post in the Agadez 
region with a non-resident who acts in the spirit of 
the central government and stresses the need to regu-
late migration.68  
The region still appears to be politically stable, 
but the mood could change if dissatisfaction with 
the economic situation increases. The economic and 
political developments in northern Niger therefore 
deserve critical attention. If former Tuareg rebels see 
no possibilities of economic compensation for them-
selves, and members of the Tubu networks feel even 
more marginalised by the restrictions on migration 
than they already do,69 violent conflicts are immi-
nent. There is also a risk of unemployed young people 
turning towards jihadist groups. This rural demo-
graphic is susceptible to radicalisation.70 
 
€1,400), for exclusive trips; Hackensberger, “Wie riegelt 
man die Wüste ab?” (see note 52), assumes €1,000. 
65 Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand (see note 15), 4. 
66 Ibid., 5. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See various interviews with Governor Sadou Soloké 
and reports about him: Hackensberger, “Wie riegelt man die 
Wüste ab?” (see note 52); Jakob, “Endstation Agadez” (see 
note 62). 
69 Molenaar et al., A Line in the Sand (see note 15), 33. 
70 UNDP, Journey to Extremism in Africa (2017), 5–7, 
http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/ 
UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf (accessed 
29 January 2018); International Crisis Group, “Forced Out of 
Towns in the Sahel, Africa’s Jihadists Go Rural”, 11 January 
2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/ 
Voluntary return 
The third priority of Niger’s migration policy com-
prises projects to support the voluntary return of 
migrants to West Africa.71 These programmes are 
implemented by the IOM and funded by the EU. The 
IOM offers migrants from West Africa the option 
of return at the central hubs of migration in Niger. 
People who are picked up during police checks in the 
desert can also receive appropriate support at an IOM 
centre.72 If interested, the organisation finances the 
voluntary return and – together with those interest-
ed, partly with the involvement of their families – 
looks for economic alternatives for them in their 
country of origin.73  
Between March and September 2017, there were 
20 return and reintegration projects launched in five 
West African countries – Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Guinea, and Cameroon – with funding from 
the EUTF and the EU’s Migrant Resource and Re-
sponse Mechanism programme. As early as 2016, 
the IOM returned more than 4,800 migrants to their 
countries of origin through 70 reintegration projects 
in Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, Mali, and Guinea-Bis-
sau.74 So far, there are no studies to assess the success 
of the IOM measures. It is therefore unclear whether 
the prospects offered are sustainable in the long term 
or whether the returnees will return to Europe after a 
certain period of time. The latter is supported by the 
new migration routes already mentioned. 
Risks for regional cooperation 
Mobility is of great importance for the West African 
economic area: Labour migration in the services sec-
tor as well as in agriculture and livestock farming75 
 
forced-out-towns-sahel-africas-jihadists-go-rural (accessed 
19 January 2018); Savannah De Tessières, At the Crossroads of 
Sahelian Conflicts. Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in 
Niger (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2017), 29–34, http:// 
www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-
SANA-Report-Niger.pdf (accessed 26 January 2018). 
71 Interviews with IOM employees, Niamey, June 2017. 
72 Jakob, “Endstation Agadez” (see note 62). 
73 “IOM Launches Reintegration Projects for West African 
Migrants with EU Trust Fund Support” (IOM, 2017), https:// 
www.iom.int/countries/niger (accessed 14 November 2017). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Malte Steinbrink and Hannah Niedenführ, Afrika in 
Bewegung. Translokale Livelihoods und ländliche Entwicklung 
in Subsahara-Afrika (Bielefeld: transcript, 2017), 108. 
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generates important sources of income. Although the 
Nigerien government distinguishes between legal 
and illegal migration, the new legislation can de facto 
hinder this circular migration. Only a few citizens 
of the ECOWAS region hold a passport because they 
were not previously dependent on it for crossing the 
border. 
However, systematic studies about the effects on 
the ECOWAS region are not yet available. Questions 
about the medium-term effects of migration measures 
on economic development in the region in terms 
of trade and job seeking must therefore be critically 
examined. West and Central African states and 
ECOWAS countries were included in European migra-
tion initiatives via the Rabat Process (see the contribu-
tion on instruments, actors, and strategies, p. 9ff.); the 
IOM also offers support to the economic community 
with regard to the collection of migration data and 
migration management.76 However, ECOWAS has not 
yet been systematically integrated and strengthened 
in order to coordinate regional dynamics.77 
With the reduction in mixed migra-
tion, the Europeans’ desire to achieve 
visible success quickly was met. 
Nevertheless, a number of security and develop-
ment policy initiatives are planned or already under-
way concerning ECOWAS countries, such as the so-
called Compact Agreements with Senegal, Ghana, and 
Côte d’Ivoire to promote economic relations, which 
are coordinated bilaterally.78 If implemented success-
fully, economic development can change the migra-
 
76 IOM, “Free Movement of Persons and Migration Project 
in West Africa Builds Capacity in Migration Data Collection 
and Management”, 26 May 2017, https://www.iom.int/news/ 
free-movement-persons-and-migration-project-west-africa-
builds-capacity-migration-data; see also IOM, “UN Migration 
Agency Co-hosts Free Movement of Persons Workshop in 
Gambia, Nigeria”, 4 August 2017, https://www.iom.int/news/ 
un-migration-agency-co-hosts-free-movement-persons-
workshops-gambia-nigeria (both accessed 25 January 2018). 
77 See also Anne Koch, Eva Dick, Benjamin Schraven, and 
Benjamin Etzold, Regionale Migrationsgovernance. Impulse für 
eine nachhaltige Migrationsarchitektur, SWP-Aktuell 81/2017 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2017), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
aktuell/2017A81_koh_etal.pdf (accessed 29 January 2018). 
78 See “G20 Compact with Africa”, https://www.compact 
withafrica.org/content/compactwithafrica/home.html (ac-
cessed 30 January 2018). 
tion dynamics within the ECOWAS region. The securi-
ty cooperation envisaged under the G5 Sahel, in turn, 
includes partner countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, 
and Niger, which are part of ECOWAS, but also some 
that do not belong to it, such as Mauritania and 
Chad.79 This can have a negative effect on ECOWAS’s 
willingness to act as a community. 
Outlook 
As the analysis of past measures in the area of migra-
tion shows, President Issoufou in particular is relying 
on cooperation with the EU. This is done in the hope 
of bringing economic development and enhancing 
Niger’s voice at the international level. The desire to 
increase his own power comes at the expense of the 
North, which has had to cope with the drastic decline 
in migration movements and a slump in the economy 
that emerged from this issue. With the reduction in 
mixed migration, the European objective of quickly 
achieving visible success has been met. Now the Ni-
gerien government is highly dependent on the rapid 
success of development policies financed by the EU. 
Dependence is twofold: The implementation of the 
agreed migration policy has to carry on if cooperation 
with the EU is to continue. 
Nigerien and European interests converge, but they 
are not congruent. For Niger, border security plays a 
role for security reasons. At least for the North, how-
ever, the containment of migration is not in its eco-
nomic interest. Cooperation with the EU should bring 
funds into the country in addition to existing devel-
opment cooperation projects. However, the high 
expectations regarding the possibilities of develop-
ment projects, which do (and can) only slowly reveal 
their effects, have not been met yet. This threatens to 
destabilise the North, which, in the worst case, could 
lead to another Tuareg rebellion and the strengthen-
ing of jihadist networks. New attempts to overthrow 
the government are also conceivable. It is difficult to 
assess whether Issoufou has sufficiently considered 
the risks of economic dissatisfaction. It is also unclear 
whether he is prepared to accept these risks for now 
in order to transform the migration economy, which 
 
79 International Crisis Group, Finding the Right Role for the 
G5 Sahel Joint Force (Brussels and Dakar, 12 December 2017), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/burkina-faso/ 
258-force-du-g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-
securitaire (accessed 30 January 2018). 
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is born out of necessity, into a more stable economic 
driver. He might then also be able to increase his 
power and control of the central government vis-à-vis 
the North. 
The cooperation with the EU and the state visits of 
high-ranking European government representatives 
have happened quickly and, in the short term, raised 
the prestige of the Nigerien government. Issoufou, in 
particular, is invested in this cooperation. His many 
years of work on joint projects with Europe now seem 
to be paying off. In contrast to other countries exam-
ined in this study, such as Egypt, migration policy 
cooperation has not increased the authoritarian ten-
dencies of the government. This could change, how-
ever, if discontent and pressure on Issoufou increase. 
If a political overthrow succeeds, a person with a 
more pronounced authoritarian consciousness could 
also prevail, who would then benefit from the en-
hancement and strengthening of the security appa-
ratus initiated by Issoufou. 
In addition to possible domestic implications, the 
interaction of various policy measures – migration, 
security, and development policies – in the ECOWAS 
region must be taken into account. Regional integra-
tion had picked up momentum, not least since the 
ECOWAS intervention in the Gambia, which per-
suaded Yayha Jammeh, who had been voted out of 
office, to withdraw.80 In cooperation with ECOWAS 
countries, it is therefore advisable to investigate the 
impact of the various initiatives on regional integra-
tion and to ensure a greater degree of coherence in 
order to coordinate the interactions of the different 
measures in West Africa and the Sahel region. 
 
 
80 Christof Hartmann, “ECOWAS and the Restoration of 
Democracy in The Gambia”, Africa Spectrum 52, no. 1 (2017): 
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Annette Weber 
SWP Berlin 
Profiteers of Migration? 
July 2018 
44 
As the region of origin for a significant group of 
refugees, the Horn of Africa is important for migra-
tion cooperation between Germany and the European 
Union (EU). Eritrean citizens make up 11 per cent, 
Sudanese 5 per cent, and Somalis 4 per cent of those 
who enter Italy via Libya and the central Mediter-
ranean route.1 In the ranking of the countries of 
origin of asylum seekers who reached Europe in 2015, 
however, the Horn of Africa countries occupied places 
far behind Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and 
Pakistan.2 
In the following, two cases – Sudan, the main 
transit country for refugees from the region, and 
Eritrea, the main country of origin – show what 
opportunities and risks are associated with the cur-
rent EU instruments and how governments react to 
the offers that are made. Sudan is being proactive in 
articulating its own interests, which are mostly not 
migration-related vis-à-vis the EU’s migration-related 
interests. It wants to normalise relations with the 
international community and secure borders with 
Darfur, and it is seeking to use migration cooperation 
to this end. The Eritrean government, on the other 
hand, is being reactive and defensive and has not 
presented an interest profile of its own, nor does it 
expect relations with Europe to normalise or improve. 
The Sudanese government’s high expectations for 
the migration cooperation have not yet been fulfilled. 
Hoping to make a deal with Europe that is similar 
to Europe’s agreements with Turkey, Sudan has been 
disappointed. Despite the fact that the deployment of 
 
1 European Commission, Irregular Migration via the Central 
Mediterranean, EPSC Strategic Notes, Issue 22 (Brussels: Euro-
pean Political Strategy Centre [EPSC], 2 February 2017), 5, 
https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/strategic_note_issue_ 
22_0.pdf (accessed 16 January 2018). 
2 European Stability Initiative, The Refugee Crisis through Sta-
tistics (30 January 2017), 20, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI% 
20-%20The%20refugee%20crisis%20through%20statistics% 
20-%2030%20Jan%202017.pdf (accessed 16 January 2018). 
Sudanese security forces at the border is actually 
helping to reduce immigration figures, no deal has 
been made. However, there is no agreement with 
the EU that provides for such a border policy, and the 
EU’s critical reactions to the security forces are seen 
as a snub by the government in Khartoum.3 Sudan is 
confronted with a cacophony of European norms and 
wishes that it cannot possibly meet – and therefore 
it accuses the EU as a whole of lacking transparency. 
The domestic political pressure on European coun-
tries to reduce the number of refugees and migrants 
from Africa is strengthening the negotiating power of 
the governments in Sudan and Eritrea. In the medium 
term, however, they calculate that Europeans will 
have to bow to their ideas and wishes, otherwise 
migration pressures will not diminish but increase. 
Disagreements 
The basic causes of flight and migration are identified 
differently from European versus Sudanese and Eri-
trean perspectives. For example, the governments in 
Sudan and Eritrea emphasise economic push factors 
and assume that the lack of jobs is the reason for the 
large number of departures. Europeans, on the other 
hand, consider the repressive policies and human 
rights situation in the two countries to be crucial. The 
government in Asmara also blames pull factors for 
the exodus. 
 
3 “EU: No Support to Sudan’s RSF”, Radio Dabanga, 6 Sep-
tember 2016, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/ 
article/eu-no-support-to-sudan-s-rsf (accessed 29 January 
2018). 
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The basic assumptions about flight 
and migration differ fundamentally. 
It is therefore difficult to imagine a 
common fight against the causes. 
The high rates of approval of Eritrean refugees in 
Europe, for example, attracted more and more young 
people in the hopes of leading better lives abroad.4 In 
his speech on the 25th anniversary of independence, 
the Eritrean president spoke firmly of weakening his 
country through emigration: 
The greatest historical threat to Eritrea’s arch-
enemies being the Eritrean people, “human traf-
ficking” was employed to disperse and weaken 
Eritrea’s human capital. This policy was given 
paramount priority under the rubric of “granting 
asylum status” to Eritreans. The campaign was 
formalized with the official blessing of the US 
President. Organized crime of human trafficking 
thereby received additional impetus and gained 
traction through frantic and intensive propaganda 
and diplomatic campaigns. It is now being utilized 
as another tool for accusation of violation of 
human rights against Eritrea.5 
In view of such different basic assumptions on flight 
and migration, cooperation with the EU in the field 
of irregular migration faces serious obstacles. A com-
mon fight against the causes is hard to imagine. 
What remains is the politically explosive power 
of the topic. The Sudanese Commissioner for Europe 
at the Foreign Ministry in Khartoum, for example, 
warns: “One hundred million people from Africa will 
make their way to Europe.” That is a blatant threat. 
As long as Europe concentrates on the Eritrean refu-
gees and neglects the large group of refugees from 
South Sudan, and the even larger group of internally 
displaced people in Sudan, social tensions in Sudan 
will increase. Social tensions have again caused new 
flight movements, possibly also to Europe. A coopera-
tion agreement similar to the EU-Turkey agreement 
 
4 Eritrea’s ambassador to the African Union (AU) in a 
lecture in Nairobi, October 2016. 
5 Eritrea’s president during his speech on the 25th In-
dependence Day on 24 May 2016, see http://www.shabait. 
com/news/local-news/21863-president-isaias-afewerkis-
speech-on-the-occasion-of-the-25th-independence-day-
celebrations- (accessed 16 January 2018). 
could relieve the situation.6 The Sudanese govern-
ment certainly sees bargaining power here. 
Sudan and Eritrea: Regional realities 
Sudan is the transit country par excellence for the 
Eritrean group that is relevant to Europe. At the 
height of the wave of refugees from Eritrea to Israel 
via Sinai (2006-2014), the smuggling and trafficking 
network consisted of the Rashaida peoples, who live 
as nomads between Sudan and Eritrea, and human 
traffickers in Sinai.7 In addition, the involvement of 
security forces on the Eritrean and Sudanese sides has 
been demonstrated.8 The United Nations (UN) investi-
gation report on Eritrea and Somalia mentions specific 
names of Eritrean military personnel who smuggled 
human beings.9 
After Israel completed its border fence with the 
Sinai in 2012 and tightened conditions in the recep-
tion camps, the route of Eritrean refugees changed, 
but their numbers remained constant. As a goal, 
Israel was replaced by Europe. Under the current 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) procedure, after crossing the 
Eritrean border into Sudan, people are registered 
by the Sudanese authorities and then looked after by 
the UNHCR. However, more than 70 per cent of those 
 
6 Interview with the European Commissioner in the Suda-
nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khartoum, 27 April 2017; 
names are not mentioned here for reasons of source protec-
tion. 
7 Michael Obert, “Im Reich des Todes”, Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Magazin, no. 29 (2013), http://sz-magazin.sueddeutsche.de/ 
texte/anzeigen/40203/; Christopher Horwood and Tuesday 
Reitano, A Perfect Storm?, RMMS Discussion Paper 3 (Nairobi: 
Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat [RMMS], May 2016), 
http://www.regionalmms.org/images/DiscussionPapers/ 
A_Perfect_Storm.pdf (both accessed 16 January 2018). 
8 Interview with the UNHCR representative in Sudan, April 
2017; Phoebe Greenwood, “Eritrean Regime Cashes in on 
Arms and Human Trafficking, Says UN Report”, The Guardian, 
17 July 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/ 
17/eritrean-regime-arms-human-trafficking; Human Trafficking 
and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa – Central Mediterranean Route 
(Sahan and IGAD, February 2016), https://igad.int/attachments/ 
1284_ ISSP%20Sahan%20HST%20Report%20%2018ii2016%20 
FINAL%20FINAL.pdf (both accessed 16 January 2018). 
9 Report of the Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia Pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 2002 (2011) S/2012/545, 20, http:// 
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/545& 
referer=/english/&Lang=E (accessed 23 January 2018). 
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who cross the border disappear before registering 
because they neither want to be known to the author-
ities nor want to stay in Sudan.10 This also means that 
they do not receive any services such as housing, care, 
or schooling from the state or a refugee organisation 
and are still dependent on smugglers and smuggling 
networks. Even the inhumane and dangerous con-
ditions on the route through Libya, which most people 
are aware of, do not prevent them from continuing 
their journeys. “We know from surveys that women 
coming from Eritrea and Ethiopia protect themselves 
preventively against rape to which they are exposed 
on the flight, especially in Libya. And yet they choose 
this dangerous route to Europe, preferring it to stay-
ing in Sudan.”11 The Eritrean refugees often perceive 
the smugglers more as helpers than criminals, which 
means that they hardly support the authorities in the 
prosecution of smugglers and human traffickers.12 
Sudan 
Sudan is an authoritarian state in which the National 
Congress Party (formerly the National Islamic Front), 
which came to power in 1989 through a bloodless 
coup, rules with President Omar al-Bashir at the head. 
Like its predecessors, the government is engaged in 
violent conflicts on the periphery. Between 1983 and 
2005, the government waged war against the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army; since 2003 there has been 
an armed conflict with opposition groups in Darfur; 
and since 2011 there have been conflicts with the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army/North in South Kor-
dofan and the Southern Blue Nile. After decades of 
civil war, South Sudan had split off as an independ-
ent country in 2011. As a result of these wars, there 
are more than 3.3 million internally displaced per-
sons in Sudan.13 
The war in Darfur, which was waged primarily 
between government-supporting militias and various 
armed parties and, to a large extent, directly against 
the civilian population, also led to legal action against 
 
10 UNHCR Representative in Khartoum, May 2017. 
11 UNHCR Representative in Sudan, May 2017. 
12 Interview with an Eritrean academic in Khartoum re-
searching Eritrean refugees, Khartoum, May 2017. See also 
Peter Tinti and Tuesday Reitano, Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, 
Savior (London: Hurst, 2016). 
13 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Africa Re-
port 2017, http://www.internal-displacement.org/library/ 
publications/2017/africa-report-2017 (accessed 23 January 
2018). 
senior government officials who were brought before 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the face of 
at least 300,000 deaths and more than two million 
displaced civilians. Arrest warrants were issued in The 
Hague against President Bashir and Janjaweed militia 
leader Musa Hilal.14 Khartoum hopes that a normali-
sation of relations, especially with Western countries, 
through cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
and in migration control will also lead to the lifting 
of these arrest warrants. Confidence in the Western 
community, in particular, is low, but the partial 
lifting of sanctions by the US government in October 
2017 and the urgent interest of Europeans in reduc-
ing migration has raised expectations in this regard.15 
Since the late 1990s, Sudan’s economy has focussed 
primarily on oil exports, mainly to South Sudan, 
through a pipeline to Port Sudan. The fall in oil prices 
and the outbreak of war in South Sudan in December 
2013, which resulted in a drop in oil production of 
more than two-thirds, forced Khartoum to look for 
other sources of income.16 Economic output is still 
weak, and an increase in “bread price protests” points 
to growing dissatisfaction among the population.17 
Gold mining in Darfur and the north of the country, 
income from agricultural investments by various Gulf 
States and India, and bonds from China may bring 
foreign exchange into the country, but the majority 
of the population is not achieving economic stabili-
sation. However, since the partial lifting of US sanc-
tions, which have been a burden on the country 
for more than 20 years, Khartoum is optimistic that 
investments and foreign exchange will now quickly 
flow into the country, and that the economic hurdles, 
which have been exacerbated by high defence spend-
 
14 Two arrest warrants have been issued against the presi-
dent. The charges are war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
See also “The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, 
ICC-02/05-01/09, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir (ac-
cessed 16 January 2018). 
15 US Department of the Treasury, Sudan and Darfur Sanc-
tions, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/ 
Programs/pages/sudan.aspx (accessed 16 January 2018). 
16 Annette Weber, Red Sea: Connecter and Divider?, SWP Com-
ments 50/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
November 2017), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/ 
red-sea-as-connecter-and-divider/ (accessed 16 January 2018). 
17 “Sudanese Students Stone Police on Third Day of Bread 
Price Protests”, Reuters, 8 January 2018, https://uk.reuters. 
com/article/uk-sudan-protests/sudanese-students-stone-police-
on-third-day-of-bread-price-protests-idUKKBN1EX212 (ac-
cessed 29 January 2018). 
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ing (30 per cent of GDP) and corruption, can be over-
come.18 Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese have fled 
to work as labour migrants to neighbouring countries 
or the Gulf States due to the crisis-ridden economic 
situation. On the other hand, refugees to Europe 
are mainly politically persecuted or members of the 
middle class who can afford the costs involved. In 
political and civil liberty indices, Sudan is at the lower 
end (not free) on the press freedom list, ranking 174 
out of 180.19 
The ICC’s arrest warrant against the president, the 
conflicts and human rights violations, and the gov-
ernment’s refusal to sign the Cotonou Agreement20 
are weighing on relations with Europe. After the 1989 
coup, Germany froze development cooperation with 
Khartoum.21 Although Sudan is central to European 
migration management in the Horn of Africa, co-
operation is associated with high political risks to the 
German government and the EU, as the critical media 
coverage of recent months has shown.22 
Eritrea 
In Eritrea, which is Africa’s second youngest country 
and gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after 
decades of conflict, three phases of state formation 
 
18 EIU Country Report Sudan (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, June 2017), 6. Sudan ranks 170th (out of 176) on Trans-
parency International’s corruption index, far behind Ethio-
pia and Egypt (both 108th). See Transparency International, 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, https://www.transparency. 
org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (ac-
cessed 16 January 2018). 
19 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017, https:// 
freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/sudan; Report-
ers Without Borders, 2017 World Press Freedom Index, 
https://rsf.org/en/ranking# (both accessed 16 January 2018). 
20 The Cotonou Agreement between 79 African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries and 15 European countries is 
a set of rules covering both trade agreements and human 
rights and governance issues. 
21 See Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der 
Abgeordneten Klaus-Jürgen Hedrich, Dr. Norbert Blüm, Siegfried 
Helias, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU, 
Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/5922, 24 April 2001, 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/14/059/1405922.pdf (acces-
sed 18 January 2018). 
22 See the report “Grenzen dicht” of the ARD magazine 
Monitor of 23 July 2015, https://www1.wdr.de/daserste/ 
monitor/sendungen/grenzen-dicht-100.html (accessed 18 
January 2018); Christian Jacob and Simone Schlindwein, 
Dictators as Bouncers of Europe (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2017). 
can be distinguished: departure, war, and dictator-
ship.23 President Isaias Afewerki continues to rule in 
a one-man dictatorship through political repression, 
militarisation of society, and a command economy 
closely linked to the military-political apparatus. The 
primary instrument of mobilisation is an unlimited 
national service, which includes both military and 
labour services. Every man of working age and every 
woman between 18 and 27 years of age is obliged to 
complete the national service. The people concerned 
are neither told where they will be working nor for 
how long, which leads to enormous frustrations and 
problems in terms of relationships and family plan-
ning. This service, known as the Warsay-Yikealo 
Development Campaign, was introduced in 2002 to 
fundamentally change, homogenise, and build a 
national consciousness in Eritrean society,24 as well as 
to absorb the large number of otherwise unemployed 
people. 
Afewerki’s radical policy of isolation has resulted 
in a catastrophic economic situation: People are tor-
tured, murdered for political reasons, or disappear 
without charge or trial. In terms of political and 
civil liberties, Eritrea ranks at the bottom of the list. 
Charges are brought without trial and there is no 
independent judiciary. In 2001, independent media 
were banned and the right of assembly was suspended. 
In the Freedom House Ranking of 2017, Eritrea ranks 
third to last among the states of the world.25 
Especially young people are driven to flee due to 
this mixture.26 Every month, 5,000 Eritreans leave 
the country, despite a ban on leaving the country – 
a visible consequence of this political hardening. 
Although the Eritrean autocracy has been relieved 
financially in the short term by its participation in 
the Saudi Arabian alliance in the Yemen war, it 
shows no movement towards a political opening. 
Neither the restrictions on the national service de-
 
23 Annette Weber, “Eritrea”, in How Regimes Change. Post-
Conflict Transitions Revisited, ed. Hajo Gießmann and Roger 
Mac Ginty (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018; forthcoming). 
24 On the campaign, see Nicole Hirt, “Fleeing Repression: 
Inside Eritrea”, in Out of Africa: Why People Migrate, ed. Gio-
vanni Carbone (Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Inter-
nazionale [ISPI], 2017), 95–118, http://www.ispionline.it/ 
sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/out_of_africa_web.pdf (ac-
cessed 18 January 2018). 
25 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017 (see note 19). 
26 Amnesty International, Annual Report 2016/2017, https:// 
www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/eritrea/report-eritrea/ 
(accessed 22 January 2018). 
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manded by the EU in the talks on migration coopera-
tion, nor socio-economic improvements that would 
counteract the mass exodus can be implemented. 
Eritrea’s economy is closely linked to the small 
elite around President Afewerki.27 The government 
sought to ease the pressure on the Eritrean national 
budget by levying a diaspora tax of 2 per cent and a 
forced depreciation of the national currency, the 
Nakfa, in 2015.28 However, after sanctions were im-
posed on Eritrea and some countries stopped Eritrean 
embassies and consulates from collecting the diaspora 
tax, the share of foreign transfers fell by 75 per cent 
to less than 10 per cent of GDP.29 Remittances of 
migrant workers and refugees from abroad have re-
placed social benefits. However, the latter first have 
to raise the money for the escape, and this is very 
expensive to do from Eritrea when compared to other 
African countries, since escape helpers and smugglers 
want to be paid in advance for the departure. These 
financial resources are therefore lost to the relatives 
as well as the state. 
There is no reliable population data from Eritrea, 
nor are economic and budgetary data published.30 
The defence budget is estimated to be one of the 
highest in Africa.31 In 2009, the UN Security Council 
imposed an arms embargo on the country, as the 
government was suspected of supporting the Somali 
jihadist group Al-Shabaab. In 2017 the US govern-
ment followed up with its own sanctions because the 
 
27 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Monitoring 
Group in Somalia and Eritrea Submitted in Accordance with Reso-
lution 1916 (2010), S/2011/433. 
28 On the devaluation of the Nakfa and the forced ex-
change, see Nicole Hirt, “Fleeing Repression: Inside Eritrea”, 
in Out of Africa, ed. Carbone (see note 24), 95ff. 
29 Analysts have different assessments. Before the sanc-
tions, up to 37 per cent of GDP is spoken of, http://www. 
iwim.uni-bremen.de/Dorow/kifle-Remittances-Layout-Final-7-
2009.pdf; more recent calculations are below 10 per cent and 
a decline of 75 per cent due to sanctions: AFDB and UNDP 
(ed.), African Economic Outlook, Eritrea für die Jahre 2013, 2014 
und 2017, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/ 
African%20Economic%20Outlook%202013%20En.pdf, http:// 
www.er.undp.org/content/dam/eritrea/docs/MDGs/African 
EconomicOutlookEritrea2014.pdf?download, http://www. 
africaneconomicoutlook.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/ 
Eritrea_EN_2017.pdf (all accessed 4 April 2018). 
30 Mary Harper, “Has Eritrea’s Self-reliant Economy Run 
Out of Puff?”, BBC, 14 July 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-africa-36786965 (accessed 16 January 2018). 
31 “Eritrean Military Budget”, MilitaryBudget.org, http:// 
militarybudget.org/eritrea/. 
Eritrean navy had undermined sanctions against 
North Korea.32 The German government stopped 
development cooperation with the state as early 
as 2008. Funds from the EU Emergency Trust Fund 
(EUTF) were not utilised by Eritrea.33 
Flight and migration in the region 
More than 10 million people are displaced in the 
Horn of Africa, 7 million of them internally displaced 
(3.3 million in Sudan alone).34 Only a small propor-
tion of these people have the means and the desire to 
make their way to Europe. 
The largest group of refugees in Sudan is officially 
comprised of more than 400,000 war refugees from 
South Sudan.35 In reality, however, the number is 
much higher, as many of those affected do not regis-
ter with the UNHCR but move to where relatives live. 
However, to the annoyance of the government in 
Khartoum, the group of South Sudanese hardly plays 
a role in the EU’s migration policies. In addition, Eri-
trean refugees remain in the country or return to 
Eritrea. However, Sudan is mainly used as a transit 
country. In recent years, irregular emigration of Suda-
nese people via Libya to Europe has also increased, 
where 56 per cent of them were recognised as being 
entitled to asylum in 2015. Politically persecuted 
people are also moving to North America and Aus-
 
32 “US Imposes New Sanctions on Eritrea’s Navy over 
North Korea Links”, Voice of America, 8 April 2017, 
https://www.voanews.com/a/us-sanctions-eritrea-navy-over-
north-korea-links/3802651.html (accessed 16 January 2018). 
33 See Elise Kervyn and Raphael Shilhav, An Emergency for 
Whom?, Oxfam Briefing Note (Oxfam Research EUTF for 
Africa, November 2017), 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/emergency-whom-eu-
emergency-trust-fund-africa-migratory-routes-and-develop 
ment-aid-africa (accessed 12 January 2018); European Com-
mission, The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. 2016 Annual 
Report, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf_ 
2016_annual_report_final_en.pdf (accessed 18 January 2018). 
34 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Africa Report 
2017 (see note 13); European Commission, Better Migration 
Management. Annual Progress Report, 1 April 2016 to 31 March 
2017, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/2017-08-
09-bmm-annual-progress-report-publication_en.pdf (accessed 
18 January 2018). 
35 UNHCR, South Sudan Situation, 29 June 2017 http://data. 
unhcr.org/SouthSudan/download.php?id=3267 (accessed 
18 January 2018). 
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tralia.36 Readmission agreements with Sudan have 
been concluded by Italy, the EU, and Switzerland. 
However, the majority of Sudanese refugees and 
migrants – fleeing war or looking for work – move 
to the surrounding countries, the Gulf States, or other 
Arab states.37 In Chad’s border region alone, there are 
more than 300,000 people who cannot return to their 
villages in Darfur.38 
New to this group are Syrian refugees who fly 
directly to Sudan, where they receive Sudanese pass-
ports, schooling, and health care.39 In Sudan itself, 
refugee groups from Syria, Eritrea, and South Sudan 
are provoking mixed reactions. Although Syrians are 
respected as “Arab brothers”, the growing number of 
Syrian businesses is considered to be unwelcome com-
petition. Eritrean refugees, who mainly work in the 
services sector in the restaurant and hotel industries, 
are certainly recognised; if they are in the country 
illegally, they face the threat of exploitation, forced 
prostitution, and extortion if relatives abroad are to 
make money available for onward travel. The South 
Sudanese are now often treated even worse than 
under a common government. Many of them returned 
to South Sudan on the occasion of independence in 
2011 and fled again to Sudan because of the renewed 
war in 2013. Most of them live in the slums on the 
outskirts of Khartoum and earn a meagre living as 
domestic workers or day labourers in construction.40 
 
36 Amira Ahmed Mohamed, “More Effective Options in 
Addressing Irregular Sudanese and South Sudanese Migra-
tion to Europe”, in Escaping the Escape. Toward Solutions for 
the Humanitarian Migration Crisis, ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung 
(Gütersloh, 2017), 245–64 (253ff.). 
37 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Africa Report 
2017 (see note 13). 
38 Mahamat Adamou, “Sudanese Refugees in Chad Must 
Adapt or Starve”, IRIN, 9 June 2016, http://www.irinnews.org/ 
feature/2016/06/09/sudanese-refugees-chad-must-adapt-or-
starve (accessed 18 January 2018). 
39 See “Sudan Imposes Security Clearance ahead of Citizen-
ship for Syrian Refugees, Middle East Monitor, 9 August 2017, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170809-sudan-
imposes-security-clearance-ahead-of-citizenship-for-syrian-
refugees/, and “‘At Least We Are Treated as Humans’: Syrians 
in Sudan”, Al Jazeera, 7 December 2015, http://www.aljazeera. 
com/indepth/features/2015/12/syrians-seek-refuge-sudan-
escape-isil-assad-unhcr-151206104145843.html (both ac-
cessed 23 January 2018). 
40 Talks with an Eritrean refugee researcher and round-
table discussion with representatives of civil society and 
academics in Khartoum on the issue of migration and 
refugee policy in Sudan, Khartoum, May 2017. 
Migration cooperation 
The starting point for European cooperation on 
migration issues with Sudan was the reports of tor-
ture and extortion of Eritrean refugees who fled to 
Israel via the Sinai. Prior to the migration summit in 
Valletta in November 2015, 58 European and African 
ministers met in Rome in June to adopt the “EU Horn 
of Africa Migration Route” initiative and to set the 
Khartoum Process in motion (see the contribution on 
instruments, actors, and strategies, p. 9ff.). 
By the time of the migration summit in Valletta, 
however, the priorities had changed due to the in-
crease in the number of refugees to Europe in the 
summer and autumn. From then on, the main focus 
was on the prevention of uncontrolled migration 
movements to the EU. Following on from earlier 
agreements, such as those between Italy and the 
Libyan government under Muammar Gaddafi (see 
the contribution on instruments, actors, and strat-
egies, p. 9ff.) and those with Turkey on the Aegean 
route, African countries should also be actively 
involved in the so-called migration management.41 
Almost all Eritreans, Somalis, and Ethiopians tra-
velling to Europe via the Mediterranean route must 
travel through Sudan and Libya. Since no government 
was (or is) available in Libya with which cooperation 
could be agreed, Sudan as a transit country and Eri-
trea as the main country of origin were established as 
important partners. 
The decisive factor for the Khartoum Process and 
the resulting instrument of “Better Migration Manage-
ment” (BMM) as well as the entire EU strategy was the 
fight against human trafficking, smuggling, and thus 
irregular migration. The BMM is led by Deutsche Ge-
sellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and 
provides for four components: harmonisation of na-
tional migration policies, capacity-building, protec-
tion of refugees, and general awareness of the issue. 
Six countries from East Africa and the Horn of Africa 
are partners; the focus is different in each country. 
The BMM is financed with €40 million from the EUTF 
and a further €6 million from the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).42 
 
 
41 Talks with regional managers at the Berlin Foreign 
Office and in Brussels, 2014 to 2017. 
42 “Better Migration Management, Project Description”, 
GIZ, https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/40602.html (accessed 
18 January 2018). 
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Map 2 
Migration routes to and through Sudan 
The EU has other objectives than the 
Sudanese government assumes. This 
leads to misunderstandings and 
discontent. 
However, neither the states of the region nor most 
of the refugees regarded the BMM’s approach as being 
particularly urgent. For the countries, the focus is on 
development aid and support for border security; 
for the refugees from Eritrea, the smugglers are facili-
tators, and any fight against them would not lead 
to improved conditions for escape. From the EU’s 
perspective, which, in addition to war and economic 
crisis, also identifies political persecution and repres-
sion as the causes of flight, neither a purely develop-
ment policy approach nor a securitisation of the prob-
lem is sufficient. 
Three examples illustrate the different interests, 
assessments, and the resulting reputational risk in 
the area of migration cooperation. 
Unclear expectation management 
Although the Sudanese government assumes that 
the EU is primarily interested in reducing migration 
figures, it formulates as its goals the fight against the 
causes of flight as well as improvement in the resili-
ence and living conditions of the people on the 
ground. This leads to misunderstandings and dis-
content. 
The government in Sudan is taking a robust ap-
proach to securing its own borders because of its – 
correct – perception that Europe has a great interest 
in ensuring that refugees remain in their region of 
origin. It hopes to be able to record this as a migra-
tion regulation activity vis-à-vis the EU. However, it 
overlooks the fact that the EU cannot tolerate border 
protection by state-funded militias that violate the 
human rights of refugees. The latter, on the other 
hand, hopes that development-based measures will 
encourage people to stay – measures that, however, 
do not reach the majority of the refugees and are 
therefore irrelevant to their decisions about continu-
ing their journeys. 
Migration cooperation between the EU and Sudan 
began with poor public relations: For almost a year, 
the wish list of the Sudanese Interior Ministry for 
border security assistance was the only publicly acces-
sible document concerning the state of cooperation 
between Sudan and the EU within the framework of 
the BMM.43 
For the Sudanese government, migration coopera-
tion was an opportunity to highlight its situation as 
a transit country, especially for Eritrean refugees. 
Improved border management using helicopters, 
detention cells, and the biometric recording of people 
crossing borders were considered a priority by the 
Ministry of the Interior in Khartoum.44 The BMM 
hardly meets these requirements. The eight planned 
EUTF and BMM projects will focus on other compo-
nents such as harmonising migration policies, im-
proving livelihoods, and protecting refugees, for 
example in eastern Sudan on the Eritrean border. 
Although logistical and political coordination with 
the governments of the countries takes place, imple-
mentation in Sudan is largely carried out through 
(Western) NGOs. GIZ is examining several projects 
and locations, but less than a year after the start of 
the BMM, no final decisions had yet been reached.45 
 
43 European Commission, The European Union Emergency 
Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular 
Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa. Action Fiche for the Im-
plementation of the Horn of Africa Window, 13, https://ec.europa. 
eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/t05-eutf-hoa-reg-09-better-
migration-management_en.pdf (accessed 18 January 2018). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Interview with the programme director of the BMM in 
Berlin, April 2017. 
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Only one consultant is currently active in eastern 
Sudan for cooperation with the police and border 
guards. Although this is a high priority and is at 
the centre of media coverage in Europe, there are no 
concrete projects for improving border management 
between Sudan and Eritrea.46 The newly established 
National Committee for Combating Human Traffick-
ing and the Commissioner for Refugees are two cen-
tral bodies for the registration of refugees and the 
fight against smugglers. However, according to 
the coordinator in the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, 
the office of the Commissioner for Refugees is not 
financed by the BMM or the EUTF.47 
The Centre for Migration, Development and Popu-
lation Studies in Khartoum analyses regional migra-
tion and flight movements, the return and reintegra-
tion of Sudanese, and their flight to Europe. The head 
of the authority criticises the EU’s approach as being 
too short-sighted. The belief is that whatever Brussels 
thinks, Africa will implement. Sustainability cannot 
be achieved in this way.48 The international commu-
nity is not using Sudan’s knowledge and experience 
in this area, nor does it recognise Sudan’s successes, 
for example in the fight against organised crime. The 
message of both the head of the authorities and the 
Foreign Ministry is: Only improvements in the living 
conditions of refugees and locals will lead to fewer 
people leaving the country for Europe. This would 
require more development cooperation than what is 
being offered through the EUTF instruments. Since 
Germany froze development cooperation with Sudan 
after 1989, the projects offered by the BMM cannot be 
compared to conventional development cooperation 
and cannot be implemented directly by the govern-
ment in Khartoum either. There is a lack of under-
standing for both. The political consequences that the 
refugee movement of 2015 will have in Europe are 
very precisely registered in the Sudanese capital city. 
As the main transit country of the region, it sees itself 
in a strong negotiating position, but it must be taken 
note of in the interior and foreign ministries that 
offers from the Sudanese side are not being acknowl-
edged. The fact that more and more delegations are 
being sent to investigate, but hardly any projects are 
being implemented, is also generating discontent. 
 
46 See the dossier “Migrationskontrolle”, taz, o. D., https:// 
migration-control.taz.de/#de/pages/about (accessed 18 Janu-
ary 2018). 
47 Conversation in Khartoum, May 2017. 
48 Conversation in Khartoum, April 2017. 
Sudan’s borders are predominantly 
areas of conflict. 
A frustrated employee of the refugee commissioner 
in Khartoum stated: 
We’ve done our job. We’re going after the smug-
glers and human traffickers. In 2014, we adopted 
an anti-trafficking law and established a high-level 
body on migration. We are investing in joint bor-
der troops on the border with Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Chad, and Libya. We are also active members in 
the Khartoum Process. And yet nothing is im-
plemented, there are no projects, we are not sup-
ported.49 
This assessment is often shared by local implementa-
tion organisations and embassies. However, a better 
management of expectations would require a clear 
political orientation that both the EU and Germany 
are trying to circumvent. Being too close to the regime 
is risky and small projects remain ineffective because 
they would require cooperation with the government. 
On their side, frustration is increasing as the pros-
pects for the hoped-for normalisation of relations 
dwindle. 
Border security – diverging interests 
Sudan’s borders are predominantly areas of conflict. 
This applies to the Horn of Africa–Sahel nexus – 
the area between Sudan, Libya, and Chad – where 
regional armed movements are active and use the 
respective neighbouring countries as retreats. The 
same applies to the border with South Sudan, which 
is volatile, partly because of the unclear status of 
Abyei, which is claimed by both countries and is cur-
rently protected by a UN mission. Also on this border, 
in South Kordofan and the Southern Blue Nile, the 
government is fighting rebel organisations that were 
previously part of the South Sudanese Liberation 
Front and are now lamenting the central state’s ne-
glect of their region. The border area between Sudan 
and Ethiopia is used as a transit area by armed Ethio-
pian opponents, but also by fighters from Sudan and 
South Sudan. In any case, fighters and jihadists acting 
 
49 Interview with the Sudanese Refugee Commission in 
Khartoum, April 2017, which serves as a focal point for the 
BMZ’s “Better Migration Management” project and acts as 
EUTF coordinator. 
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between the regions roam the whole country. The 
regions on the borders with Egypt and Eritrea have 
also become increasingly conflict-ridden. There is a 
dispute with Egypt over the Halaib Triangle, and on 
the border with Eritrea the government in Khartoum 
is mobilising militias, since Egypt is said to have sta-
tioned military forces on the Eritrean side.50 All these 
conflicts are responsible for the large number of 
refugees and displaced persons. 
Sudan’s policy of border security is ambivalent: On 
the one hand, it makes it more difficult to escape war 
and expulsion and often involves repression and war 
tactics. On the other hand, secure borders are neces-
sary to protect one’s own sovereignty and population. 
Border security also has a regulatory function in con-
nection with migration cooperation. For Europe, the 
borders with Libya and Eritrea are particularly rele-
vant; for Sudan, the borders with South Sudan and 
Chad play a greater role. 
The decisions of the Valletta Summit and the BMM 
specifically refer to border control in the fight against 
smuggling. In May 2017, Minister of the Interior Tho-
mas de Maizière also made border security a priority 
with his proposal to set up an EU border protection 
mission to secure Libya’s southern borders in coopera-
tion with the states of the region.51 Sudan, on the 
other hand, has a vested interest in making the bor-
der with Libya as impermeable as possible. There 
are fears about the return of Darfur rebels, who have 
taken on the role of mercenaries in Libya and now 
want to return to Sudan armed. The government is 
therefore setting up a Rapid Support Force under the 
control of the secret service, primarily composed of 
former Janjaweed militias, which are responsible for 
war crimes in Darfur.52 This is disastrous for a value-
 
50 “Sudan Declares Popular Mobilization on Eritrean 
Border”, Sudan Tribune, 8 January 2018, http://www. su-
dantribune.com/spip.php?article64450 (accessed 18 January 
2018). 
51 “De Maizière fordert EU-Grenzschutzmission zwischen 
Libyen und Niger”, Die Zeit (online), 14 May 2017, http:// 
www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-05/de-maizi-re-eu-grenz 
schutzmission-afrika (accessed 18 January 2018). 
52 “UNAMID Handed Over Its Former Basis to Darfur Mili-
tia: Rebel Groups”, Sudan Tribune, 9 September 2017, http:// 
www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article63468; “Sudan Not 
Closing Libya Border to Stop Smugglers Says Khartoum FM”, 
Libya Herald, 7 September 2017, https://www.libyaherald.com/ 
2017/09/07/sudan-closes-border-to-stop-weapons-and-vehicle-
smuggling/; “Sudan’s RSF Detain Musa Hilal Militiamen on 
Darfur-Libya Border”, Dabanga, 13 August 2017, https://www. 
oriented foreign policy and the fight against the 
causes of flight from the European perspective. 
These troops block the onward movement of refu-
gees from the Horn of Africa to Libya as a kind of 
secondary activity. For Europe’s interest in reducing 
irregular migration across the Mediterranean, this 
regulation produces the desired result, whereby the 
Sudanese government sees itself as a border guard on 
behalf of the EU. For them, sending a border force is a 
service in the spirit of Valletta. Why this border force 
is not financed by the EU and why the border police 
requested by Refugee Commissioner General Raja 
Dahir are not trained is therefore incomprehensible 
in Khartoum.53 
In addition, the Sudanese government does not 
consider its positioning in the region to be appreciated. 
Whereas Khartoum is on the side of the Western-
backed Libyan government of Prime Minister Fayez 
al-Sarraj, Western allies such as Egypt and the Emir-
ates are also supporting the parallel government of 
General Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya without reap-
ing sanctions or criticism from the West.54 
For Europe and Germany, securing the border 
between Darfur and Libya, currently being carried out 
by Sudan, is unacceptable. Major General Mohammed 
Hamdan (Hameti), who uses his Rapid Support Force 
as border guards, is considered to be an alleged war 
criminal. His units are suspected of involvement in 
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Dar-
fur conflict, which has been ongoing since 2003.55 In 
a press conference he gave after the capture of more 
than 800 refugees on the border with Libya, Hamdan 
nevertheless described border security as the Euro-
peans’ mission: “We are doing this for Frontex, and 
nobody thanks us for it.”56 This results in considera-
 
dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-rsf-detain-
musa-hilal-militiamen-on-darfur-libya-border (accessed 
18 January 2018). 
53 European Commission, Valletta Summit, 11–12 November 
2015, Action Plan, 12, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ 
21839/action_plan_en.pdf (accessed 18 January 2018). 
54 Interview with an EU representative of the Sudanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khartoum, May 2017. 
55 On the activities of Janjaweed, see the prosecution 
against one of its leaders, “The Prosecuter v. Ahmad Mu-
hammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Abd-Al-Rahman 
(Ali Kushayb)”, ICC. ICC-02/05-01/07, https://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
darfur/harunkushayb (accessed 18 January 2018). 
56 Jacob and Schlindwein, Diktatoren als Türsteher Europas 
(see note 22), 17ff. Read more about Hamdan in the 2008 
reports from the US Embassy in Khartoum, item 6, https:// 
 Migration Hub Sudan/Eritrea: Disappointed Expectations – Conflicting Interests 
 SWP Berlin 
 Profiteers of Migration? 
 July 2018 
 53 
ble political risks to the reputations of Germany and 
the EU, which are denounced – falsely – in the 
media as being clients of a militia. 
With regard to Eritrea, where the majority of the 
refugees come from, the EU is facing a completely 
different problem. Until 2015, the Eritrean army 
issued orders to shoot all those who attempted to 
leave the country. Eritrea denies its citizens official 
departure, especially since most of them want to 
escape the National Service.57 EU cooperation with 
these same Eritrean border guards would exacerbate, 
not combat, the causes of the conflict. The explicit 
aim of the Khartoum Process and the BMM to combat 
smugglers and human traffickers cannot be imple-
mented with the Eritrean security authorities either. 
After all, they are often the ones who earn extra 
money by assisting escapees. 
Confusion over readmissions 
As in border management, the Sudanese government 
sees itself as an enforcer of European wishes when it 
deports Eritrean refugees to their countries of origin. 
However, since most European countries are not 
themselves deporting migrants to Eritrea because of 
the human rights situation, such an approach by the 
Sudanese border militias in the name of Europe is by 
no means politically opportune. 
Since 2016, reports of the arrests, floggings, and 
deportations of Eritrean refugees from Sudan have 
been accumulating.58 Even if this is certainly not the 
 
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KHARTOUM385_a.html (accessed 
18 January 2018). 
57 Amnesty International, Just Deserters: Why Indefinite 
National Service in Eritrea Has Created a Generation of Refugees, 
AFR 64/2930/2015 (December 2015), https://amnesty.org.pl/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Raport_Just-deserters_11_ 
2015.pdf (accessed 18 January 2018). 
58 “EU Urged to End Cooperation with Sudan after Refu-
gees Whipped and Deported”, The Guardian, 27 February 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 
2017/feb/27/eu-urged-to-end-cooperation-with-sudan-after-
refugees-whipped-and-deported (accessed 2 April 2018); 
see also the report “Flüchtlingsdeals mit ostafrikanischen 
Machthabern?” of ARD-Magazin’s Monitor from 14 April 
2016, http://www.ardmediathek.de/tv/Monitor/Fl%C3% 
BCchtlingsdeals-mit-ostafrikanischen-Ma/Das-Erste/Video? 
bcastId=438224&documentId=34691418; Kristy Siegfried, 
“Sudan and Eritrea Crackdown on Migrants amid Reports on 
EU Incentives”, IRIN, 25 May 2016, http://www.irinnews.org/ 
news/2016/05/25/sudan-and-eritrea-crackdown-migrants-
amid-reports-eu-incentives (accessed 18 January 2018). 
intention of European and German migration policy, 
the German Federal Government is held jointly re-
sponsible for this in public discourse, both in Germany 
and in Sudan. At the same time, Khartoum is both-
ered by European media reports of the violent repat-
riation of Eritrean refugees by the Sudanese author-
ities. The Sudanese Commissioner for Europe accuses 
the Europeans of hypocrisy: 
Europe wants to return people to Eritrea, but they 
have no coherent policies, they do politics accord-
ing to the mood of the day, sometimes people are 
sent back, sometimes they receive travel docu-
ments. You want to send Eritreans back, but you 
don’t want to do it yourself. If we do it for them, 
there’ll be trouble.59 
If one considers the previous considerations, the in-
terests of the EU and the government in Sudan only 
overlap in a few fields.60 Both are keen to see the 
region become more stable, jihadism contained, and 
the situation of the population improved. Sudan 
wants relations to return to normal, the ICC’s case 
against President Bashir to end, economic sanctions 
to be lifted completely, and debt relief to be granted. 
Europe wants fewer human rights violations, im-
proved migration management, and a higher rate of 
return of Sudanese refugees whose asylum applica-
tions in Europe are not successful. 
In both areas – the regulation of migration and 
the readmission of rejected asylum seekers – Sudan 
sees itself as having the greater leverage. 
Conclusion: Directed past each other 
The Sudanese government has high expectations 
for the EU’s migration policies. The government in 
Khartoum and the implementing organisations are 
expecting support in the areas of border management 
and security, caring for refugees in the country – in-
 
59 Meeting at the Foreign Ministry, Khartoum, April 2017; 
Tesfa-Alem Tekle, “UNHCR Urges Sudan to Halt Forcibly 
Deporting Eritreans”, Sudan Tribune, 3 June 2016, http:// 
www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59178 (accessed 
18 January 2018). 
60 European Commission, Joint Commission-EEAS Non-paper 
on Enhancing Cooperation on Migration, Mobility and Readmission 
with Sudan (Brussels, 16 March 2016), http://statewatch.org/ 
news/2016/mar/eu-com-eeas-readmission-sudan-7203-16.pdf 
(accessed 18 January 2018). 
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cluding those who do not want to travel on to Europe 
– and above all a coordinated and common Euro-
pean policy. In all discussions on the topic of migra-
tion in Sudan, the demand “coordinate!” is heard 
sooner or later. There is displeasure about coordina-
tion meetings that do not involve relevant partners 
and an excess of delegations travelling through Khar-
toum and to the borders that take up a lot of time 
but produce few results. 
Sudan wants to free itself from the 
nimbus of a rogue state and establish 
a partnership with the West. 
The government in Khartoum faces a variety of 
instruments, offers, and ideas within the framework 
of migration partnerships with the EU. For the gov-
ernment in Khartoum, this signals an urgent interest 
of Europeans to find a solution to a European prob-
lem as soon as possible. Sudan therefore hopes to 
receive financial support for equipment and training 
to help reduce irregular migration across the Mediter-
ranean. Following the agreement between the EU and 
Turkey on 18 March 2016, the government was pre-
pared to conclude a similar deal with the EU.61 The 
fact that this has not happened has led to growing 
frustration in Khartoum because they do not see their 
proactive approach being appreciated and are dis-
appointed by the small-scale migration projects that 
are not meeting their expectations. Moreover, Euro-
pean migration policies do not provide a coherent 
strategic direction for negotiating a convergence of 
interests. 
The interests of the Eritrean government are far 
less clear, as the country has the highest percentage 
of refugees and has not shown the slightest tendency 
towards eliminating the causes of political flight. In 
the cooperation between the EU and Eritrea, the flow 
of communication is also significantly slower. From 
the regime’s point of view, cooperation is essentially 
due to the need to generate foreign exchange and 
cushion economic decline – but not at the price of 
ideological compromises or political concessions. 
Sudan, on the other hand, wants to free itself from 
the nimbus of a rogue state and achieve a partnership 
with the West that is based on economic cooperation 
 
61 Talks in the Sudanese Foreign Ministry, Khartoum, May 
2017; European Council, “Erklärung EU–Türkei”, 18 March 
2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press-releases/ 
2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/ (accessed 18 January 2018). 
and investment. In its view, the possibility of such 
a normalisation of relations arises from successful 
migration cooperation with Europe and the lifting of 
economic sanctions currently being negotiated with 
the US administration. The geostrategic shifts in the 
Horn of Africa and the Sahel make the country an 
important player, primarily in the fight against terror-
ism, but also in the difficult Nile water negotiations 
between Egypt and Ethiopia. It is in the mutual inter-
est of all actors to improve relations. 
Change of perspective: European interests 
The EU and Germany are in a dilemma over their 
cooperation with states in the region. The expansion 
and improvement of development cooperation is not 
an instrument that brings about rapid solutions and 
generates visibility. On the other hand, close coopera-
tion with the security forces of authoritarian and 
repressive countries carries the risk of supporting 
groups and individuals who have committed war 
crimes or are involved in human rights violations. 
The European member states must decide whether 
they really want to create better conditions for people 
in their regions of origin in the long term or reduce 
the number of refugees arriving in Europe in the 
short term. Instead of combating the causes of flight, 
the issue would then be the security of Europe’s 
external borders, for which other mechanisms and 
negotiation processes would be necessary. 
The basic problem often lies in the paradox of 
European migration policies and their mediation. 
The EU and Germany are pursuing tough security 
goals: reducing irregular migration and prosecuting 
smugglers and human traffickers. The programmatic 
design and the migration projects under considera-
tion, however, focus on improving living conditions 
and managing migration. Aims and programmes are 
not very congruent. Moreover, when working with 
repressive regimes, which are widely seen more as 
being a cause of flight than as a remedy, the contra-
diction becomes even clearer. 
For the government in Khartoum, the 
ambiguity of migration cooperation is 
irritating and disappointing. 
The example of Sudan shows how necessary it is to 
reach a political decision: If the focus is on soft targets 
– such as improving living conditions for the popula-
tion and the refugees – then comprehensive develop-
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ment aid projects are needed, but their implemen-
tation does not mean the rapid end of irregular 
migration. If combating the causes of flight through 
development is the policy of choice, the German 
government would also have to reconsider its position 
adopted after the 1989 coup to discontinue develop-
ment cooperation with Sudan. 
However, if tough security goals such as border 
security and criminal prosecution are sought, Ger-
many and the EU must be aware that direct coopera-
tion with a repressive, authoritarian state that 
employs human rights criminals as security forces 
entails an undeniable risk to its reputation. Finally, 
the question arises as to why cooperation with the 
security authorities of this state is conceivable, but 
not development cooperation. 
For the government in Khartoum, the ambiguity 
surrounding migration cooperation is annoying and 
disappointing. It requires clarification and thus puts 
the German Federal Government and the EU under 
pressure. 
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Introduction 
At a meeting with the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Sep-
tember 2014, Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi 
stressed his country’s efforts to tackle the refugee 
crisis. According to Sisi, Egypt hosts more than five 
million refugees, even though the country itself is 
facing serious economic problems.1 
What initially sounded like a cautious cry for help 
to the international community became an increasing 
threat in the following years. Thereby, the primary 
aim of the government was not to raise aid in the area 
of refugee policy. Although more and more people 
had fled to Egypt as a result of the regional crises and 
wars, the number was far lower than officially stated. 
At least the country was by no means exposed to 
a burden comparable to that of Syria’s neighbours: 
Measured against their total populations, those 
countries had hosted significantly more refugees.2 
Against the background of the refugee crisis in 
Europe, the Sisi administration saw its opportunity to 
generate urgently needed financial aid on the migra-
tion issue without having to make concessions with 
regard to political reforms that might jeopardise its 
own consolidation of power. Accordingly, it designed 
its migration policy approach in a reactive way that 
was oriented towards the interests and goals of Euro-
pean policy, but by no means followed a defensive 
logic of action. 
 
1 “Almost 5 mln Refugees in Egypt: Sisi”, Aswat Masriya, 
6 September 2014, http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/details/ 
9536 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
2 For an overview, see Björn Rother et al., The Economic 
Impact of Conflicts and the Refugee Crisis in the Middle East and 
North Africa, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/08 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: International Monetary Fund [IMF], September 
2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/ 
sdn1608.pdf (accessed 1 April 2018). 
Starting point: Egypt as a destination, 
transit country, and country of origin 
of migration 
Due to its size and geographical location, Egypt has 
always been a destination for migration. Especially 
since the 20th century, African migrant communities 
have been forming here, mainly in the large metropo-
lises of Cairo and Alexandria. The majority of job 
seekers and refugees have been of Sudanese origin, 
not least because Sudanese did not need a visa for 
entry until 1995.3 However, the figures vary greatly. 
The claim often made in the literature – that the 
Sudanese community in Egypt alone comprises sev-
eral million people – is not based on reliable data.4 
There are some indications that these figures are too 
high.5 
In the second half of the last century, many refu-
gees from other Arab countries came to Egypt, includ-
ing an estimated 70,000 Palestinians, who had to leave 
their homes during the 1948 and 1967 wars. The 
largest group of officially registered refugees are now 
Syrians. As a consequence of the Syrian civil war, 
 
3 Françoise De Bel-Air, Migration Profile: Egypt, Policy Brief 
2016/01 (Florence: Migration Policy Centre, European Uni-
versity Institute, February 2016), http://cadmus.eui.eu/ 
bitstream/handle/1814/39224/MPC_PB_2016_01.pdf (accessed 
1 April 2018). 
4 Michael Kagan, “From the Archives: Troublesome Refu-
gee Statistics and the Case of Sudanese in Egypt”, RSDwatch, 
15 January 2014, https://rsdwatch.com/2014/01/15/from-the-
archives-troublesome-refugee-statistics-and-case-of-sudanese-
in-egypt/ (accessed 1 April 2018). 
5 It is often unclear whether Egyptians of Sudanese origin 
who have lived in the country for generations are also counted 
as part of the Sudanese community. For an overview of the 
Sudanese migrant community, see Anita H. Fábos, “Brothers” 
or Others? (New York, NY, and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008). 
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their number increased rapidly, from less than 1,000 
in July 2012 to more than 138,000 in January 2015.6 
In the absence of its own asylum legislation, refu-
gee status is recognised through the UNHCR, with 
which Egypt has maintained an agreement since 
1954. In addition to the refugees registered with the 
UNHCR, however, there are a large number of un-
registered refugees and migrants. The Egyptian gov-
ernment occasionally speaks of a total of 500,000 
people in the case of the Syrians – a figure that ex-
perts classify as too high.7 
Information on the costs incurred by Egypt as a 
result of the influx from abroad is also by no means 
certain. With regard to Syrian refugees, the govern-
ment puts the financial burden of providing sub-
sidised food and free access to education and health 
care at $200–$300 million annually.8 On the other 
hand, there are reports that the Syrian community 
itself invested up to $800 million in the Egyptian 
economy between 2011 and 2016.9 Accordingly, 
Syrians in particular have likely made a significant 
contribution to job creation in recent years. 
However, most of the refugees and migrants 
stranded in Egypt do not consider the country as 
their final destination, but as a stopover.10 Regis-
 
6 Ayman Zohry and Khaled Hassan, “Human Mobility 
in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: The Case of Egypt”, in 
Escaping the Escape, ed. Bertelsmann Stiftung (Gütersloh: 
Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017), 183–96. 
7 Omar Karasapan, “Who Are the 5 Million Refugees 
and Immigrants in Egypt?”, Brookings, Future Development, 
4 October 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-
development/2016/10/04/who-are-the-5-million-refugees-
and-immigrants-in-egypt/ (accessed 1 April 2018). 
8 “Egypt Hosts Five Million Refugees: Foreign Ministry”, 
Egyptian Streets, 1 September 2016, https://egyptianstreets. 
com/2016/09/01/egypt-hosts-five-million-refugees-foreign-
ministry/; United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan  
2015–16: Egypt, 5, http://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Syria/ 
3RP-Report-Egypt.pdf (both accessed 1 April 2018). 
9 United Nations Development Programme, Jobs Make 
the Difference – Expanding Economic Opportunities for Syrian 
Refugees and Host Communities (5 April 2017), 62, http://www. 
arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/crisis-
response0/jobs-make-the-difference.html (accessed 1 April 
2018). 
10 Many migrants realise after their arrival in Egypt that 
travelling to Europe is much more difficult than expected 
and are therefore forced to stay. International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), Migration Trends across the Mediterranean: 
Connecting the Dots (June 2015), 66, https://publications.iom. 
tered refugees, for example, hope that the UNHCR 
will resettle them in a third country. Others try to 
leave the country on their own. This development 
is not new. Between 2006 and 2012, thousands of 
migrants from African countries, above all Sudan and 
Eritrea, crossed Egyptian territory via Sinai to Israel. 
As a result, not only smuggling but also human-traf-
ficking structures developed. African migrants were 
partly kidnapped in order to extort ransom money, or 
even fell victim to organ traders.11 Only the construc-
tion of a border fence on the Israeli side and the civil 
war–like conflict in North Sinai have led to a drastic 
decline in transit migration since the end of 2012.12 
Egypt is likely to gain importance as a 
country of origin for migration. 
Instead, irregular migration via the Egyptian Cen-
tral Sea coast to Europe increased. On the one hand, 
there was a partial shift in the migratory routes. Both 
the actual closure of the Sinai route and the increas-
ingly difficult conditions on the central Mediterrane-
an route via Libya were decisive in this regard. On the 
other hand, the number of locals who tried to leave 
their land by sea also increased: While between 2009 
and 2012 around 4,000 Egyptian migrants were regis-
tered who arrived in Italy irregularly,13 between 2013 
and 2016 there were well over 13,000 (Table 2, p. 65).14 
In relation to the overall sharp increase in the 
number of refugees and migrants, these figures were 
negligible. However, European decision-makers were 
 
int/system/files/altai_migration_trends_accross_the_ 
mediterranean.pdf (accessed 1 April 2018). 
11 See Martin Gehlen, “Ermordet, gequält und ausgewei-
det”, Die Zeit (online), 15 January 2013, http://www.zeit.de/ 
wissen/gesundheit/2013-01/organraub-beduinen-sinai-
aegypten-menschenrechtsausschuss (accessed 1 April 2018). 
12 Gideon Israel, “Why Israel’s Border Fence Worked”, 
Mida (online), 21 February 2017, http://mida.org.il/2017/02/ 
21/israels-border-fence-worked/ (accessed 1 April 2018). 
13 Author’s calculation, data source: Philippe De Bruycker, 
Anna Di Bartolomeo, and Philippe Fargues, Migrants Smuggled 
by the Sea to the EU, Research Report 2013/09 (Florence: Migra-
tion Policy Centre, European University Institute, 2013), 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29459/MPC-RR-
2013%2009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 1 April 
2018). 
14 This increase is clearly put into perspective when we 
consider the period 2004–2007, when more than 10,000 
Egyptians reached Italy by sea. Against the background of 
the acute refugee crisis, however, such considerations were 
hardly made in the European capitals. 
Stephan Roll 
SWP Berlin 
Profiteers of Migration? 
July 2018 
58 
reminded of the potential that Egypt could have as 
the country of origin of migration. The population 
development of the country plays a central role here. 
Egypt will have well over 100 million inhabitants 
in 2020. Of these, more than two-thirds are younger 
than 29 years, implying that some 600,000 young 
Egyptians will enter the labour market every year. In 
order to create sufficient employment opportunities 
for these new employees – and at the same time 
reduce high unemployment levels that are, presum-
ably, well above the officially reported 12 per cent – 
the country would need continuous economic growth 
rates of well over 6 per cent.15 Egypt is far from that.16 
It is also important, however, that the previous 
target countries of Egyptian labour migration have 
become significantly less attractive. In neighbouring 
Libya, where it is estimated that up to two million 
Egyptians had been working before the start of the 
civil war in 2011, only a few hundred thousand 
Egyptian guest workers are still employed today.17 
Conditions in Saudi Arabia, currently the most im-
portant destination for labour migration, have also 
deteriorated significantly since 2011. In view of the 
“Saudization” of the labour market by the govern-
ment, the future is uncertain for many of the 1.3 to 
2 million Egyptian guest workers.18 
Against this background, future scenarios predict-
ing that more than 2.7 million Egyptians could be 
tempted to leave their country by 2030 appear par-
 
15 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Private Sector Diagnostic Egypt (London, March 2017), 2, http:// 
www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395255626323 
&d=&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FDownloadDocument 
(accessed 1 April 2018). 
16 Between 2014 and 2016, growth in gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) averaged less than 4 per cent. 
17 However, it is remarkable that, despite a travel ban to 
Libya imposed by the Sisi administration in 2015, Egyptians 
are still trying to cross the border into a country in a civil 
war – the prospects for work in their own country are too 
poor. Hassan Abdel Zaher, “Despite Risks, Egyptian Workers 
Cross into Libya”, The Arab Weekly, 29 October 2017, http:// 
www.thearabweekly.com/Society/9558/Despite-risks%2C-
Egyptian-workers-cross-into-Libya (accessed 1 April 2018). 
18 For example, the introduction of a tax for the family 
members of migrant workers is likely to significantly reduce 
the attractiveness of the kingdom as an at least temporary 
destination for many Egyptians. “Saudi Arabia’s Dependent 
Fees Leave Egyptian Expats in Dire Straits”, Gulf Insider, 
17 July 2017, http://www.gulf-insider.com/saudi-arabias-
dependent-fees-leave-egyptian-expats-dire-straits/ (accessed 
1 April 2018). 
ticularly relevant from a European perspective.19 It is 
true that no statements can be made as to what ex-
tent those who are willing to migrate are also willing 
to do that in an irregular way via the dangerous sea 
route. However, Egypt’s fundamental importance as a 
country of origin for migration to Europe is likely to 
increase. 
Migration policy interests 
In summer 2013, the military coup against Egypt’s 
first freely elected president, the Muslim brother 
Muhammad Mursi, paved the way for Abdel Fatah 
al-Sisi, then Minister of Defence, to take power and 
to get himself elected as president in June 2014. 
In this highly volatile phase of establishing a new 
ruling regime, migration policy was of limited inter-
est to political decision-makers. In the first six months 
following the coup, the issue was seen solely from 
the point of view of internal security. Migrants and 
especially Syrian refugees, to whom President Mursi 
had generously offered asylum, were now regarded 
by the Egyptian security establishment as an acute 
threat. They were said to be close to the Muslim 
Brotherhood,20 whose members and structures the 
new political leadership fought with all means. Con-
sequently, the new administration had no interest in 
offering the Syrians already in the country a longer-
term prospect to stay. Above all, however, it was fun-
damentally opposed to take in new refugees. It was 
only in 2014 – after the resistance to the military’s 
assumption of power had largely been broken – 
that the government began to focus more strongly 
on migration policy, but primarily from an economic 
 
19 See Michael Bommes, Simon Fellmer, and Friederike 
Zigmann, “Migration Scenarios: Turkey, Egypt and Morocco”, 
in Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe, ed. 
Michael Bommes, Heinz Fassmann, and Wiebke Sievers (Am-
sterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014), 271ff. In the 
scenarios calculated here, the actual potential for migration 
to Europe is considerably lower, since the Egyptian migrant 
community in Europe is so far very small and will therefore 
only have a very limited “pull factor” effect for compatriots. 
However, the scenarios do not take into account any “crowd-
ing out effects” resulting from the crises and isolation ten-
dencies described here in the classical target countries of 
Egyptian migration. 
20 See Jasmin Fritzsche, “Egypt’s Others”, Sada, 5 Novem-
ber 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=53501 (ac-
cessed 1 April 2018). 
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point of view due to the steadily deteriorating eco-
nomic situation. 
Initially, the interest of the state leadership was 
primarily directed towards Egyptian labour emigra-
tion. The aim was to achieve the highest possible 
level of remittances from Egyptian guest workers 
from abroad to their home country. In the extremely 
tense economic and political situation, such revenues 
had become increasingly important for the Egyptian 
national budget, but above all for the country’s for-
eign exchange control: The transfer payments of 
Egyptians living abroad reached a 17-year high in 
terms of GDP in 2012/2013.21 These were indispen-
sable foreign currencies for continuing to service 
the government’s liabilities in foreign currency. In 
addition, in view of the growing pressure on the 
Egyptian labour market and the desolate social sys-
tems, the emigration of young people was not in-
convenient for the political leadership. This applied 
both to migrants trapped in Egypt and to those young 
Egyptians who were becoming increasingly dissatis-
fied with their living conditions. 
The Sisi administration saw the 
refugee crisis in Europe 2015 as an 
opportunity to receive financial 
support to overcome its own 
financial crisis. 
With the escalation of the refugee crisis in Europe 
– and since the summit of European and African 
leaders in Valletta at the end of 2015 – the Sisi ad-
ministration began to see the issue of irregular migra-
tion from a new perspective. In the announcement of 
the European Union (EU) to focus more than before 
on measures to combat the causes of flight and migra-
tion, Cairo saw an opportunity to receive help in cop-
ing with its own economic crisis, but above all with 
the crisis in public finances. 
This situation was extremely acute at the end 
of 2015. The three Gulf countries Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, which transferred 
billions of dollars in loans and donations to Cairo 
after the military coup in 2013, were not willing to 
finance Egypt’s national deficit of well over $30 bil-
 
21 See The World Bank, “Personal Remittances, Received 
(% of GDP)”, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF. 
PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=EG (accessed 1 April 2018). 
lion (2014/2015) on a permanent basis.22 The threat of 
insolvency therefore became the central challenge for 
the further consolidation of power of the new politi-
cal leadership.23 From then on, Cairo saw migration 
policy primarily as a bargaining chip in the negotia-
tions on international financial assistance. 
Strategies and political action 
On the surface, the migration policy pursued by Egypt 
after 2013 appears arbitrary, uncoordinated, and ill-
considered, but the course of action was by no means 
haphazard. Rather, it was oriented towards the inter-
ests of the Sisi administration outlined above, which 
changed between 2013 and 2017. Although, at the 
beginning, repression against refugees and migrants 
was in the foreground, later on the new rulers saw 
the topic of migration increasingly from a foreign 
policy and economic point of view. Accordingly, the 
establishment and development of an institutional 
migration policy framework was not accompanied by 
concrete measures against irregular migration. These 
would have led, in particular, to better control of 
the Egyptian maritime border. Rather, such measures 
were the subject of negotiations on financial assis-
tance that the Egyptian government conducted with 
European states and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in summer 2016. 
Dealing with Syrian refugees 
Immediately after the military coup in 2013, the new 
leadership in Cairo made an abrupt turn in its policy 
towards Syrian refugees.24 The military-led govern-
ment underlined Egypt’s continuing willingness to 
 
22 In particular, the change of government in Saudi Arabia 
at the beginning of 2015 caused a stir in Cairo. The foreign 
policy course of the new Saudi king, Salman, was considered 
uncertain and fears of a cessation of Saudi financial aid rose 
accordingly. See Stephan Roll, Egypt’s Foreign Policy after the 
Coup. Change in Strategy to Secure Power, SWP Study 16/2016 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2016), 12 
and 16. 
23 Ibid., 11. 
24 Maggie Fick, “Egyptian Welcome Mat Pulled out from 
under Syrian Refugees”, Reuters, 12 September 2013, http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-egypt-refugees/ 
egyptian-welcome-mat-pulled-out-from-under-syrian-
refugees-idUSBRE98B0OE20130912 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
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help at international forums.25 Syrian refugees are 
on an equal footing with Egyptians, especially with 
regard to education and medical care. According to 
the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, they would continue 
to receive visas, so they would not have to fear fun-
damental changes under the new administration. 
In practice, however, the visa policy towards 
Syrians has been drastically tightened. The procedure 
established under President Mursi, whereby Syrian 
refugees could enter the country on tourist visas 
issued at the border, was abolished. Instead, Syrians 
had to apply for visas at the Egyptian embassy in 
Damascus and undergo a security check – a pro-
cedure that almost brought the influx of refugees 
from Syria to a standstill.26 
Above all, however, security forces took massive 
action against the Syrian refugees already living in 
Egypt, but also against Palestinian refugees coming 
from Syria. Under the pretext of the fight against 
terrorism, hundreds of them were imprisoned,27 and 
some, especially Palestinians, were even deported to 
Damascus against their will. The police repression 
was accompanied by inflammatory propaganda. Media 
outlets close to the government portrayed Syrian refu-
gees as the “fifth column” of the Muslim Brother-
hood, which had to be fought.28 
It was not until spring 2014 that the Egyptian 
authorities tempered their hard course again. Family 
reunification, for example, has become much easier. 
Nevertheless, the repression had a noticeable effect. 
Since July 2013, the number of new registrations with 
the UNHCR has fallen significantly, and from summer 
2014 onwards, there has been a decline not only in 
new registrations but also in the number of registered 
 
25 3RP, “Government of Egypt, United Nations and Part-
ners Launch Major Aid Plan for Syrian Refugees in Egypt and 
Host Community”, in 3RP – Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 
2018–2019, 17 February 2015, http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/ 
news/government-egypt-united-nations-partners-launch-
major-aid-plan-syrian-refugees-egypt-host-community/ 
(accessed 1 April 2018). 
26 De Bel-Air, Migration Profile: Egypt (see note 3); Andreas 
Gorzewski, “Driven Out of Egypt”, Qantara.de, 24 October 
2013, https://en.qantara.de/node/1712 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
27 Amnesty International, Egypt: End Deplorable Detention and 
Deportation of Refugees from Syria, 17 October 2013, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/egypt-end-
deplorable-detention-and-deportation-refugees-syria/ (ac-
cessed 1 April 2018). 
28 Fritzsche, “Egypt’s Others” (see note 20). 
persons.29 The number of refugees fell from 138,212 
in January 2015 to 116,013 in January 2017,30 with 
Syrian refugees apparently increasingly trying to 
leave the country irregularly by sea. The expansion 
of trafficking networks and related “infrastructure” 
facilitated irregular migration also for members of 
other migrant groups, especially those with African 
origins. Although they were not subjected to system-
atic, politically motivated attacks like the Syrian 
refugees after the military coup, racially motivated 
harassment and mistreatment as well as inadequate 
protection by Egyptian security forces were also 
reported in their communities. Above all, however, 
their already difficult economic and social situations 
have deteriorated steadily since 2011.31 
Redesigning the legal and 
institutional framework 
From spring 2014 onwards, the government has put 
the issue of labour migration of Egyptians on the 
political agenda. Even before his election to the presi-
dency, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi stated: “There are over 9 
million Egyptians living abroad. They all were edu-
cated in Egypt’s schools and universities and lived 
on Egyptian soil. Did any of them think to give one 
month’s salary for the poor in Egypt?”32 After taking 
office, Sisi tried to siphon off this “source of financ-
ing” through concrete measures for the state budget. 
These efforts were reflected not only in the introduc-
 
29 It can hardly be proven that this trend can be attributed 
exclusively to the political changes in Egypt. However, other 
analyses also conclude from the temporal correlation of both 
developments that there is at least one connection here. See 
e.g. Maysa Ayoub and Shaden Khallaf, Syrian Refugees in Egypt: 
Challenges of a Politically Changing Environment, Cairo Studies on 
Migration and Refugees, Paper 7 (The American University in 
Cairo, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, 2014), 10, 
http://schools.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/Documents/Final_ 
Syrian%20refugees.pdf (accessed 1 April 2018). 
30 See Zohry and Hassan, “Human Mobility” (see note 6), 
185, and Table 2, 65. 
31 See on Sudanese migrants, Tom Rollins, “Ten Years 
of Waiting: Sudanese Refugees Stuck in Egypt”, Middle East 
Eye, 12 August 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ 
everyone-was-just-watching-420605811 (accessed 1 April 
2018). 
32 Mohamed El Dahshan, “Does General Sisi Have a Plan 
for Egypt’s Economy?”, Foreign Policy, 18 April 2014, http:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/18/does-general-sisi-have-a-plan-
for-egypts-economy/ (accessed 1 April 2018). 
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tion of a new tax for foreign residents,33 but above all 
in the creation of a state ministry for “Emigration and 
Egyptian Expatriates Affairs”.34 
However, the new “Emigration Ministry” was not 
given any responsibility for the issue of irregular 
migration. To enhance the capacity to act in this area, 
but above all to demonstrate to international donors 
that the state is capable of acting, the government set 
up the National Coordinating Committee for Combat-
ing and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM) in 
March 2014. It is composed of representatives of seven 
ministries and reports directly to the prime minister.35 
The declared task of this inter-ministerial body – 
organisationally assigned to the Foreign Ministry – 
was to draft a national strategy and a legal framework 
to combat irregular migration. In reality, however, 
the main objective was to create an institutional con-
tact point for foreign development aid organisations 
and enable Egypt to take a regional lead in interna-
tional negotiations related to the migration issue.36 
Career diplomat Naima Gabr was appointed head 
of the NCCPIM. Gabr had already headed an inter-
ministerial body set up in 2007 to combat and pre-
vent human trafficking. This was later merged with 
the new NCCPIM. Through her former assignments, 
she had the relevant experience, both with the neces-
sary coordination processes within the administration 
and in conducting negotiations with international 
organisations or foreign embassies.37 
 
33 These include income earned by Egyptians living abroad 
that was not previously taxed. “Sisi Introduces Taxes on Rev-
enue Earned Abroad”, Mada, 2 July 2014, https://www. 
madamasr.com/en/2014/07/02/news/u/sisi-introduces-taxes-
on-revenue-earned-abroad/ (accessed 1 April 2018). 
34 Until then, responsibility for the interests of Egyptian 
guest workers had been with a Minister of State, who in turn 
was subordinate to the Ministry of Labour and Emigration. 
See Ayman Zhory, Migration and Development in Egypt (online: 
Berlin, 2007), http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Zohry_ 
Migration_Development_Egypt.pdf (accessed 1 April 2018). 
In many reports, the Arabic name of the “Ministry of Emi-
gration and Egyptians Affairs Abroad” is erroneously trans-
lated as “Ministry of Immigration”. 
35 See http://nccpimandtip.gov.eg/about-nccpim/ (accessed 
1 April 2018). 
36 See “Nationale Strategie zur Bekämpfung und Verhin-
derung illegaler Migration” (Arab.), on file with the author. 
37 Among other functions, Gabr was the personal assistant 
to Susanne Mubarak, the wife of the president, in the 1990s, 
and in this respect was closely associated with the then 
power centre. 
Legislative procedures 
have been protracted. 
In fact, the NCCPIM drafted a new law to combat 
illegal migration that was submitted to the govern-
ment and ratified by the Egyptian parliament in 
October 2016.38 The law makes smuggling of human 
beings a punishable offence, illustrating that legal 
progress is being made. However, the text of the law 
does not provide for any rules on the status of refu-
gees in Egypt. Therefore, an asylum system was not 
established. Moreover, the government’s assertion 
that refugees are “decriminalised” and that only 
smuggling is punishable is not correct. Even with the 
law, crossing the Egyptian border without permission 
remains a criminal offence. In the absence of an asy-
lum system, therefore, refugees are at the mercy of 
the police, as long as they are not granted status by 
the UNHCR – a process that can take months – 
provided they reach a UNHCR office.39 
Above all, however, the legislative process took a 
disproportionate two and a half years. Drafting and 
ratification were delayed, indicating that the Sisi ad-
ministration was in no hurry to combat trafficking. 
Rather, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the 
increase in smuggling activities, and thus the increase 
in irregular migration to Europe, has been deliberate-
ly approved – or at least that the state authorities 
have made no effort to prevent it.40 The security appa-
ratus has done as little to combat tugs as it has to 
combat trade in boats.41 On the contrary, there have 
been repeated indications that Egyptian security 
 
38 Law no. 82/2016, “Law on Combating Illegal Migration 
& Smuggling of Migrants”, http://nccpimandtip.gov.eg/the-
legislation/ (accessed 1 April 2018). 
39 See as detailed criticism of the law: Human Rights 
Watch, “Egypt: Immigration Law Lacks Key Protections”, 15 
December 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/15/egypt-
immigration-law-lacks-key-protections (accessed 1 April 2018). 
40 For 2015, see Mohamed Abdel Salam, “Egypt’s Respon-
sibility in the Mediterranean Refugee Crisis”, Atlantic Council, 
1 May 2015, 3, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ 
menasource/egypt-s-responsibility-in-the-mediterranean-
refugee-crisis (accessed 1 April 2018). 
41 Wooden boats for the Libya route were also reportedly 
imported from Egypt. See EUNAVOR MED – Operation SOPHIA, 
Six Monthly Report: June, 22nd to December, 31st 2015, 7, https:// 
wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf 
(accessed 1 April 2018). 
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forces are also involved in the human-trafficking 
business.42 
Bargaining about financial assistance 
The lack of action by the security forces against 
human trafficking and the lack of control of the 
Egyptian maritime border with the Mediterranean 
have caused the number of those who set out irregu-
larly from Egypt to Europe to increase since 2014 
(Table 2, p. 65). Although Egyptian security forces 
have repeatedly picked up refugees and migrants in 
the coastal region in a media-effective manner.43 
However, in spring and summer 2016, in particular, 
a significant increase was observed in Italy. The Euro-
pean Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) was 
correspondingly alarmed, according to a report: 
“From 1 January to 14 August 2015, a total of 6,021 
migrants were apprehended while trying to reach 
Italy from Egypt. During the same period in 2016, 
this number increased by ~96% to 11,801, confirming 
Egypt as the main alternative route to Italy.”44 There 
was also an increase in the number of Egyptians, 
especially unaccompanied minors, trying to reach 
Europe via the Mediterranean. 
The passiveness of the security forces also re-
mained unchanged when refugee ships apparently 
sailing from the Egyptian Mediterranean coast sank. 
Hundreds of refugees and migrants drowned in these 
tragedies, especially from Egypt, Syria, and sub-Sahar-
an Africa.45 It was by no means the lack of technical 
 
42 See e.g. Patrick Kingsley, “Trading in Souls: Inside the 
World of the People Smugglers”, The Guardian, 7 January 
2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/-sp-
trading-souls-inside-world-people-smugglers (accessed 1 April 
2018). 
43 In 2014, the UNHCR Egypt registered 3,025 refugees and 
migrants who were picked up by the Egyptian coastguard. 
See IOM, Migration Trends across the Mediterranean (see note 10), 
89. In 2015, according to UNHCR figures, around 3,652 per-
sons were recorded; between January and September 2016, 
the number rose to 4,600. See UNHCR, Migrant and Refugee 
Boat Tragedy and Irregular Departures from Egypt, 23 September 
2016, http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2016/9/57e4ee964/ 
migrant-refugee-boat-tragedy-irregular-departures-egypt.html 
(accessed 1 April 2018). 
44 Frontex, Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report 
2016 (Warsaw, April 2017), 22, http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/AFIC/AFIC_2016.pdf 
(accessed 1 April 2018). 
45 One known example is an accident off Malta in Sep-
tember 2014, during which a ship coming from the Egyptian 
requirements that explained the absence of govern-
ment action, both in terms of preventing irregular 
migration and in terms of rescue measures.46 
Instead, a political decision was needed but not 
made before September 2016. Almost overnight, 
security forces hermetically sealed off the Egyptian 
Mediterranean coast. An irregular departure from 
the country by sea became practically impossible, the 
route to Europe closed: Between October 2016 and 
December 2017, apparently fewer than 100 migrants 
arrived in Italy who had debarked from Egypt. This 
abrupt change in migration policy by the Sisi admin-
istration came as no surprise. It was preceded by a 
complex process of negotiations on international 
financial aid, during which the Egyptian government 
seemed to be extremely clever in using the closure of 
the maritime border as a bargaining chip, knowing 
how to take advantage of Europeans’ fears of relocat-
ing the central Mediterranean route to Egypt. 
Behind closed doors, Egyptian officials openly 
threatened their European counterparts by announc-
ing a flood of refugees in 2016 if European countries 
did not cooperate and provide Egypt with financial 
support.47 At least in one case, the migration issue 
was used publicly as a political lever: When Italy 
announced in July 2016 that it would not deliver 
military equipment ordered by Egypt out of anger 
over the delayed investigation of the murder of an 
Italian scientist in Cairo, the Egyptian Foreign Minis-
try discussed on its Facebook page the possibility of 
terminating cooperation in the area of irregular 
 
coastal town of Damietta was deliberately sunk by tugboats. 
Around 500 people were killed. See “Malta Boat Sinking 
‘Leaves 500 Dead’ – IOM”, BBC News, 15 September 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29210989. Another 
accident occurred off the coast of the island of Crete in June 
2016. The ship, also from Egypt, may have had over 700 
people on board, of whom only 340 could be rescued. See 
Stephanie Nebehay, “Death Toll of Migrants in Wreck 
Off Crete Climbs to 320”, Reuters, 7 June 2016, https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-greece-iom/death-toll-
of-migrants-in-wreck-off-crete-climbs-to-320-iom-idUSKCN0Y 
T1IU (both accessed 1 April 2018). 
46 The sinking of a refugee ship off the Egyptian coast in 
February 2016 was particularly dramatic, killing more than 
500 people – 195 Somalis, 150 Ethiopians, 80 Egyptians, 
and 85 Sudanese and Syrians. Stephen Grey and Amina 
Ismail, “The Forgotten Shipwreck”, Reuters, 6 December 2006, 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/migration/ 
#story/60 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
47 Talks with European diplomats, Berlin, 2016 and 2017. 
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migration.48 For Italy – the only European country to 
have had a readmission agreement with Egypt since 
2007 – this was a serious threat that ultimately con-
tributed to the gradual normalisation of relations 
between the two countries.49 
Moreover, the Egyptian side made it clear time and 
again that it had little interest in concrete, practical 
measures that, for example, would help to strengthen 
migration management. To the astonishment of Euro-
pean diplomats, the country repeatedly opposed proj-
ects within the framework of the EU Emergency Trust 
Fund (EUTF).50 Only offers to support the Egyptian 
side’s own security sector were of fundamental inter-
est. However, in that field, cooperation with individ-
ual European countries was preferred to cooperation 
with European agencies.51 Cooperation with Frontex, 
for example, was much more difficult than expected 
from the European side.52 A working agreement to 
seal Egypt’s participation in the Seahorse Mediterra-
nean Network, which was created to ease communi-
 
48  See https://www.facebook.com/MFAEgypt/posts/ 
1110118635 726748 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
49 However, the most important factor for the improve-
ment of Italian-Egyptian relations is likely to be economic 
cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the 
energy sector. 
50 After several delays by the Egyptian side, the EU was 
able to agree with the Sisi administration at the beginning 
of 2017 on seven projects under the EUTF with a funding 
volume of €60 million. However, negotiations on the imple-
mentation of these projects are ongoing and appear to be 
difficult (as of the end of 2017). Project description: “Action 
Fiche of the EU Emergency Trust Fund, Egypt 2017”, https:// 
ec.euro-pa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/action_ 
document_egypt_action_fiche_20170523_en_4.pdf. On the 
course of the negotiations: Paolo Cuttitta, “Egypt: Europe’s 
Other North African Border”, Statewatch Viewpoint, 2017, 10, 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-313-egypt-viewpoint. 
pdf (both accessed 1 April 2018), and diplomatic correspond-
ence available to the author. 
51 Cooperation was agreed with Germany on 11 July 2016 
within the framework of a security agreement. The agree-
ment on the “Bilateral Dialogue on Migration” between Ger-
many and Egypt, which was signed on 27 August 2017, also 
provides for cooperation between the security authorities 
of both countries. See Markus Bickel, “The Cairo Cronyism”, 
taz.de, 8 January 2018, http://www.taz.de/!5471852/ (accessed 
1 April 2018). However, this cannot be verified because the 
Federal Government declares the agreement to be classified. 
52 Christian Jacob and Simone Schlindwein, Diktatoren als 
Türsteher Europas (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2017), 181. 
cation between national border guard services, did 
not come about until the end of 2017. 
Rather, as mentioned in a non-paper of the Euro-
pean External Action Service, the Egyptian side had 
“clear expectations that the EU should provide more 
substantial financial support” in the context of migra-
tion policy cooperation in order to overcome the 
country’s serious economic challenges.53 The Sisi 
administration had followed closely the conclusion of 
the EU-Turkey agreement and was encouraged by all 
the publicly made considerations of European politi-
cians to transfer this model to Egypt.54 
The unproven but often repeated claim by Egyp-
tian officials that the country was hosting 5 million 
refugees underlined that, from an Egyptian point of 
view, the financial sum of the EU-Turkey agreement 
could only represent the lower limit for aid pay-
ments.55 Such substantial support had been under 
negotiation with the IMF since July 2016. Even though 
these discussions were not officially linked to the 
issue of migration, statements by top European poli-
ticians, such as then-president of the European Par-
liament, Martin Schulz, made it clear that both were 
directly related.56 
European governments played a very decisive role 
in these negotiations. On the one hand, they have an 
important voice on the IMF’s Board of Directors, and 
 
53 See “Options on Developing Cooperation with Egypt 
in Migration Matters” (European External Action Service 
[EEAS]), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-com-
eeas-non-paper-egypt-migration-cooperation.pdf (accessed 
1 April 2018). 
54 Chancellor Angela Merkel described the agreement with 
Turkey before the German Bundestag as “a model” for Egypt 
as well. Speech by Chancellor Merkel in the German Bundes-
tag, 7 September 2016, https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ 
Content/DE/Rede/2016/09/2016-09-07-merkel-bundestag.html. 
The Austrian Federal Chancellor at the time, Christian Kern, 
made similar statements. “Can Egypt Secure $7bn in Refugee 
Support”, Daily News Egypt, 21 September 2016, https:// 
dailynewsegypt.com/2016/09/21/550155/ (both accessed 1 April 
2018). 
55 Nicolaj Nielsen, “Egypt Blames EU-Turkey Deal 
for Refugee Spike”, EUobserver, 31 August 2016, https:// 
euobserver.com/migration/134829 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
56 Schulz made it clear that IMF aid to Egypt would be 
out of the question if the country did not cooperate on the 
migration issue. See Nico Fried and Paul-Anton Krüger, “EU 
Fears Mass Flight from Egypt”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 Sep-
tember 2016, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/nach-
bootsunglueck-mit-vielen-toten-eu-befuerchtet-massenflucht-
aus-aegypten-1.3174453 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
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thus have a considerable influence on the Fund’s 
credit decisions. On the other hand, the IMF had 
called for further loans from national donors and 
international organisations as a precondition for 
the granting of a $12 billion loan.57 For the Egyptian 
government, the acquisition of this additional loan 
package, also worth around $12 billion, became a 
central challenge. There were tough negotiations, 
particularly with some major European countries, 
including Germany, about this aid package.58 
Finally, in August 2016 – coinciding with the 
closure of the Egyptian maritime border – an agree-
ment in principle was reached on the details of the 
aid programme, approved by the IMF Board on 11 
November. Germany, France, and the United King-
dom participated in the agreed loan package with 
$550 million.59 The programme is ultimately based 
on a number of macroeconomic conditions. However, 
the lenders have completely abstained from imple-
menting any political conditionality aiming at im-
proving the human rights situation, better govern-
ance, or the withdrawal of the military from the 
country’s politics and economy.60 
Conclusion 
The Egyptian leadership under President Sisi very 
quickly developed an understanding that the most 
populous Mediterranean country is of great im-
portance for the implementation of the migration 
 
57 See Arab Republic of Egypt: Request for Extended Arrangement 
under the Extended Fund Facility, IMF Staff Country Reports 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 18 January 2017), https://www.imf. 
org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/01/18/Arab-Republic-of-
Egypt-Request-for-Extended-Arrangement-Under-the-
Extended-Fund-Facility-44534 (accessed 1 April 2018). 
58 Chancellor Merkel’s foreign policy advisor at the time, 
Christoph Heusgen, travelled to Cairo three times in 2016 
for talks. 
59 Germany increased the amount of committed loans 
to €500 million in spring 2017. See “Egypt Is a ‘Stability 
Leader of the Region’”, Handelsblatt, 2 March 2017, http:// 
www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/merkel-in-kairo-
aegypten-ist-stabilitaetsanker-der-region/19467732.html 
(accessed 1 April 2018). 
60 See also Stephan Roll and Matthias Sailer, Wird der 
IWF-Kredit für Ägypten zur vertanen Chance?, Kurz gesagt (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 16 August 2016), https:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/kurz-gesagt/wird-iwf-kredit-fuer-
aegypten-zur-vertanen-chance/ (accessed 1 April 2018). 
policy plans of the EU countries, but above all for the 
effective closure of migration routes across the Medi-
terranean. In order to benefit from this, it gave up 
its initial course of repression against Syrian refugees 
and demonstrated its own ability regarding migration 
policy action by reorganising the institutional and 
legal framework. At the same time, it left the mari-
time border largely unsecured, so that irregular 
migration from Egypt continued to rise between 2014 
and 2016, albeit at a generally low level. 
This is the background to European support for the 
IMF assistance package. It may be that migration was 
only one of the issues that played a role in the nego-
tiations with the Egyptian side. Europe’s governments 
also see the country as a partner in the fight against 
international terrorism and repeatedly emphasise its 
importance for the resolution of regional conflicts. 
Business interests were, of course, also an important 
driver for European policy. However, since 2016, 
the migration issue has probably been of overriding 
importance, not only because the governments in 
Berlin, Paris, and other European capitals see the 
management of the refugee crisis as a central political 
challenge, but also because – contrary to other issues, 
such as combating terrorism – Egypt can deliver real 
and quick results by closing the maritime border. 
Only after the agreement on 
international financial assistance was 
concluded was irregular migration to 
Europe completely stopped. 
On the surface, the IMF agreement could therefore 
be interpreted as a successful political conditioning of 
European financial assistance. Immediately after the 
agreement came into being with European help, the 
Sisi administration closed the sea border and almost 
completely brought irregular migration to Europe 
emanating from its territory to a standstill within a 
few days. However, the extent of the financial aid – 
without any political conditions for improving the 
human rights or the governance situation in Egypt – 
points in a different direction: The Egyptian leader-
ship under President Sisi conditioned its migration 
policy towards Europe in order to consolidate its own 
power. 
From this point of view, the question arises for 
Germany and its European partners how sustainable 
their own policies towards Egypt really are in terms of 
preventing irregular migration. In the future, the Sisi 
administration could again instrumentalise the migra- 
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Table 2 
Irregular migration to Italy (by sea) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Migrant arrivals (total) 13,267a 42,925b 170,100b 155,842c 181,436c 119,369d 
Egyptian migrant arrivals  1,223  2,728  4,095  2,610  4,230  733e 
of which unaccompanied minors 
(in %) 
 32%  42%  49%  66%  58%  13%  
(Jan–Nov 2017)f 
Migrant arrivals  
(any nationality embarking from Egypt) 
 1,401g  n/a  15,283g  11,114h  12,766 
(until Oc-
toberi – 
after- 
wards 0) 
 79j 
Sources (all URLs accessed 1 April 2018): 
a https://egypt.iom.int/sites/default/files/FactSheet2016Final28MARW.pdf; 
http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/rapporto_ 
accoglienza_eng_isbn_appendice_rev3b.pdf 
b https://publications.iom.int/system/files/altai_migration_trends_accross_the_mediterranean.pdf, 72 
c http://migration.iom.int/docs/2016_Flows_to_Europe_Overview.pdf 
d https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/61549 
e https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205 (until 31 October 2017) 
f https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/61461 
g https://publications.iom.int/system/files/altai_migration_trends_accross_the_mediterranean.pdf, 74 
h https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/53356 
i http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-com-eeas-non-paper-egypt-migration-cooperation.pdf  
j Informed circles referring to official bodies in Italy. 
 
tion issue to enforce its own interests. That it 
is willing to use this lever became clear just a few 
months after signing the IMF agreement. In March 
2017, in response to European criticism of the human 
rights situation in Egypt, the Egyptian government 
temporarily suspended the previously agreed migra-
tion dialogue with the EU. So the Egyptian side could 
soon put the issue of securing the Community’s 
maritime borders back on the agenda in negotiations 
with European governments – at the latest when the 
loans agreed in the IMF agreement are paid out at the 
end of 2019. 
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The growing number of instruments of the external 
migration policies of the European Union (EU) en-
counters a variety of political interests and social 
contexts in the countries examined in this study. Not 
only does the degree and nature of authoritarian rule 
vary strongly, but some of the states are primarily 
countries of origin or transit, whereas others are 
increasingly also countries of immigration: Eritrea, 
for example, “produces” primarily refugees, whereas 
Sudan functions primarily as a transit state and as a 
hub for displaced persons and circular migration in 
the Horn of Africa. Niger is also a transit country or 
starting point for (circular) migration to the Maghreb 
and within the region of the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS). The North African 
states, on the other hand, are changing from classic 
countries of origin of migrants to countries of transit 
and immigration for people from sub-Saharan Africa. 
Accordingly, the importance of flight and migration 
for the local economies, the geographical and social 
peripheries, and the respective political elites varies. 
It comes as no surprise that political decision-
makers in the countries analysed are trying to miti-
gate European pressure and benefit from financial 
incentives. Nor is it remarkable that almost all coun-
tries prefer bilateral cooperation with individual EU 
member states to cooperation with the EU because 
it enables them to place more targeted, informal, 
and often successful demands. Ultimately, the ruling 
elites – and often other social groups in all these 
states – benefit from mixed migration movements 
and the associated development and security policy 
cooperation. A remarkable range of reactions of Afri-
can states can be observed not only to European 
migration policies, but also quite fundamentally to 
the challenge of flight and migration. 
Proactive versus reactive approaches of 
the partner countries 
In order to systematise the way authoritarian regimes 
in Africa deal with migration movements and with 
external EU migration policies, a distinction between 
proactive and reactive approaches is appropriate. In 
one case, governments have their own creative claim 
in migration policy, which is reflected in an active 
and corresponding agenda-setting. In the other case, 
such ambitions are lacking, but the respective govern-
ments are reacting to the EU’s offers of cooperation. 
Some of them make strategic use of the available 
opportunities, others act purely defensively, largely 
refusing cooperation for various reasons, and others 
leave it to the EU to define the parameters of coopera-
tion (see Table 3, p. 69). 
Morocco is an example par excellence for a pro-
active approach. The king pursues development and 
security policy as well as domestic, regional, and geo-
political goals through Morocco’s own distinctive 
migration policy. For example, Rabat uses the funds 
available under European and German migration 
policies to strengthen local administrative capacities. 
With its involvement in multilateral forums, the 
regulation of irregular migration, and the gradual 
creation of legal and institutional structures for immi-
gration and refugee protection, Morocco has earned 
itself an international reputation as an African pio-
neer in the progressive management of mixed migra-
tion movements. In doing so, it deliberately sets itself 
apart from its competitor and neighbour Algeria and 
presents itself as a comparatively reliable and asser-
tive partner in bilateral cooperation with individual 
EU states. Rabat is therefore resolutely using its 
migration policy to consolidate the country’s mod-
ernisation, to gain political prestige in sub-Saharan 
Africa, to strengthen the monarchy’s international 
legitimacy, and to push calls for political transforma-
tion into the background. Last but not least, Morocco 
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uses control of migration to try to forge international 
support for its position in the Western Sahara con-
flict. All in all, Rabat’s migration policy has made 
a major contribution to increasing its negotiating 
power vis-à-vis the EU and reversing long-standing 
power asymmetries. 
Sudan is also pursuing a proactive migration policy 
with its own priorities. Given its role as a hub and 
transit country for refugees from neighbouring coun-
tries, and the fact that it accommodates millions of 
displaced persons in the long term, the available EU 
funds and cooperation opportunities are a welcome 
starting point for circumventing decades of inter-
national economic and financial sanctions. The 
Sudanese government has a particular interest in 
border security, as large parts of the armed opposition 
are in neighbouring countries. There are obvious 
overlaps with the EU agenda, but Khartoum is hoping 
for more, such as equipment and intelligence sup-
port. Further international rehabilitation and com-
prehensive financial assistance are on the govern-
ment’s wish list; in particular the “Better Migration 
Management” programme launched within the 
framework of the EU Emergency Trust Fund has 
raised high expectations. The frustration is therefore 
increasing because, from Khartoum’s point of view, 
the EU does not reward Sudan enough for success-
fully securing its borders and continues to refuse to 
engage in comprehensive development and security 
policy cooperation on account of ongoing human 
rights violations in Sudan. Moreover, the EU is send-
ing ambivalent signals about the priority of security 
and development-oriented migration policies. This 
unclear communication and the large number of 
smaller European projects create confusion and are 
not good prerequisites for sustainable cooperation 
on migration policies. 
The other countries examined in this study are 
more reactive to the EU’s external migration policies. 
Nevertheless, there are relevant differences, especially 
with regards to the ability to successfully assert one’s 
own interests. For example, the Egyptian government 
is closely monitoring the European migration debate 
and making strategic use of Europe’s interest in 
curbing irregular immigration to consolidate power: 
Cairo’s willingness to cooperate in the area of border 
security, for example, is closely linked to the exten-
sion of urgently needed international loans. An im-
portant model for this policy is the often-quoted deal 
on the regulation of migration that the EU has con-
cluded with Turkey. As a result, it is not the European 
states and international financial institutions that de 
facto make their loans and other cooperation depend-
ent on regulatory efforts in the area of migration, but, 
conversely, it is Egypt that conditions its efforts in 
this regard and puts, in particular, European actors 
and its direct neighbours under pressure to act. 
Algeria, which is increasingly becoming a target 
country for refugees and migrants from sub-Saharan 
Africa, has so far done little to shape its political 
response to the associated challenges. The divided 
political elite is dominated by the faction that relies 
on a policy of isolation and expulsion – thereby 
accepting high reputational costs, especially with 
regards to West Africa. However, Algiers is using the 
mixed migration movements and the strong increase 
in the emigration of its own citizens in 2017 to tight-
en its security measures at home and on the borders. 
So far, however, Algiers has hardly profited from the 
funds available in the context of the EU’s external 
migration policies, since the country’s pronounced 
claim to sovereignty, founded in colonial history, is 
expressed in a generally defensive attitude towards 
EU cooperation offers and instruments. However, 
the Algerian government’s security policy interest 
in equipment for border management and in intel-
ligence know-how is weakening its defensive stance 
vis-à-vis individual EU states. Against this back-
ground, cooperation on migration policy with Algeria 
amounts to an expansion of bilateral agreements, a 
strengthening of the security apparatus, and the con-
solidation of existing (authoritarian) structures. 
The migration-related activities of Eritrea – one 
of the most authoritarian states in the world, from 
which many people flee from state repression and 
enforced military service – are limited to the closure 
of borders and a strongly enforced travel ban for all 
citizens. The European discourse on combating the 
causes of flight has found no resonance here, in that 
the causes of flight are inherent in the system and 
are denied by the regime. Although the country is 
in long-term economic decline, and the European co-
operation instruments linked to financial incentives 
could therefore be attractive, the government is de-
fensive about development cooperation with Europe. 
It is not prepared to make any ideological conces-
sions; security policy cooperation projects (e.g. within 
the framework of the “Better Migration Management” 
programme) that would serve Asmara’s interests are 
not acceptable from a European perspective. Against 
this background, the EU lacks starting points to en-
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courage the Eritrean government to pursue an active 
and rights-based approach to migration. 
Finally, Niger is the only country examined in this 
study whose reactive policies show neither creative 
ambition nor defensive reflexes. The informal eco-
nomic structures that have formed in the northern 
border area in response to migration are of great rele-
vance to this transit country characterised by great 
levels of poverty. Preventing migration therefore un-
dermines the economic interests of the country. At 
the same time, the EU’s security and development 
policy cooperation offers promises of financial and 
reputational opportunities that the government in 
Niamey can hardly ignore. This ultimately leads to 
the EU being the one managing Nigerien migration 
policy. Tellingly, migration-relevant bodies in Niger 
are composed of equal numbers of Nigeriens and 
Europeans. In addition, the EU is intervening in the 
social and economic structures of the country, par-
ticularly in the border region with Libya. The con-
sequences for the government as well as for the EU 
are associated with not inconsiderable risks. The 
potential for local conflicts is growing in the course 
of the structural changes associated with the forma-
lisation of migration policy, and the advantages of the 
freedom of movement implemented in the ECOWAS 
region are in danger. The EU’s close cooperation with 
the president also threatens to reinforce occasional 
authoritarian tendencies and to damage the country’s 
power, as criticism from the north of the country con-
cerning the consequences of migration cooperation is 
growing. 
How to explain these differences 
in policies? 
Whether a government pursues a proactive or a re-
active migration policy, whether it has the capacity 
to act strategically, reacts defensively, or is quite help-
lessly exposed to European instruments depends on 
numerous factors. These include state constitution 
(governance capacity, strength of the security appa-
ratus, state penetration, centre-periphery divide, in-
ternal conflicts, economic situation), colonial herit-
age, migration and emigration practices, (sub-)regional 
contexts, and not least the question of whether ex-
perience has already been gained through coopera-
tion with the EU. 
State constitution. The partner country’s own capacity 
to act is decisive in determining whether, and to what 
extent, migration policy cooperation with the EU can 
be achieved, and to what extent a state is in a position 
to use the instruments offered by Europe for its own 
– not necessarily migration policy – interests. Who 
has the monopoly of violence? Is a government able 
to control its borders – if it wants to – with its own 
security apparatus, or does it have to use militias to 
keep actors in conflict-laden border regions at bay? 
What about the gap between the centre and the periph-
ery or the degree of state penetration in order to en-
force measures? The analysis in this study shows that 
there is no direct correlation between the degree of 
authoritarianism and state capacity to act. Eritrea is 
certainly the most repressive and autocratic country 
among the case studies, but its ability to act and nego-
tiate is far more limited and reactive than Sudan, which 
is also repressive. The later outsources border control 
– especially in conflict regions – to militias, which 
makes cooperation more difficult from a European 
perspective. In other border regions, such as Western 
Sahara and the border between Morocco and Algeria, 
conflicts lead to an expansion of state border controls. 
State penetration can be improved through coopera-
tion, as the example of Niger shows, where European 
actors intervene to support border security. With re-
gards to state services in terms of basic care, education, 
and medical care, inhabitants of the periphery often 
have no great expectations anyway; border communi-
ties, in particular, often secure their needs in trade, 
health, and schooling independently and across bor-
ders. 
In the event of internal conflicts and the associated 
security-related interests of states, as is evident in Dar-
fur, cooperation with Europe may serve to legitimise 
one’s own actions through external actors. The Suda-
nese regime, for instance, is trying to normalise rela-
tions with Europe and legitimise its rule internation-
ally through migration cooperation. 
Administrative capacity and ideological orientation 
are also important parameters of state constitution. 
A country such as Niger, whose political infrastruc-
ture is rudimentary and whose statehood is weak, is 
certainly more inclined to accept external support – 
including at the price of interference – than, for 
example, Morocco or Egypt. If there are strong anti-
Western reservations, as in Sudan, or determined 
efforts at self-sufficiency, as in Algeria, such ideologi-
cal factors influence the options for migration co-
operation. In authoritarian states, the will to shape 
 Diversity of Cooperation Contexts as a Challenge for the EU 
 SWP Berlin 
 Profiteers of Migration? 
 July 2018 
 69 
Table 3 
Interests and migration policies of selected authoritarian states in Africa 
State Constitution Migration  
profile 
Interests linked to  
flight and migration 
Migration 
policy 
Morocco authoritarian monarchy 
with relatively high degree 
of pluralism; 
coherent and assertive 
power centre 
country of origin, 
transit, and immi-
gration 
 legal emigration to the EU  
(remittances) 
 international recognition of  
Western Sahara as Moroccan 
 influence in Subsaharan-Africa 
 bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU 
 EU security support 
 financing the development of adminis-
trative capacities 
proactive-
strategic 
Sudan strongly authoritarian;  
power centre protected by 
military, secret service, 
and security forces of the 
secret service;  
continuing civil war in 
two regions on the 
periphery 
country of origin, 
transit, and im-
migration; 
destination of 
circular migration 
from the Horn of 
Africa 
 normalisation of relations with the 
Western international community 
 upgrading of regional position 
 EU support for security and border 
management 
proactive 
Egypt strongly authoritarian;  
power centre linked to the 
military 
country of origin, 
transit, and immi-
gration 
 budget support from EU/member states 
and international organisations 
 legal emigration/labour migration to the EU 
 EU support for the security sector 
 recognition as leading nation in Middle 
East/Africa 
reactive-
strategic 
Algeria authoritarian with certain 
degree of pluralism;  
strong security apparatus;  
divided power centre;  
little political coherence 
country of origin, 
transit, and immi-
gration; 
destination of cir-
cular migration 
from the Sahel 
states 
 reduction of mixed migration flows 
 demonstration (internal and external) of 
national sovereignty and capacity for bor-
der control and safeguarding internal secu-
rity 
 legal emigration to the EU 
 transfer of security equipment and know-
how 
reactive-
defensive 
Eritrea extremely authoritarian;  
repressive dictatorial rule 
with disguise of military, 
party, and economy 
country of origin  foreign exchange 
 EU budget support 
reactive-
defensive 
Niger semi-authoritarian power 
centre with weak adminis-
trative structures 
especially transit 
country and in-
tensive circular 
migration 
(ECOWAS states 
and Maghreb) 
 officially: “converging interests with EU” 
 border security and control to ward off 
attacks and conflicts from neighbouring 
regions 
 development with EU financial support 
 securing power through international 
cooperation 
reactive 
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migration policy often also depends on the person 
of the state leader. This leads, on the one hand, 
to a personalised policy that the EU must take into 
account in its offers of cooperation; on the other 
hand, it limits the ability of civil society to review 
or criticise political decisions. At the same time, it is 
precisely civil society actors, political parties, and 
business representatives who play an important role 
in the implementation or blocking of migration 
cooperations or mediating existing migration real-
ities. In view of the restricted freedoms of the press, 
information about these realities would otherwise 
hardly be able to leak out to the outside world. 
Last but not least, the economic situation of a 
country is essential for the cooperation arrangements. 
Liquidity constraints or a low level of development 
and high poverty rates can increase the willingness to 
cooperate with European actors, as paradigmatically 
demonstrated in the case of Egypt and Niger in this 
study. However, it is precisely the variance in the 
respective attitudes to cooperation that points to the 
importance of the interplay of economic, political, 
social, and ideological factors in explaining proactive 
and reactive, formative and defensive migration poli-
cies. Especially since two similarly poor countries 
react completely differently to European offers of 
migration policy cooperation: Whereas the Nigerien 
government is primarily hoping for urgently needed 
financial resources to improve the ailing economy – 
accepting the harmful effects on the informal econo-
my in the north – Eritrea regards such aid as a repu-
tational risk for its own ideal of self-sufficiency. 
Colonial heritage. Arbitrary historical demarcations 
by the European occupying powers across the entire 
African continent play a role for current migration 
policies and countries’ willingness to cooperate that 
should not be underestimated. However, the differ-
ences in the effects on today’s cooperation attitudes 
are great. This is related to the different French and 
British colonial models as well as to the respective 
form of decolonisation. 
In countries such as Algeria, Eritrea, and Sudan, 
where weapons were used to rebel against colonial 
rule and to create a national identity-building, anti-
colonial consensus, there is a sceptical distance to 
European politics. During the Cold War, patronage-
based alimony – and later dependence on develop-
ment cooperation and aid deliveries – limited the 
claims to sovereignty of individual states in their rela-
tions with Europe, particularly in the case of sub-
Saharan African countries. In today’s multipolar 
world, the need to orientate oneself towards Euro-
pean interests has weakened massively. This is reflected 
in the proactive, sometimes strategic policies of some 
countries towards European migration interests. The 
African governments, which emerged from an armed 
anti-colonial struggle, see themselves as sovereign 
decision-makers with their own creative powers and 
not as “stooges” of European interests – even if 
migrants from the respective populations often seek 
refuge in the former colonial powers. 
Paradoxically, it is precisely the ambivalent but 
shared colonial history that promotes a tendency 
towards bilateralism between formerly colonised 
states and their colonisers, which often undermines 
common approaches to European migration policies. 
This is particularly evident in Morocco’s relations 
with France and Spain. Moreover, the Western Sahara 
conflict, which plays a problematic role in European-
Moroccan (migration) cooperation, is a colonial legacy 
here. In addition, the border demarcations formerly 
imposed by the colonial powers, which the Organisa-
tion of African Unity decided to maintain one year 
after its foundation, often do not adequately reflect 
social realities. The need for mobility and cross-border 
cooperation therefore remains an important issue 
for the continent. Free movement of persons within 
Africa – as made possible by ECOWAS for example, 
from which a poor state such as Niger benefit greatly 
– is of central importance for African populations 
and governments. 
Migration and emigration practices. The ways in which 
individual countries deal with migration and emigra-
tion are also decisive for the willingness and necessity 
for cooperation. For the Maghreb states – and in-
creasingly also for Egypt – emigration of their own 
citizens to the EU presents itself both as an essential 
building block of the national economy and as a bar-
gaining chip with the European Union. Therefore, the 
Mediterranean countries negotiate with Europe much 
more intensively about legal migration routes and the 
status of emigrants in Europe than Niger or Sudan, 
for example. 
For Niger, circular regional migration is at the 
centre of attention; for Sudan, the focus is on the 
large number of refugees from conflict areas in neigh-
bouring countries – but both are hardly taken into 
account in the EU’s instruments. For all countries 
examined in this study, circular migration and emi-
gration have existed for decades due to economic 
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necessity. Nevertheless, there are clear regional differ-
ences, and these have an impact on the willingness to 
cooperate with Europe: In the Horn of Africa, labour 
migration to the Gulf States plays a far greater role 
than migration to Europe – unlike in the Maghreb 
states, where emigration mainly to France and Spain 
takes place due to the specifics of late decolonisation 
and geographic proximity. The amount of remittances 
and the regions to which they flow can be used to 
illustrate the significance of migration for the respec-
tive domestic economy and politics. 
(Sub-)regional contexts. Regional and sub-regional con-
texts and complexes are central to migration pro-
cesses – and thus also to European cooperation in-
struments. They constitute important framework 
conditions for cooperation and often define the pos-
sibilities for cooperation. These include situations of 
competition for regional supremacy, such as between 
Morocco and Algeria or between Egypt and Sudan. 
Conflicts such as civil wars (Sudan, South Sudan) or 
armed conflicts with jihadists (Somalia), which deter-
mine regional dynamics, especially in the Horn of 
Africa, are responsible for the high number of dis-
placed persons and refugees within the region. How-
ever, the country where there is no violent conflict 
(Eritrea) provides the largest number of migrants 
to Europe. Due to this constellation, the migration 
dynamics in the Horn of Africa can best be under-
stood as a migration complex. 
However, these regional dynamics also have posi-
tive aspects. Both in Niger and on the Horn of Africa 
and between the Sahel and the Maghreb, there are 
many years of experience with circular migration and 
flight movements. This is reflected in the negotiating 
traditions of pastoralists whose pastures extend across 
national borders, but also in the reception of people 
fleeing war, poverty, and hunger. Regional organisa-
tions such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) are taking up these 
long-standing practices of cooperation, which are 
thwarted by European instruments when it comes to 
strengthening border regimes. However, the profound 
knowledge bundled and available in the region and 
in the individual states is hardly used in Europe’s 
current migration cooperation with these states. 
Experiences in cooperation with the EU. Previous experi-
ences in dealing with European actors is a decisive 
element for migration cooperation. It is not so much 
the volume as the nature and history of the coopera-
tion that is important. For example, most of the funds 
that the EU makes available in the form of humani-
tarian aid and financial support for the various United 
Nations missions flow into the conflict areas in Sudan 
– however, development cooperation between Germa-
ny and Sudan ceased after President Oman al-Bashir’s 
coup against the National Islamic Front in 1989. 
Egypt and the Maghreb, on the other hand, as Medi-
terranean countries, have been in close contact with 
the EU for several decades within frameworks such 
as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and later the 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for 
the Mediterranean. 
The degree of familiarity with processes and people 
on the other side influences the form and intensity of 
communications between the EU and migration policy 
partners. For example, Morocco and Egypt, which 
have been cooperating closely with Europe for decades, 
see the EU as being more transparent than Niger or 
Sudan: The Maghreb states and Egypt have a much 
more profound knowledge of the EU apparatus and 
decision-making processes within the union. This is 
reflected not least in the fact that they successfully 
use the issue of flight and migration to strengthen 
their own negotiating powers vis-à-vis the EU and 
individual EU member states. The cooperation new-
comer Niger, on the other hand, is more reactive. 
Conversely, the EU also lacks knowledge of adminis-
trative structures, cross-sector planning, and relevant 
contacts in countries such as Eritrea and Niger. 
Recommendations for European policy 
The same applies to migration as to other policy 
areas: Successful cooperation between the EU and 
its member states and African states requires a com-
prehensive understanding of the interests that differ 
from country to country. Incentives are not universal, 
but vary according to the political and economic 
priorities of the respective elites and decision-makers. 
Authoritarian states also react very differently to 
pressure. 
For governments pursuing their own migration 
agenda (and categorised as “proactive” in the context 
of this study), it is often not primarily a matter of 
direct financial contributions but of strategic inter-
ests, such as the pursuit of regional supremacy, the 
economic significance of the diaspora, the lifting of 
sanctions or the normalisation of relations and inter-
national recognition. If countries have not yet devel-
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oped a conscious approach to the phenomena of 
flight and migration (categorised as “reactive” in this 
study), it is worthwhile to find out why this is the 
case. Only in this way can the opportunity be seized 
to influence the development of future migration 
policy approaches or, in the case of weak states, to 
prevent the cornucopia of European programmes and 
projects from exacerbating internal social and eco-
nomic imbalances or triggering conflicts. Beyond the 
strategic European considerations of how migration 
can be regulated, it is important to consider which 
broader social dynamics migration policy interven-
tions can set in motion and which instruments are 
appropriate in the long term from a development 
policy perspective. Particularly with regards to co-
operation with authoritarian regimes, the question 
arises as to whether existing repressive structures 
might be promoted as a result of migration coopera-
tion. 
In general, the following specific points must be 
taken into account in migration policy cooperation 
with African countries of origin and transit: 
∎ Migration flows – circular, within the region, as 
well as to Europe – are best understood as trans-
national migration complexes. West Africa, for 
example, connects Niger, Mali, and the western 
Maghreb states to form a north-west African migra-
tion complex, while the Horn of Africa is located 
in a migration complex with the Gulf States and 
Libya. If European instruments build upon evolv-
ing regional dynamics rather than trying to coun-
ter them, the prospects of success are larger. 
∎ Regional freedom of movement promotes the eco-
nomic development of African states. It is counter-
productive to jeopardise the progress made to date 
in this area through a focus on restrictive border 
management. Rather, it is necessary to explore 
how intra-African circular migration and free eco-
nomic areas can be preserved despite intensified 
border management. 
∎ In authoritarian contexts, in particular, there is 
a danger that funds and equipment intended to 
build up migratory capacities are being misappro-
priated. When allocating funds, it is of central 
importance to take a close look at the administra-
tive structures on the recipient’s side. A coherent 
overall strategy with clear sub-goals can be more 
promising than a confusing variety of small indi-
vidual projects. 
∎ Remittances of migrants are an important eco-
nomic factor in many countries of origin. Their 
importance lies not only in their overall volume, 
but also in the fact that they provide long-term 
social security for many families – and allow 
more planning security than development policy 
project funds. Against this background, interna-
tional migration routes for partner countries are 
often more important than selective financial 
contributions. 
∎ European efforts to repatriate irregular migrants 
are also so delicate because they threaten to under-
mine the economic system of remittances. Euro-
pean negotiations for readmission agreements are 
therefore generally particularly difficult when the 
majority of remittances come from Europe. There 
is more room for negotiation with countries whose 
emigrants work primarily in the Gulf States. 
∎ If the EU attaches importance to concrete progress 
in migration cooperation, it should refrain from 
the demand for the readmission of third-country 
nationals, which is particularly problematic for 
many partner countries in terms of internal poli-
cies, and instead support partner countries in 
building up capacities to integrate migrants and 
protect refugees. It should also be borne in mind 
that racism towards refugees from sub-Saharan 
Africa in North Africa is a major problem, and 
that North African governments justify xenophobic 
attitudes not least by referring to European policies 
and discourse. 
∎ The case studies also show that European instru-
ments for “migration management” work best 
where there are no fundamental differences in 
expectations between cooperation partners. It is 
therefore in the interests of European actors to 
send out clear signals, avoid misunderstandings 
about the respective European priorities (develop-
ment, security, or both?), and to draw up realistic 
timelines. 
∎ Prudence in communication is particularly neces-
sary when partner countries negotiate in parallel 
with the European Commission and with individu-
al EU member states. Although there are diverging 
preferences and a tendency towards bilateralism 
within Europe, it is in the interests of European 
actors to speak with one voice: If the EU and its 
member states are played against each other, there 
is a risk of shifting the negotiating power in favour 
of the potential partners. 
∎ Several of the case studies suggest that individual 
cooperation instruments such as the EU-Turkey 
agreement are having a significant impact. This 
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gives rise to expectations that must be taken into 
account in the communication and planning of 
migration policy cooperation with other partner 
countries. 
∎ With its migration agenda, the European policy 
approach has de facto abandoned its post-2011 
transformation agenda vis-à-vis its immediate neigh-
bours. If the EU wants to increase the confidence of 
its authoritarian cooperation partners in Europe’s 
external migration policies as well as its general 
credibility, it is appropriate to communicate this 
clearly. Instead of using transformation rhetoric, 
European decision-makers should define clear red 
lines in the area of human rights and consistently 
observe these in concrete cooperation efforts. 
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Abbreviations 
AU African Union 
BMM Better Migration Management 
CAMM Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility 
Destatis German Federal Statistical Office 
DG 
DEVCO 
Directorate-General for International 
Cooperation and Development 
DG HOME Directorate-General for Migration and Home 
Affairs 
DG NEAR Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and 
Enlargement 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EU European Union 
EUTF EU Emergency Trust Fund 
Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
GAM Global Approach to Migration 
GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
ICC International Criminal Court 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IOM International Organization for Migration 
NCCPIM National Coordinating Committee for Com-
bating and Preventing Illegal Migration (Egypt) 
UN United Nations 
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs 
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees 
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